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                                                                       ABSTRACT 
This study is about the coverage of religious conflict in Nigerian newspapers. Although it was 
not originally intended to compare the coverage of the conflicts between papers in the 
North and those in the South of Nigeria, the perceived differential situations of the media in 
the two regions necessitated such a comparison. It is a qualitative research project 
consisting of three studies: First, there was a comparative critical examination, through 
critical discourse analysis, of the reports by two newspapers, THISDAY and Daily Trust, 
during the November 2008 religious violence in Jos, a central Nigerian city. Second, by 
means of interpretative phenomenological analysis interview data obtained through the 
semi-structured technique from Nigeria were critically analysed. Third, also applying 
interpretative phenomenological analysis data obtained by means of focus group 
interviewing from Nigeria were critically analysed. The results in all three cases suggest the 
newspapers are regionally, ethnically and religiously inclined; they are particularly affected 
by factors like ownership, location, staffing and audience perception, which determine how 
they tailor reports; the newspapers are not usually the cause of religious crises but they 
stoke the problem through biased and sometimes inflammatory reports; and, although, 
they are very vibrant factors like Nigeria’s economic recession, political culture – arguably 
comprising of violence, corruption and tribalism – and new media/technology and so on, 
contribute towards making their role in the conflicts one of amplification rather than 
mitigation. The thesis also suggests the application of Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis 
using the media as a conduit towards de-emphasising dissimilarities, while emphasising 
similarities to reduce tension and prevent conflict.  
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                            CHAPTER ONE                                                                
                                                                Introduction   
1.     INTRODUCTION 
The drive for doing this thesis came shortly after the sectarian violence of September 7, 
2001 in the central Nigerian city of Jos. This researcher had been working as a journalist with 
Daily/Weekly Trust newspapers and was visiting home (Jos) for the weekend of 7-8 
September. During the violence the researcher observed with utmost shock as people that 
had lived for several decades as brothers and sisters irrespective of tribe and religion 
ferociously attacked each other. In one gory case a young Christian woman was cornered 
and savagely attacked by a group of young Muslim men. The researcher realised there was 
an urgent need to intervene and save the woman’s life in spite of the clear risk. Although he 
successfully prevented the killing of the woman the mob, angered by his intervention, 
turned their weapons on him and his life was only spared after a man who had watched 
from the distance raced to the scene begging the youths not to take the researcher’s life. 
The man, who turned out to be the researcher’s cousin, was a popular sportsman and well 
respected in the community and that, perhaps, was the quality that appealed to the 
reasoning of the mob.  
Subsequent happenings during and after the crisis also contributed towards fuelling 
the desire to critically probe into the conflict in order to understand the real factors that 
have caused (and often fuel) it. For example, the then Governor of Plateau State Chief 
Joshua Dariye had, despite several allegations of incompetence on the part of his 
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government in handling the violence, blamed the media for all that happened. Dariye 
specifically accused Daily/Weekly Trust of waging a jihad against his government to mark 
200 years of Sheikh Usman Danfodio’s jihad in Northern Nigeria. Generally, there were 
attempts on both sides to shift the blame to the media, which the researcher found difficult 
to understand.  
Thus, as a journalist with about 10 years of practice experience the researcher felt 
conducting a study of this quality was a possible means of critically evaluating and 
understanding the deeper meanings in the whole problem and how best it could be tackled 
with the media playing a huge role in the entire process. However, the researcher had to 
deal with his own biases in order to be able to effectively do the study: first, the researcher 
is a Muslim from Northern Nigeria, where often the conflicts erupt; second, as a researcher 
that has worked with one of the newspapers that is studied in the thesis there is a 
connection with the paper that needs to be cautiously handled; and, third the fact that at 
some point the researcher solicited assistance from former colleagues in Nigeria during the 
study might be been seen as having some effect on the study itself. Thus, the researcher 
decided from the outset to take a critical distance from all the links mentioned, including 
those perceived. The choice of phenomenology as a theoretical framework made this quite 
effective as often the choice of themes and theories was dictated by the subjective 
phenomenology of the researched. In effect, the researcher attempted to understand the 
phenomenon through the experiences of the researched and interpreted it in their own 
voices as illustrated by quotations in Chapters Five and Six. 
The thesis is, therefore, a study of how newspapers have reported religious conflicts 
in Nigeria in terms of objectivity and other journalistic professional roles. It is an attempt to 
critically evaluate how they might have contributed to fanning the embers of hate in the 
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country’s long history of sectarian violence. While it might not be a deliberate comparison 
of newspaper reportage in the country during such crises, the fact that the country is seen 
as constituting people of diverse and distinct cultures and religious beliefs with seemingly 
little similarities might necessitate such a comparison in order for us to understand how 
they become part of the cleavages. It is also important that this study critically determines 
how ownership, location, staffing, economic and political incentives among other issues 
possibly lead the press into being part of this dichotomy, otherwise referred to as the North 
versus South division. 
 Of immense relevance to this study are the colonisation of Nigeria and the 
amalgamation of the North and South to create one country as it is today, which many 
Nigerian’s still consider artificial as well as later political and economic developments that 
might have played a role in further sowing the seed of discord among the people. Rosalind 
Hackett (2003) and Toyin Falola (1999, 2009) see colonialism as having major impacts on the 
people and country and events happening today; there are also arguments that the 
economic depression of the 1980s has had a huge effect (Campbell 2011). This study will 
seek to essentially determine how these factors might have affected the media as well, 
resulting in the possible jettisoning of their watch-dog, public interest role to promote 
sectional/sectarian/personal interests and how this might have impacted on their 
audience/readers. This is essential because the media effects model attempts to establish a 
link between crime/violence and the consumption media products (like news reports, 
violent movies/programmes and so on) as Gauntlett (1998) explains. 
This research shall therefore, among other issues, explore the nature of the violence, 
involvement of the media in the Jos violence (November 2008) and develop a strategy for 
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understanding the problem and transforming it. It shall, thus, be guided by the following 
aims/objectives:  
(a) To critically examine the emergence of newspapers in Nigeria and how it might be 
linked to their perception and choice of news values 
(b) To extensively investigate the influence of ownership and control among other 
issues, on newspapers and how it affects the reportage of religion/religious conflicts 
in Nigeria 
(c) To carefully determine how it might be possible for the media to manipulate their 
audiences/readers  
(d) To thoroughly examine the role of political and socio-economic factors in the crises 
(e) To significantly expose the danger of manipulation and its relations to violent 
conflicts in the country. 
The significance of the study shall include to: 
(a) Profoundly understand the particular challenges of reporting religion/religious 
violence in complex societies like Nigeria 
(b) Genuinely proffer solutions to the problems discovered 
(c) Significantly contribute to discourses on ownership, control and use of the media in 
the study of journalism and society in colleges and universities. 
(d) To particularly device a framework for critically examining the issues highlighted and 
the means by which ethnic, cultural and religious similarities might be emphasised 
while de-emphasising dissimilarities especially in societies with complexities like 
Nigeria, using the media as a conduit. 
On the basis of the above discussions the research project will attempt to answer the 
following research questions: 
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 (a) To what extent do the media (newspapers) in Nigeria provide a platform for 
promoting religious disharmony? 
(b) What are the factors that make it difficult for journalists in Nigeria not to be biased 
when reporting religion or religious conflict? 
(c) How are enemy images and stereotypes created in news production and reporting?  
(d) To what extent are the conflicts actually religious? 
This thesis shall comprise of eight chapters with Chapter One outlining the context in 
which the study shall be conducted. In this chapter attempts shall be made to establish the 
background knowledge of the study itself and the media, the environment in which 
newspapers operate (in this case Nigeria) and their historical antecedents, which are 
important for one to understand later chapters of the study. It is also pertinent to 
understand the political culture of Nigeria. The aims/objectives of the study are outlined as 
well as the significance and research questions. Attempts will also be made to set a 
background for the study in this chapter. 
 Chapter Two consists of the literature review and issues such as the sources of 
violence shall be discussed by means of an examination of a range of theories. Scholarly 
works shall also be employed in discussing previous studies on violent conflicts and their 
reporting in the media in Nigeria and other parts of the world. Chapter Three is an 
explanation/description of the research methodologies of this study like its ontology, 
epistemology, theoretical approach, which is phenomenology; including where primary and 
secondary data will be obtained. Here, how the data will be analysed and the specific 
approach to be applied, which is interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), will also be 
explained. 
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Chapter Four is a study, the first of the three studies this thesis will be made of. In 
this chapter critical discourse analysis will be used in discussing the reportage of two 
newspapers, comparatively, during one of the religious crises in Northern Nigeria – the 
November 2008 violence in Jos. In the light of this the THISDAY and Daily Trust reports shall 
be examined during a period of four weeks. A discussion shall be done to conclude the 
chapter by explaining the meaning and framing of headlines and texts of news 
stories/articles/opinions as well as other relevant issues. Chapter Five is the second of the 
studies and shall be the analysis of semi-structured interview data obtained from Nigeria. 
Data analysis in this chapter shall be presented by means of interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA), using themes and sub-themes that emerge from the data 
to categorise and explain statements (illustrative quotations) by participants in the study. 
Similarly, Chapter Six is the third of the studies and shall be the analysis of focus 
group interviews. Two focus groups shall be considered from the field and these shall be 
simultaneously analysed using IPA too. As in Chapter Five, themes and sub-themes 
constructed from the data shall be used to analyse quotes from participants. Chapter Seven 
shall be an overall discussion of the findings of the studies in Chapters Five and Six. Using 
themes linked to theories, the discussion shall focus on how answers to the research 
questions earlier posed are answered. For example, in the discussions reference shall be 
made to the media systems theory of Jay G. Blumler and Michael Gurevitch (1995) and 
Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004) and other theories that emerge from the data 
while discussing issues arising from the analysis. Chapter Eight shall be the last chapter of 
the thesis, wherein a conclusion for the entire study shall be drawn, outlining its limitations, 
findings, contributions and suggesting further areas of research. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND 
Nigeria, a country with an estimated population of 151,212 million people1, is Africa’s most 
populous nation. The population is roughly divided between Muslims, who are dominant in 
the North, and Christians, who largely inhabit the South.2 The major ethnic groups are: 
Hausa/Fulani, mainly found in the North; Yoruba, largely in the South-West; and Igbo, 
dominant in the South-East.3 Figures from the country’s National Population Commission 
(NPC) reveal that the lowest literacy level of 32.51 per cent is in the North (Yobe State), 
while the highest (88.45 per cent) is found in the South (Lagos State).4  
Nigeria is also an oil-rich country, producing an estimated 2.458 million barrels of 
crude oil per day.5 Its economy was boosted by oil boom in the 1970s. Fashoyin (1990) 
argues that during the period between 1965 and 1980 Nigeria’s GDP grew at an average of 8 
per cent a year and that an outstanding structural change in the economy at the end of the 
1967-70 civil war was responsible for the growth. But the economy began a downward 
spiral from the early 1980s and today the GDP is (currently estimated at 8.4 per cent) much 
lower than what it was in 1970 and far below the average in sub-Saharan Africa (Campbell 
2011). This has been blamed on political instability, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, 
and poor macroeconomic management (CIA The World 2011; Campbell 2011). A major 
issue, however, has been the country’s overdependence on oil (Campbell 2011; Fashoyin 
                                                             
1 This figure is based on a 2008 estimated census and can be accessed at the following 
linkhttp://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=NIGERIA#Social accessed 02 November, 2011. 
  
2 A recent estimate suggests 50% Muslim, 40% Christian and 10% indigenous beliefs. Information is available 
at http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics_profile.html, accessed 10 November, 2011. 
 
3 Information available at http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics_profile.html estimates that 
Nigeria comprises of Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo (Ibo) 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, 
Tiv 2.5% among other smaller tribes, accessed 10 November, 2011 
 
4 This can be found at http://nigeriavillagesquare.com/forum/main-square/36507-nigerias-literacy-data-released-
npc.html accessed 10 November, 2011.  
 
5 This information can be accessed at the following web address https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html 
accessed 2 November, 2011.  
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1990). For instance Fashoyin (1990) postulates that overreliance on oil as the main source of 
revenue saw a backlash following a world oil surplus while Nigeria’s output sharply dropped. 
The implication was a serious budget deficit (including huge debts) leading to the 
government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) introducing a medium-term stabilisation 
programme in April 1982 otherwise known as austerity measure. This had a major 
implication on the people’s standard of living, dramatically increasing poverty. Expounding 
the issue of poverty further, Campbell (2011: 11) states:  
Poverty is about people; statistics only attempt to measure it. Nevertheless, 
the standard social indicators used by international aid agencies confirm that 
most Nigerians are very poor…the standard of living for many people has 
fallen, possibly below the levels that existed at Nigeria’s independence in 1960. 
In a bid to disguise the extent of the insidious poverty in the country the government 
of President Olusegun Obasanjo insisted the Nigeria Living Standard Survey (NLSS) in 2004 
lower their metric for poverty line to a per capita income of twenty-six thousand naira 
(about US$200); it was far lower than the international standard of less than one US dollar 
per day for measuring poverty in developing countries. Yet it was so bad that 54.2 per cent 
of the population were found to live below the altered poverty line. It was particularly 
shocking in the North-East and North-West that 72 per cent live below poverty line 
(Campbell 2011: 12). Perhaps the figures would have shown no fewer than 90 per cent of 
the population living below poverty line if the standard had not been amended. A major 
cause of this was the death of the middle class following the collapse of the last oil boom in 
the 1980s, particularly during the regime of Gen Ibrahim Babangida (IBB). This class has 
been replaced by what Campbell (2011: 12) describes as the so-called respectable poor: 
18 
 
educated, white-collar Nigerians without the means to maintain a ‘middle class’ standard of 
living.  
 
Map of Nigeria showing states and geo-political divisions.6 
One of Nigeria’s fundamental problems is that the vast of its oil is concentrated in 
the hands of a small group of wealthy Nigerians and distribution of income has been very 
unequal. Children are most affected as over 40 per cent of them are undersized due to 
chronic malnutrition. Many are also particularly exploited by politicians and used to provoke 
or maintain violent conflicts. Campbell (2011) observes that Kano, a city of 9.8 million 
people, is very poor and loitered by “throngs of street children, dressed in rags” and begging 
for alms and food. They are known as the almajiri (plural almajirai, meaning 
                                                             
6 Map was retrieved from http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2415/8/17/figure/F1?highres=y accessed on 09 
November, 2011. 
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pupils/students), sent to the city from rural areas by their parents to learn about Islam 
under the tutorship of scholars known as malams (mullah/teacher). They are made to beg 
for money (to pay their own tuition fees) and food (on which they survive). Many of them 
hardly survive. But those that do, according to Campbell (2011), are often rented as street 
urchins to wreak havoc during sectarian or political violence. 
Like most Nigerian cities that prospered prior to the oil boom, Kano’s wealth was 
due to its position as an important manufacturing centre of textile and leather goods. But its 
fortunes have since dwindled. It is now clearly a hob of poverty; the textile industries have 
all folded up; the basis of its prosperity (groundnut and cotton) has collapsed. Campbell 
(2011) posits the Nigeria’s oil boom has largely played a role in all this, as the arrival of oil 
led to the government focussing attention on oil at the expense of agriculture and 
transportation. Thus, railways which were used to transport groundnut and cotton were 
allowed to crumble, while roads have sufficiently disintegrated. Other factors that have 
contributed to the collapse of economic activities in Nigeria, generally, are serious energy 
production setback, rising costs of production (overhead costs inclusive), rising prices of 
petroleum and the failure of successive governments to introduce policies to protect 
indigenous industries. In the end most local industries and other businesses have liquidated, 
rendering millions of people effectively unemployed. With rising deficits all sections of the 
public sector also became incapacitated as they were forced to retrench or rationalize their 
workforce to cut cost. Fashoyin (1990: 653) notes that Railway Corporation, a semi-
commercial government agency, responded to the situation by downsizing its staff force of 
over 10,000 by 34 per cent. 
The mass media as Yusha’u (2009) has observed cannot operate in isolation of their 
environment. In Nigeria the press is the most vibrant strand of the media (Babalola 2002). 
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Since the media operate in environments where they are, like other industrial and 
commercial organisations, producing and distributing commodities (Murdock & Golding 
1973) their entire survival depends on their ability to make profit. But Ojo (2008) observes 
that in Nigeria, giving a situation of acute recession, they face numerous challenges that 
make it practically impossible for them to survive. These include: the lack of adequate 
capital; a poorly developed market for media markets arising from the high level of illiteracy 
and widespread poverty; poor economic conditions of media establishments in the face of 
high production cost; poor medical facilities and infrastructure; widespread corruption and 
unethical practices in the media industry; and inadequate legal, regulatory, and policy 
frameworks for media practice. 
In spite of an enormous population the fact that nearly 70 per cent (particularly in 
some parts of the North) is made up of illiterates explains why circulation figures of 
newspapers in Nigeria are very low. Ojo (2008) notes that even the nation’s largest 
circulating newspaper, arguably the Punch, can only boast of an estimated average daily 
circulation of less than 100,000 copies. But Ojo (2008: 198) adds that there is no reliable 
circulation or readership figure as newspapers guard their circulation figures jealously. 
Nonetheless, a study by the Baltic Media Centre in 2001 estimates that the combined daily 
circulation of all national, regional and provincial newspapers in the country is between 
350,000 and 500,000 (Ojo 2008: 198). This argument is boosted by another survey by the 
Advertisers Association of Nigeria (ADVAN) showing that the total daily circulation figures of 
all the newspapers in the country is a little over 300,000. For example, the Punch which 
claims to circulate between 100,000 and 120,000 daily was found to actually circulate only 
34,264 copies while most smaller national dailies like the Independent, New Nigerian, 
Triumph, Daily Champion and others whose circulation figures are represented with an 
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asterisk in Table 1 were, according to the ADVAN survey, found to be circulating not more 
than 1,600 copies daily. 
Below table 1 shows major Nigerian national daily newspapers and ownership and 
circulation figures based on research conducted by Advertisers Association of Nigeria 
(ADVAN) 2009.7 
Newspaper Ownership/publisher Location  Region Circulation figure 
Business Day Johnnic 
Communications 
West Africa LTD 
Lagos 
 
South * 
Daily Champion Chief Emmanuel 
Iwuanyanwu 
Lagos  South * 
Nigerian Tribune Awolowo Family Ibadan South   8314 
The Punch Aboderin Family Lagos South 34264 
The Guardian Guardian 
Newspapers LTD 
Lagos South 25222 
Vanguard  Vanguard Media LTD Lagos  South 25241 
Daily Trust  Media Trust LTD Abuja North 11672 
THISDAY Leaders & Company 
LTD 
Lagos South 21703 
The Sun The Sun Publishing 
LTD 
Lagos South 25632 
Triumph  Triumph Publishing 
Company 
Kano  North * 
The Nation Asiwaju Bola Ahmed 
Tinubu 
Lagos South * 
New Nigerian Governments of 
Northern States 
Kaduna North * 
People’s Daily People’s Media 
Corporation 
Abuja North * 
Leadership  Leadership Nigeria 
LTD  
Abuja North * 
 Next Dele Olojede Lagos South * 
 
While poverty might be one of the major factors contributing to low newspaper sales 
in Nigeria there is deregulation of the media industry to blame too. In 1992, a new decree 
introduced by the military allowed private ownership of the electronic media (Oyovbaire 
2001; Jibo & Okoosi-Simbine 2003). And the floodgate of private ownership of all other 
strands of the media was thus thrown wide open, including home video production (Larkin 
                                                             
7fesmedia Africa, the media project of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in Africa available at 
http://fesmedia.org/african-media-news/detail/datum/2010/04/09/-05d8ba2b4a/ accessed 09 November, 2011. 
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1997a, 2000). It also paved the way for the proliferation of hate literature (Hackett 2003) as 
both charismatic Christian groups and Muslim scholars profusely began to use the media to 
propagate their faith with a likely striking impact on the audience. Increased competition 
amidst rising poverty and economic recession also affected the fortunes of the media, 
especially newspapers. Other factors identified following the ADVAN survey8 were: poor 
reading culture among Nigerians; corruption on the part of newspaper vendors who take 
advantage people’s poor economic situations to encourage them to pay a token of 20 naira 
to read as many newspapers as possible instead of buying one copy at the cost of 150-200 
naira, and the 20 naira goes into the vendor’s pocket; declining creativity in newspaper 
contents which made papers less attractive and people began to rely more on the electronic 
media, especially radio and television, than newspapers; and the advent of the internet 
resulting in every newspaper publishing online, which is accessed free of charge. In Britain, 
following a similar trend after 1945, newspapers faced major challenges as costs rose and 
more competitors entered the market. Murdock and Golding (1973: 210) explain: 
Inevitably prices reflected this cost inflation, and many national dailies 
doubled, or even trebled their cover price between 1959 and 1971. The 
resulting decline in circulations reflects both a decreasing willingness to buy 
two newspapers, and a growing use of television as a primary source of 
information and entertainment. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
8 Again refer to http://fesmedia.org/african-media-news/detail/datum/2010/04/09/-05d8ba2b4a/ accessed 09 
November, 2011. 
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Table 2 shows national weekly newspapers, which are stable-mates of the dailies in Table 1.9 
Newspaper  Ownership/publisher Location Region Circulation 
Sunday 
Champion 
Chief Emmanuel 
Iwuanyanwu 
Lagos South - 
Weekly Punch The Aboderin Famliy Lagos South - 
Sunday Punch The Aboderin Famliy Lagos South - 
Saturday Sun The Sun Publishing 
LTD 
Lagos South - 
Sunday Sun The Sun Publishing Lagos South - 
Weekly Tribune The Awolowo Family Ibadan South - 
Sunday Tribune The Awolowo Family Ibadan South - 
Weekly Trust Media Trust LTD Abuja North - 
Sunday Trust Media Trust LTD Abuja North - 
THISDAY 
Saturday 
Leaders & Company 
LTD 
Lagos South  - 
THISDAY 
Sunday 
Leaders & Company 
LTD 
Lagos South - 
Weekend 
Triumph 
Triumph Publishing 
Company 
Kano North  
- 
Weekend 
Vanguard 
Vanguard Media LTD Lagos South - 
Weekend 
Leadership 
Leadership Company 
LTD 
Abuja North - 
Next on Sunday Dele Olojede Lagos South - 
 
 Thus, the issue of alternative media has become increasingly important with the 
internet (new media), radio, television and mobile phones stepping into the vacuum. Radio 
is quite appealing especially given that many of the programmes are broadcast in 
vernacular. In addition, newspaper reviews have been introduced to draw audience to 
issues/reports carried by major newspapers. The BBC Hausa service, which is quite popular 
among Hausa speakers in Nigeria, Ghana, Niger and the Cameroon, for example, does a 
review of major newspapers on a weekly basis. Television also plays an increasing role as an 
alternative since the world has become more globalised and events are televised (with 
pictures) in real time. The internet is having the most impact on Nigerians today as no fewer 
                                                             
9 Information is available at http://library.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/nigeria/nigerianews.html   
accessed 09 November 2011. 
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than 43 million people in the country have internet access.10 This is complemented by the 
growing popularity of mobile phone technology.11 Both the internet and mobile phones 
could easily be used in accessing and spreading information, which could be sent to one’s 
mobile phone after subscription at no cost other than one’s air time.  
Thus, people hardly miss out on major happenings, although the flip side of it all is 
that these new sources of information might be subject to abuse, with serious implications. 
Nyamnjoh (2005) explains that people are forced devise or subscribe to alternative sources 
of information under regimes that repress press freedom (for example during colonial rule). 
Thus, Nyamnjoh (2005: 42) argues, pavement or clandestine media emerge under such 
circumstances as people utilise “clandestine radio and word of mouth; turn to or marry with 
alternative channels of communication such as the grapevine, political rumour, humour, 
parody, irony an derision…” 
 Media effects model focuses attention on the relations between violence/crime and 
what the media retail to their audience (Gauntlett 1998). This presupposes that people’s 
behaviour is directly influenced by the media and anti-social behaviour is usually a reflection 
of the consumption of negative media contents. Gauntlett (1998) describes this approach as 
stereotypical and refers to a study by Hagell and Newburn (1994: 30), in which an attempt 
was made to trace the behaviour of 78 violent teenage offenders to media usage, by 
comparing them to more than 500 ordinary school pupils of similar age. Gauntlett (1998) 
notes that the researchers discovered that the violent behaviour of the teenage offenders 
had no connection with media usage as they watched less television and video than the 
                                                             
10 A report by International Telecommunications Union in August 2010 cites Nigeria as topping the list of 
countries with internet access in Africa. Information is available at http://saharareporters.com/news-
page/nigeria-claims-top-internet-spot-africa accessed 10 November, 2011. 
 
11As of 2007 more than 40 million Nigerians were using mobile phones 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0933605.html accessed 10 November, 2011. 
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other participants in the study and had no access to technology or interest in violent 
programmes.  
In Nigeria, from what was revealed by the research by ADVAN on newspaper 
circulation and the reasons adduced for declining circulation, it is relevant to argue that 
newspapers, considered the most vibrant strand of the media, might have less effect on the 
people since they directly consume less of their products. And to ensure their own survival 
newspapers rely heavily on adverts, advertorials and special feature drives to accrue 
income. Thus, their products are customised to the taste of certain sections of the society as 
opposed to others. For example the Grand Patron of Newspaper Distributors Association (of 
Nigeria), Chief Elisha Akanle argues that in terms of sales newspapers rely mainly on bank 
executives and other wealthy Nigerians.12 This, perhaps, could be better understood within 
the context of Peter Ekeh’s (1975) ‘Two Publics’ explanations, where the educated elites are 
struggling to negotiate between the inherent contradictions in the civic and primordial 
publics to which they are expected to be generously connected. Newspapers, by tailoring 
contents to suit the taste of these elites, become part of the contraction as they are seen to 
be polarised and promoting divisions as Chief Akanle’s statement suggests. Therefore, a 
proprietor’s interest might have an overbearing influence over the public interest (Jibo & 
Okoosi-Simbine 2003).  
Coinciding with Nigeria’s economic depression was the recurrent eruption of 
religious violence, the first of which took place in Kano on December 18-19, 1980. The 
media, especially newspapers, were saddled with the responsibility of reporting the 
conflicts. Journalists were eventually singled out for blame by both sides in the conflicts, 
including observers, for either filing reports that directly or indirectly inflamed the tense 
                                                             
12 Chief Elisha Akanle‟s comment is available in an article at http://fesmedia.org/african-media-news/ accessed 
09 November, 2011. 
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climate or for not properly reporting the conflicts, leading to amplification. Often they were 
accused of taking sides. They were, for example, accused of actively fuelling the Kafanchan 
religious violence of 1987. Ibrahim (1989) writes that the New Nigerian newspaper and 
Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria Kaduna (FRCN) incited people to murder by 
emphasising the reign of terror and the killing of Muslims by Christians in Kafanchan. 
Although Kukah (1993) argues the media have always contributed towards fanning and 
sustaining the embers of bigotry in Nigeria, Kukah13 (1996a) rose to their defence in the case 
of Kafanchan saying no reports were sensationalised and that provocative ones were 
neither published nor broadcast. Nonetheless, Hackett (2003) argues they were seen to be 
creating stereotypes and shaping attitudes.   
This study intends to further critically explore the issues raised, especially the 
accusation of biased reporting made against the media. It shall focus on the factors that 
aided the emergence of newspapers in the country and their possible links to bitter 
competition and divisions. It shall trace the history of the country and the likely 
contradictions in the colonial legacy passed on to Nigerians at independence in 1960. But 
most importantly the rise of sectarian violence, how they are reported in newspapers and 
how that might further fuel the crises shall be extensively discussed, taking into 
consideration the political and socio-economic factors in the crises that might be within or 
outside of the control of the media.  
1.2 NIGERIA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The History of Nigeria predates the 1914 amalgamation of the entities that presently 
constitute the country. It dates back to before 500 BC, when humans were said to have 
                                                             
13 Revd Father Mathew Hassan Kukah is a prolific writer, author and a commentator on a range of issues of 
national and international importance in Nigeria. 
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populated some parts of it (Falola 1999: 1). The people had lived separately and 
independently in empires, kingdoms, chiefdoms, villages and clans (in-groups). In 1851 
Britain occupied and established a consulate in the tiny Awori kingdom of Eko, Lagos (Isichei 
1983: 362) heralding the beginning of the conquest of the diverse people and their 
colonisation under the name Nigeria. Prior to this, European contact with Africans had been 
restricted to four major activities namely: exploration, Christian missionary, trade and 
imperialism. Falola (1999: 39) explains further: 
…explorers provided useful knowledge for others to use and encouraged the 
traders to move to the hinterland; missionaries served as pathfinders for 
colonialists; traders indicated the profits to be made from imperialism, and, 
together with missionaries, pressured the British government to take over 
Nigeria. 
From then, treaties were signed with indigenous monarchs or rulers eventually ceding 
control to Britain. While some were peaceful, many were done through expeditions like the 
one sent against Ijebu-Ode in 1892 leading to its bloody defeat and humbling. Isichei (1983: 
365) notes:  
The invading force consisted of West Indians, Hausa, Gold Coast and Ibadan 
troops, under a handful of British officers…The defeat of the brave and well-
armed Ijebu had many consequences for the future. The Ijebu themselves seem 
to have felt their traditional gods had failed them, and turned to either Islam 
or Christianity with a wholeheartedness which missionaries compared with 
Uganda. 
The two possible implications of this development narrated by Isichei are: first, the 
involvement of foreigners from within Nigeria, for example Hausa, in the raid; and two, the 
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conversion of Ijebu to the two main religions that were to later sharply be used as a 
yardstick for dividing Nigeria. Both of these issues raised must have eventually played a role 
in the sort of division we are seeing today in Nigeria. By 1905, following the patterns 
described by Falola (1999) and Isichei (1983), almost the entire independent states of 
Nigeria had been brought under British rule. This was part of a grand design, following the 
Berlin conference of 1884-85, to conquer and impose colonial rule on African states with the 
exception of Liberia and Ethiopia (Falola 1999: 53). But the irony in this, particularly in 
relations to Nigeria, is that its heterogeneity defied, and still defies, the manner of 
administration imposed, despite certain modifications to give it a semblance of human face. 
Falola (2009: 171) argues that the manner of Nigeria’s conquest and colonisation played out 
in later developments in the country, including the entrenchment of violence as a way of life 
(political culture): 
Violence is not an irrational behaviour. The British used violence to unsettle 
and conquer the pre-colonial states and their leaders…the large Sokoto 
Caliphate crumbled, the powerful Empire of Benin destroyed, and the arrogant 
Ijebu humiliated. This violence had a clearly defined political agenda: to attain 
political domination. 
As Falola (2009) mentions above this has become the way Nigeria has been run, from its 
colonial days to present day. 
 By 1906 Nigeria’s British Governor General Lord Lugard had imported his colonial 
style of administration that had been applied and adjudged successful in India to Nigeria. 
Known as indirect rule, it allowed the colonial administrator to rule without directly 
tampering with the structures on ground. It was for colonial convenience and cost-saving. 
And for the same purpose in 1914 Lord Lugard merged the constituent units into one big 
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whole, called Nigeria. This was called amalgamation, dismissed later by nationalist leaders 
from the various regions as “a mistake”14, or its outcome (Nigeria) as “a mere geographical 
expression”15. Perhaps, the mistake or futility in this structure pointed out above was the 
earlier mistake made by British administrators by partitioning the country into three 
regions, North, West and East for easy administration and application of indirect rule. The 
North, although not so homogenous, had more Islamic influences and had been 
predominantly Muslim especially due to the early 19th century Jihad waged by Sheikh 
Usman Dan-Fodio.16 The West, owing to its closeness to the coast, had more contacts with 
Europeans and missionaries; many had converted from traditional beliefs to Christianity, 
although the Dan-Fodio’s Jihad had some impact too. The East too had early visits from and 
exchanges with Europeans owing to trade in legitimate goods and slaves; Christianity had 
impacted more on them. In terms of systems of governance in the pre-colonial states of 
Nigeria they had run completely different systems. In the North the Caliphate established by 
Dan-Fodio was the most organised administrative system of the three. Administering from 
the centre in Sokoto, a Caliph was both the administrative and spiritual leader. The entire 
North, except the Kanem-Bornu in the North-East was under the Caliphate and every emir 
and chief paid homage to the Caliph or Sultan. In the West, there was a not so homogenous 
                                                             
14 Reacting to the motion moved by leaders from South-Western Nigeria for independence by 1957, Sir Ahmadu 
Bello, who became the premier of Northern Nigeria at independence in 1960, said the “mistake of 1914 has 
come to light. The North will not accept an invitation to commit suicide.” This led to the humiliating heckling of 
Northern leaders by the South-Western people in Lagos in 1953, and later when leaders from the South-West 
visited Kano, they were also heckled and attacked by Northerners. 
 
15 Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the South-West and opposition leader of Nigeria at Independence, wrote 
in his „Path to Nigerian Freedom‟ (1947) that “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression.”  
 
16 In 1804, a Fulani Islamic scholar Sheikh Usman Dan-Fodio began a military campaign against Hausa rulers in 
the territory that became Northern Nigeria in order to stop them from mixing Islam with traditional practices. 
Supported by fellow Fulani scholars Dan-Fodio‟s jihad successfully led to the overthrow of pagan Hausa rulers 
and their replacement with Fulani Caliphs/emirs/rulers. It also led to the establishment of a centralised system of 
administration with Sokoto as the capital. Sokoto was defeated and conquered by British forces in 1903 and 
months later the fleeing Caliph, Sultan Attahiru I, was pursued and killed at Burmi (to the east of the Caliphate) 
(see Falola 2009: 14-16). 
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setting but the powerful Oyo Empire headed by the Alaafin was able to bring much of the 
South-West, including parts of the Nupeland and Borgu (in the Middle Belt) and present day 
Republic of Benin under its control. But its fortunes dwindled and its strength weakened 
from the second part of the 18th century. There was also Benin Kingdom in the Mid-West, 
which rose to its peak and operated a centralised, powerful monarchy until its invasion and 
conquest by the British in 1897 (Falola 1999: 21). In the East they had a system based on 
gerontocracy, a system of governance based on age. They also had age-groups that were 
powerful in influencing peers. But the entire system was more chaotic than the others 
mentioned. It was operated in patrilineal clans and classified as non-centralised (Isichei 
1983: 162; Falola 1999: 23-24). There were other non-centralised smaller states found 
especially in the Mid-West and Middle Belt. 
 Bringing these separate systems into one administrative unit became clearly a 
mistake after independence in 1960, as Ojie (2006: 550) observes: 
The amalgamation of the Northern and the Southern Nigeria in 1914, by Lord 
Lugard, brought the separatist leaders of the regions into a marriage of 
convenience. 
What is deducible from Ojie’s (2006) statement is that the various regions (North, West and 
East) had their different cultural beliefs and orientations, symbolised by their distinct 
leadership styles and reflected in their leaders. The leaders eventually found themselves 
competing for national political positions at the centre and the differences played out 
almost immediately and easily. After independence in 1960, Ojie (2006: 550) states: 
During the first republic, the regions were at each other’s throats in a 
dangerous game of ethnic politics that easily deteriorated and culminated in 
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the 1966 coup d’état, which slid into the atrocious 30-month civil war in 
Nigeria. 
The January 1966 military coup led by seven Majors in the army who hailed from the South 
(West and East) was considered a fatal blow in the face of the North by Northern political, 
traditional and military leaders and people. The coup did not only sack the civilian 
government led by Muslim and Northerner Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, it also ensured the 
killing of the two most senior Northern politicians in government and their alliance partners 
(and government officials) in the West and Mid-West. Some high ranking military officers 
from the North were also killed in the coup. This resulted in a counter-coup in July 1966, 
leading to the assassination of Nigeria’s military leader who hailed from the East, General 
Aguiyi Ironsi and his host17, the governor of Western Nigeria Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi. Isichei 
(1983: 471), commenting on the first coup’s plotters’ claim of trying to wipe out corruption 
and tribalism in the system says: 
Perhaps few Nigerians would not have agreed with their aims. But the coup’s 
execution gave, probably unintentionally, the appearance of that very 
tribalism the plotters sought to destroy. Six of the seven majors involved were 
Igbos. They killed two Northern leaders – the Sardauna of Sokoto and Tafawa 
Balewa – the Western Premier Akintola, Okotie-Eboh (the Finance Minister 
and Mid-Westerner), and several high army officers. 
What further exposed the coup to the allegation of one-sidedness was the fact that no 
Eastern (Igbo) or opposition politician lost his life or was directly hurt, as Isichei (1983) 
explains, despite the coup leader Major Nzeogwu saying it was due to incompetence in the 
execution of the coup.  
                                                             
17 The second coup occurred while the head of state was visiting the old Western region and was hosted by its 
governor, Colonel Fajuyi. Both General Ironsi and Col Fajuyi were killed in the coup. 
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The two coups put Nigeria on the brink as a bloody civil war was fought between the 
Nigerian government, headed by Lt Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a Northern Christian from a 
minority tribe, and secessionist Biafra in the East, led by the then Eastern Governor Lt. 
Colonel Emeka Ojukwu, leading to the loss about one million lives (Falola 1999: 123). At the 
end of it all Biafra was defeated, Ojukwu humbled and went into exile, while Gowon 
consolidated his hold on power and popularised the phrase ‘no victor no vanquished’ to 
moderate his victory and heal the wounds of the war. In addition he introduced policies 
aimed at rebuilding the country that were termed Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and 
Reconciliation. It was during that time that he introduced the National Youth Service Corps 
(NYSC) through decree No.24 of May 22, 1973 “with a view to the proper encouragement 
and development of common ties among youths of Nigeria and the promotion of national 
unity.”18 But Gowon’s government soon found itself struggling to perpetuate itself, 
promising to return power to a civilian regime after elections but failing to keep its words. 
On July 29, 1975 his junta was sacked in a military coup by Lt General Murtala Ramat 
Mohammed, a Muslim from the North and a Hausa.  
 Murtala’s regime was short-lived. He was assassinated in an abortive coup on 
February 13, 1976. He was succeeded by Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian from 
the West and a Yoruba. Obasanjo continued with his predecessor’s programmes and 
handed over power to the civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, after elections were 
organised in 1979. The Second Republic survived until December 31, 1983 as it was sent 
packing by the military in another coup that was led by Major General Muhammadu Buhari, 
a Muslim from the North and a Fulani. Buhari’s regime was considered too tough as, like 
Murtala, he tackled corruption and indiscipline. In a palace coup on August 27, 1985 led by 
                                                             
18 In its dedicated website the NYSC explains the reasons for its founding and what the scheme hopes to 
achieve. Refer to http://www.nysc.gov.ng/history.php to read more about it. Accessed 4 June, 2011. 
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his army chief of staff Major General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB), Buhari and his 
deputy Major General Tunde Idiagbon were removed from office and put in detention. The 
new regime was considered friendlier as IBB released political prisoners, repealed decrees 
considered obnoxious and operated what he called an ‘open door policy’. But in 1993 IBB 
annulled a widely adjudged free and fair presidential election won by businessman M.K.O. 
Abiola, a Muslim from the West and a Yoruba, on spurious allegations. He was finally forced 
to step aside in August 1993 and named an Interim National Government led by another 
Westerner, although Christian, Chief Ernest Shonekan.  
Gen. Sani Abacha eventually edged Shonekan out of office in November 1993. And 
for nearly five years Abacha unleashed a reign of terror as his Human Rights records reveal 
utter disregard for life and freedom. Anyone in any form of disagreement or seen to be 
disloyal was either sent to jail or assassinated or forced to go on self-imposed exile. 
Meanwhile Chief Abiola’s bid to ensure the actualisation of his mandate had resulted in 
Abacha clamping him in jail. Abiola’s wife, Kudirat, campaigning to get her husband released 
and his mandate actualised, was assassinated in cold blood. Bagauda Kaltho, a journalist 
accused of working for a news magazine consistent in criticising the regime was abducted 
and never found alive. In the West pro-June 1219 election protests were savagely quelled. 
Environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa was convicted on trumped-up charges of murder and 
executed despite international calls for clemency. A number of journalists and other civilians 
were arrested alongside top military officers including Abacha’s deputy General Oladipo 
Diya and imprisoned for allegedly attempting to overthrow his government. Former military 
leader Obasanjo and his deputy Gen Shehu Yar’adua were also accused of complicity in a 
                                                             
19 The election in which Chief M.K.O. Abiola was widely acclaimed the winner but annulled by General 
Babangida was held on June 12, 1993. It became known throughout the period of the struggle for its 
actualisation and thereafter as June 12. 
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coup plot and jailed; the latter died in prison. Trade unions across the country went on 
strike and the country ground to a halt. In June 1998 Abacha died in the presidential palace 
in Abuja. Commenting on Abacha’s reign and death Falola (1999: 13) states: 
Violence followed Abiola’s arrest with many people injured or killed but with 
no positive results. Abacha manipulated ethnicity, the greed of politicians, and 
brutal violence to stay in power against the popular will until his ignominious 
death on June 8, 1998. 
Abacha’s death paved the way for General Abdulsalam Abubakar to assume power 
and organise elections within a year. And in May 1999 Obasanjo was sworn in as Nigeria’s 
president he had defeated Chief Olu Falae, another Yoruba man, in an election only the 
Yoruba contested for the office of the President of Nigeria. It was during Obasanjo’s first 
term in office that the first major sectarian violence on the Plateau erupted on September 7, 
2001. Today, 10 years on the violence keeps erupting intermittently with colossal 
destruction of lives and property (Ishaku 2009). Although there was a temporary relief when 
Obasanjo imposed a state of emergency in Plateau State in May 2004 after suspending the 
state governor Chief Dariye and appointed a military administrator General Chris Ali, neither 
Umaru Yar’Adu nor Goodluck Jonathan, his (Obasanjo) two successors, has been able to 
tame the problem currently threatening the very existence of Nigeria as a nation. 
It is essential to understand that the emergence of the media in Nigeria is directly 
linked to the colonial history of the country. In the next section of this thesis the history of 
newspapers shall be discussed explaining this connection with colonialism. 
1.3 HISTORY OF NEWSPAPERS IN NIGERIA 
The history of the print media in Nigeria is traced to the period of colonial rule when the 
press was consistently used as a medium of communication and enlightenment by the 
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colonial authorities and missionaries, on the one hand, and as a means for presenting a 
common voice against colonialism by the natives, on the other hand. It also served as a 
catalyst to the emergence of nationalism and nationalist movements because it provided a 
platform for the discussion of colonial policies and the development of fierce activism 
toward political independence. The first newspaper established was the Iwe Irohin Fun 
Awon Ara Ebga ati Yoruba in 1859 in Abeokuta. It was based in the South (South-West) of 
Nigeria and published in Yoruba and English (Ogbonda 1988; Olayiwola 1991; Babalola 2002; 
Salawu 2006; Nyamnjoh 2005). Explaining who the first media owners were then and the 
reasons for owning them, Salawu (2006: 55) states: 
The colonialists and missionaries introduced writing and printing to Africa but 
they realised fairly quickly that effective communication with and among 
Africans meant using local languages. Reverend Henry Townsend of the 
Anglican mission started Iwe Irohin…to encourage the Egba and the Yoruba to 
cultivate the habit of reading for the purpose of information acquisition. 
Olayiwola (1991: 35) adds that missionaries, colonial administrators, nationalists, 
political parties, politicians and private foreign organisations were the dominant print media 
owners at the time and that the press was used as a medium for continuous public debate 
and political protests. Its involvement in political campaigns played a vital role in the 
stimulation of nationalism and the constitutional evolution of present day Nigeria, Olayiwola 
(1991) argues. Following the founding of Iwe Irohin was The Anglo African in 1863 and 
edited by Robert Campbell. While Iwe Irohin focused attack on slavery Babalola (2002) 
observes that The Anglo African concentrated on the issues of the time by carrying both 
local and national news. A torrent of other newspapers emerged 17 years after The Anglo 
African to herald the dawn of a wave of journalism that survived up until today. Among 
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these are: The Lagos Times in 1880 by Andrew Thomas; The Lagos Observer by Blackall 
Benjamin in February 1882; The Eagle in 1887 and then The Mirror (Babalola 2002: 405).  
 Events at the turn of the new century stimulated the emergence of more 
newspapers as Babalola (2002) notes. Those events were the establishment of the colony 
and protectorate of Lagos by the British as well as the amalgamation of the North and South 
in 1914. The events aroused nationalistic feelings among the people and The Nigerian 
Chronicle was started by Johnson Brothers in 1908, followed by The Nigerian Pioneer by 
Kukoyi Ajasa, although Ajasa’s paper was criticised as an official mouthpiece. Others were 
Nigerian Daily Times in 1926 and edited by Ernest Okoli; The West African Pilot edited by Dr 
Nnamdi Azikiwe in 1936; Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo came on board in 1937-38; and The Nigerian 
Tribune founded by Chief Obafemi Awolowo in 1946 (Babalola 2002; Ado-Kurawa 2006).   
A fundamental trend common to all the newspapers was their resolve to criticise 
colonialism and lead a growing voice for independence. Salawu (2006: 55) has, against this 
backdrop, categorised the rise of indigenous press into five eras: between 1859-67 was Iwe 
Irohin, which he said stood alone, denoting the first wave; the second wave was 1885-92 in 
which two Efik newspapers, Unwana Efik and Obukpon Efik, were noted alongside Iwe Irohin 
Eko, a Yoruba paper; the third wave was marked by the emergence of Eko Akete in 1922, 
ending with the second and final death of the paper in 1937; Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo (meaning 
truth is worth more than a penny) joined the league in 1937-38 symbolising the fourth wave 
which lasted till Nigeria’s independence in 1960, and the intent of its founder, quasi-official 
Gaskiya Corporation, was the promotion of the development of literature in the North; and 
the fifth wave may be regarded as all that happened from then up until now. Salawu (2006) 
further spots that apart from Iwe Irohin, which changed name to Irohin Yoruba in 1945, and 
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Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo none of the newspapers in the first to the fourth waves is in existence 
today. 
 From the 1950s to the 1960s papers like Nigerian Outlook, Nigerian Citizen, The 
Herald, Afriscope, the Times International and others, made a short-lived appearance in the 
scene (Ado-Kurawa 2006). The 1980s and 1990s, in line with what Larkin (1997a) has 
described as the changing political economy of the global media, saw more private 
ownership. The Vanguard, The National Concord20, The Punch, THISDAY, Comet21, Daily 
Sketch, The Monitor, The Guardian, The Post Express, The Triumph all emerged in that time 
(Babalola 2002: 406; Ado-Kurawa 2006). But not all of them still exist today. In addition 
more newspapers have been founded in the North in an attempt to challenge the 
dominance of the South and these include Weekly Trust (and its stable-mates Daily and 
Sunday Trust and Aminiya), Leadership, People’s Daily and so on. There are currently up to 
21 national dailies across the country and a number of news magazines like Newswatch, 
Tell, the News, National Encomiums, Ovation, Hints, Heart and others. 
Given the discussion about the emergence of the print media, which is clearly the 
most vibrant strand of the media in Nigeria, from colonial to present day Nigeria, a number 
of features can be deduced: first, the manner of their founding and reasons in the colonial 
period; second, the manner of their establishment and reasons in post-colonial Nigeria; 
third, those behind the founding, like ownership; and the location of the newspapers. In the 
colonial era we noted the first newspaper Iwe Irohin was founded by Reverend Townsend in 
Abeokuta, Southern Nigeria (South-West) and the reason was to encourage literacy and 
                                                             
20 The National Concord was owned by businessman M.K.O. Abiola who was jailed after proclaiming himself 
president in an attempt to actualise his June 12 mandate. The paper, like most of his businesses, collapsed during 
the period of his incarceration and his death while under house arrest.  
 
21 Comet is now defunct and has been replaced by The Nation. 
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communication. This was followed by the rise of more newspapers in the South with similar 
ideals except a few that saw colonialism as an issue and spoke against it. But as Babalola 
(2002) has argued new happenings at the turn of the 20th century galvanised the rise of 
more media to challenge those developments. The events were the formal occupation of 
Lagos by Britain and the amalgamation of the North and South in 1914. Thus, the West 
African Pilot was prominent in that period and played a major role in Nigeria’s 
independence struggle. Its editor, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe became the country’s first ceremonial 
president during the First Republic at independence and remained in active politics until the 
collapse of the Second Republic in 1983. Also, the publisher of The Nigerian Tribune Chief 
Obafemi was actively involved in anti-colonial struggle and became the leader of opposition 
in the First and Second Republics.  
One needs to note the link between nationalism (later regionalism, after 
independence), politics and the media both in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria and this has 
continued till date. Olayiwola (1991: 39) lists newspapers owned by or linked to politicians 
and these include: Tribune owned by Chief Awolowo; The Nationalist published by Waziri 
Ibrahim, a presidential candidate in the second republic; Augustus Akinloye’s Sunday 
Advocate; The Eagle owned by K.O. Mbadiwe, Jim Nwobodo’s Satellite; The Trumpet of Alex 
Ekwueme; The Sun by Anthony Enahoro and the defunct National Concord owned by 
Abiola.22 Towards the end of the Second Republic newspapers like the Guardian of Alex 
                                                             
22 These men were either First or Second Republic politicians or both. For example Chief Awolowo was 
opposition leader in the two Republics, Waziri Ibrahim was presidential candidate in the second republic, 
Akinloye was a chieftain of National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the second republic, Mbadiwe was also a 
prominent politician, so also were Nwobodo (a state governor), Ekwueme (vice president) and Enahoro.  
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Ibru23, Lateef Jackande’s Lagos News, Major General (Retired.) Shehu Yar’adua’s the 
Reporter joined the league. 
In addition to those mentioned by Babalola (2002) many newspapers have been 
bankrolled by politicians in the last 12 years since the Third Republic took off. There is 
another paper, The Nation currently owned by former Lagos State governor and Action 
Congress of Nigeria chieftain, Bola Tinubu. Also, another The Sun is run by former Abia State 
governor Orji Uzo Kalu. Babalalo (2002) argues that the only newspapers that has no direct 
link, among those in the South, with politicians is the Punch, owned by the Aboderin family 
even though its publisher Olubunmi Aboderin was a close friend of Awolowo.  
From the above discussion it can further be deduced that apart from politicians 
owning newspapers to enhance their chances in politics there is commercial interest. This 
takes us back to the issue raised by Larkin (1997a) regarding the changing political economy 
of the media, which shows they are clearly out to make profit. Oso (1991) traces the root of 
the commercialisation of the press in Nigeria to the establishment of Daily Times in 1926, 
which was the result of collusion between some European financial interests and a group of 
wealthy Nigerians. It opened the doors for more financial investments in newspaper 
business as Oso (1991: 46) states: 
The arrival of men of capital ready, for whatever reason, to invest in the 
newspaper business is a notable feature of the commercialisation of the press. 
The Daily Times, as mentioned above, started this process and it has continued 
till date. 
                                                             
23 Alex Ibru‟s sibling Felix was a First Republic senator and first civilian governor of Delta State. Jakande is a 
former Lagos State governor in the Second Republic. Yar‟adua was Obasanjo‟s deputy from 1976-79 and 
contested one of the aborted primary elections by IBB. He was also the late President Umaru Yar‟adua‟s 
brother. 
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This trend became more pronounced after Nigeria’s independence and especially 
during partisan politics as we noted earlier. Almost every of the newspapers owned by a 
politician or other proprietors had commercial interest at the core of its ideals, some even 
very questionable. For example, THISDAY, although its owner Nduka Obaigbena is not 
directly linked to any political party, is seen as politically and commercially influenced 
because Obaigbena is believed to be current Nigeria’s president’s close ally. In a recent 
programme, Listening Post24, by Aljazeera he was portrayed as using his paper to make 
money off politicians and publish favourable reports about them. This, in essence, suggests 
the extent some proprietors can go to realise their commercial agenda using the media as a 
means. Oyovbaire (2001) also associates such commercial sway to the 1992 deregulation of 
the electronic media by IBB. The print media had before then dominated the entire media 
scene because of their private ownership as opposed to the government-controlled TV and 
radio companies. But their deregulation and mass entry made the market more competitive 
and the drive for capitalisation more intense. 
Another important development in the print media was the change in the way news 
is sourced, packaged and retailed. Oso (1991) calls this change professionalism in which 
media owners employ highly qualified editors and journalists who try to effectively compete 
with others in the market by getting the best and credible information. As a result of this 
Oyovbaire (2001) suggests an improved profile in the professional conduct of journalists 
despite the increasing complexities of the society they operate in. For instance there has 
been a change from dichotomy (North and South) to trichotomy (North, West and East) and 
finally multichotomy (36 states spread across the country) in which ethnic and religious 
                                                             
24 The Listening Post programme in which the report about THISDAY  was made can be viewed via the 
following link: http://www.saharareporters.com/video/pay-playchequebook-journalism-why-nigerians-distrust-
their-local-media-outlets-aljazeera-tv accessed 9 June, 2011. 
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influences in the pluralistic states seem to serve as some sort of gravitational force, 
attracting loyalty from the media and journalists and resulting in the sort of reportage often 
seen. 
1.4 NIGERIA AND SECTARIAN VIOLENCE: A CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW  
Violent conflicts associated with religion in Nigeria became a major issue from the early 
1980s with the mayhems unleashed by the Maitatsine (meaning accursed) extremist group 
in the Northern part of Nigeria. Falola (1998) says the first noticeable of these conflicts was 
the one in Kano on December 18-19, 1980 in which at least five thousand lives were lost 
although many people remain unaccounted for. The violence had spread to at least three 
other states in the region leading to a higher casualty rate. Within two years, on October 29, 
1982, another crisis by the same group erupted in a place near Maiduguri (North-East) 
causing another huge number of deaths (Falola 1998; Kukah 1993; Ishaku 2009). 
Commenting on the second eruption Falola (1998: 137) states: 
…another four thousand people were killed, almost two thousand were left 
homeless, and over three million naira worth of property destroyed. On the 
previous day, a riot in Kaduna had killed just twenty-three, but millions of 
naira in property was lost to the riot there as well. Back in Kano, a church was 
destroyed on 30 October, along with a great deal of property belonging to 
Christians. 
Both Rev Fr. Mathew H. Kukah (1993) and Ishaku (2003) have corroborated Falola’s (1998) 
account albeit with a few dissimilarities. For instance Kukah (1993: 154) does not see the 
attacks as deliberate targeting of Christians by a mainstream Muslim group but as attacks by 
a deviant, extremist sect: 
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The central figure in the 1980 saga, Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa who came to 
be known as Maitatsine, had a long history in Kano. His doctrine was a 
mishmash of theological absurdities and some of his ritual practices said to 
border on sorcery. 
Following the sectarian violence in Maiduguri was the one in Sabon Gari, Kano on 
October 30, 1982 in which for the first time there was a direct fighting between Muslims 
and Christians in Nigeria. In reference to the Kano crisis of 1982 Usman (1987: 72) observes:  
The attack on, and destruction of, Christian Churches in Sabon Gari  Kano, 
marks the highest, and most dangerous, point this systematic manipulation of 
religion has yet reached in its opposition to the unity of the people of Nigeria. 
This incident enables us to see more clearly the purposes and direction of this 
campaign of manipulation built around religion. 
A number of factors contributed towards making the campaign Usman (1987) mentioned in 
the statement above dangerously successful in the coming years. These factors shall be 
discussed later. Again, in February and March 1984 there were clashes leading to the death 
of 1,000 people and destruction of Jimeta’s modern-day market. Falola (1998) notes that 
property worth five-million naira was destroyed and that the crisis looked like an armed 
struggle with guerrilla warfare. Gombe in Bauchi State became another battlefield on April 
26, 1985 with a hundred people dying as there was exchange of gunfire between the police 
and the rioters. At least one thousand people were said to have been displaced from their 
homes and forced to take refuge in army barracks, police stations and the emir’s palace.  
 Those earlier few religious violence in Nigeria, except the Sabon Gari case, have been 
described by Falola (1998) as the Maitatsine riots after the founder of the extremist group 
earlier mentioned, Muhammadu Marwa Maitatsine. The Sabon Gari Muslim-Christian 
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violence came at a time Nigeria first saw major religious manipulations leading to the crises 
of the scale mentioned. The next violence was to happen in Kafanchan in March 1987, 
which was sparked by a clash between Muslim and Christian students of the College of 
Education in Kafanchan, Kaduna State. The crisis spread to other parts of the state and 
threatened the stability of the entire nation. It took nearly two weeks to bring the situation 
under control. Ibrahim (1989) notes that it was only the second time Muslims and Christians 
fought each other in the kind of manner seen in 1987.  
Another period of mayhem linked to the two religions happened in Tafawa Balewa in 
Bauchi State in April 1991. The problem that time was reportedly caused by a quarrel over 
meat sold to a Muslim boy by a Christian boy, which another Muslim claimed might not be 
Halal.25 The violence, according to Ishaku (2009: 65): “…soon spread to other towns in 
Bauchi State with massive casualties and colossal destruction of property and places of 
worship.” In the same year in Katsina there was a religious riot that came to be known as 
the Fun Times riot. It followed the publication of an opinion survey in Fun Times magazine in 
Lagos (a stable of Daily Times) in which they alleged “Prophet Muhammad had an affair with 
a woman of easy virtue and later married her,” (Ishaku 2009: 67). Hackett (2003: 58) 
explains that the riots, which took places in March/April 1991, were in reactions to the 
newspaper report and that one Yakubu Yahaya, a follower of the national Shi’ite religious 
leader, Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, had led thousands of supporters to burn down the office of the 
government-owned Daily Times. The report was actually published by the magazine in 
December 1990. The riots spread to Kaduna, Kano and Sokoto.  
The next bout of fighting between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria was in Kano 
over the coming of a German preacher Reverend Reinhard Bonnke in October 1991. Like all 
                                                             
25 Halal is the food recommended for Muslims to consume. Meat especially has to come from an animal 
slaughtered by a Muslim following certain Islamic procedures. 
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others that one also left in its trail a huge number of deaths, destruction of property worth 
millions of Naira and internal displacement of thousands of people. The second crisis in 
Tafawa Balewa erupted in April 1992 due to misunderstanding between Muslims and 
Christians over the use of abattoir. It was the turn of Kaduna again in May 1992. It was 
caused by initial riots in Zangon Kataf in February 1992 over the relocation of a market 
place. Corpses of slain Muslims had been brought to Kaduna and taken to the Mosque and 
this provoked reprisal attacks on Christians in Kaduna, Zaria and Ikara. There were clashes 
also in September 1994 in Potiskum and in December 1998 in Maiduguri. While the former 
was as a result of a disagreement with a local police officer the latter was over the 
introduction of the teaching of Christian Religious Knowledge (CRK) in schools in Borno State 
(Ishaku 2009: 72).  
 It is instructive to note that Nigeria was under military rule the greater part of the 
time these crises erupted; apart from the ones in the early 1980s. In 1999 there was a 
return to civil rule and former military leader Obasanjo became the elected president. With 
him came a new set of elected governors in the 36 states of the federation. In the North 
some decided to introduce Sharia law in their states. Zamfara was the first to implement the 
law in January 2000 and by the end of 2001 twelve of the 36 states in Nigeria had 
introduced Sharia. There were riots in many parts of the North either in support of or 
opposition to the system of law. In most cases lives were lost followed by reprisal attacks in 
the South (South-East).  
Between September 1999 and 2000 there were also inter-communal clashes in the 
South (South-West) between the pan-Yoruba group Odua People’s Congress (OPC) members 
and non-Yoruba citizens residing in the West leading to deaths and the destruction of 
property.  But the worst situations happened in Plateau State beginning from September 7, 
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2001 when the first of the series of conflicts on the Plateau erupted in Jos, Plateau State 
capital, between Muslims and Christians. Reports had it that a Christian woman walked 
through a Friday prayer session and was accosted by Muslims, leading to frayed nerves and 
people from the lady’s side intervened and it snowballed to clashes that lasted nearly a 
week and spread to other parts of the state. The violence intermittently raged until May 
1994 culminating in the siege of Yelwan Shendam26 and sacking of the entire settlement. 
The insensitivity of the then state governor, Joshua Dariye to the crisis in Yelwan Shendam 
led to his suspension from office for six months and the imposition of a state of emergency 
in the state by President Obasanjo. This action was faulted by many as it lacked 
constitutional backing, yet it restored normalcy in the state for the rest of Obasanjo’s tenure 
in office.  
On November 28-29, 2008 there was a fresh outbreak of violence in Jos under the 
new government of Jonah David Jang. It was also under newly elected President Umaru 
Musa Yar’adua. The violence, blamed by opposition parties on the ruling PDP, was according 
to a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report of December 21, 2008 due to dispute over a Local 
Council election in which the contest was between a Muslim and Christian candidates. They 
drew support from people in their religions. In the ensuing violence at least 500 people 
were killed, many by security forces drafted to bring the situation under control. Based on 
interviews with scores of eyewitnesses, HRW published a report on December 21, 2008 
documenting several incidents in which police and military personnel killed over 90 civilians. 
It categorically notes that almost all of the victims were Muslims/Hausa/settlers and that 
                                                             
26
 On May 2-3, 2004, following persistent but isolated attacks between the people of Shendam and Yelwan 
Shendam who are neighbours a major siege of Yelwan Shendam was carried by people from Shendam assisted 
by a large army of militants from several other places. A Human Rights Report said the attacks started with the 
killing of a woman and her two children who had gone to fetch firewood in the early hours of May 2 and 
continued to the next day, with several different groups invading and retreating (see HRW report via 
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11755/section/5) accessed 5 June, 2011. 
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the killings took place after the governor had issued a shoot-on-sight order. The report 
states that:  
The vast majority of the killings were perpetrated by the anti-riot Police Mobile 
Force, commonly referred to as the MOPOLs... According to witnesses, all of 
these victims were Muslim men, most were young, and nearly all were 
unarmed at the time they were killed. Human Rights Watch urges these 
investigative bodies to investigate the allegations of widespread killings by 
security forces as well as the circumstances surrounding, and consequences of, 
Governor Jang’s shoot-on-sight order.  (Dufka 2008: 1) 
Although there was no spread of the violence beyond Jos it brought back the fear of 
reprisals seen between 2001 and 2004 in the state. And in January 2010 there were clashes 
in the city between Muslims and Christians. There were different explanations of the cause 
of the crisis. One had it that a Muslim man whose property had been destroyed in the 
November 2008 violence wanted to rebuild it but was prevented by Christians, who are 
predominant in the area. This led to a disagreement and fighting that spread to other parts 
of the city. The second version, reported by the then commissioner of police in the state, 
Gregory Anyantin was that a Sunday Church service was subject to an unprovoked attack by 
Muslim youths. That spread to other parts of the city. But Anyantin’s account was said to 
have sparked more violence and killings in other parts of the state the next day as Muslim 
settlements in the outskirt of the capital and other parts were attacked.  
In one of the horrific cases the Fulani settlement of Kuru Karama was razed and 
women and children were killed and their bodies dumped in wells and latrine pits. In March 
2010 there was what was believed to be revenge killings by Fulani herdsmen in a quiet 
settlement in the outskirt of Jos, Dogo Na Hauwa. Again, women and children were 
47 
 
butchered in cold blood. Despite the heavy presence of joint military and police security 
operations in various parts of the state many more killings, mostly isolated, continued to 
take place up until the run-up to the April 2011 general elections. The elections further 
precipitated more clashes on April 16-17, which initially were in protest against alleged 
malpractices but turned into religious violence as places of worship were attacked. The 
violence took place in at least 10 Northern states including Plateau, Bauchi, Kano and 
Kaduna. 
So far attempts have been made to look at the background of Nigeria and the media 
in the country. It is important to understand the impacts of the historical experiences of the 
people and the kind of cultural orientations that developed over a number of years and how 
these might have contributed to what is happening today. Against the above backdrop, the 
next section of the thesis will be discussing Nigeria’s political culture. 
1.5 NIGERIA AND POLITICAL CULTURE 
The concept of modern-day political culture is linked to the 1950s, especially in the US. One 
of the outcomes of Second World War was that different political institutions were 
emerging and social scientists wanted to understand and explain why people had decided to 
adopt such systems. For example, while in some countries the system was based on 
democracy in some it was autocracy (Olick & Omeltchenko 2008). But the term political 
culture became well known with the American political scientist, Gabriel Almond and his 
colleague, Sidney Verba (1965). Almond (1965), who asserts that “every political system is 
embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action,” also published a 
ground-breaking study of political cultures in five countries in the early 1960s, namely: 
Britain, Italy, Mexico, USA and West Germany, (Olick & Omeltchenko 2008; Eatwell 1997: 
16). The study led to the scientists advancing a theory that stable democracies needed 
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certain set of attitudes, grounded on a complex balance of subject and participants cultures; 
it was also necessary for such democracies to have high levels of system support and social 
trust nurtured by corresponding memberships of diverse groups (Eatwell 1997). Based on 
their study they revealed that Britain and America were the classic civic cultures. Seymour 
Martin Lipset is also another social scientist that has contributed to the development of 
studies in political culture by arguing that democracies that survived for long were 
disproportionately located in the richer and more Protestant nations.  
Another contribution is by Sharkansky (1969), who asserts that state political culture, 
measured by a one-dimensional scale ranging from moralism through individualism to 
traditionalism, is associated to features of popular participation patterns, the bureaucracy, 
and certain governmental programs (Johnson 2001: 499). There is also the work of Wegener 
who, like Sharkansky (1969), based his discourse of political culture on the individual 
attitude and its effect on the state as well as the impact of the relationship between leaders 
and followers on people’s perception of political action and values etc. 
A country’s political culture is, based on the foregoing, the combination of people’s 
diverse cultures or ways of life in a political system. Thus, the political culture of a society 
“consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the 
situation in which political action takes place,” (Verba 1965: 513). It has also been defined: 
 …as the pattern of successive alliances embedded in a specific cultural 
context, it can be seen as a dialogue or conversation between rationalities 
(and alliances): some cultural biases are loudly voiced, others are muted. 
Differences are rooted partly in the cultural context. (Mamadouh 1999: 479) 
In Nigeria the political culture has been described by Falola (2009) as consisting 
primarily of violence. Falola (2009: 171) argues that violence: “…is often used to resolve 
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major arguments and conflicts between the state and its citizens, between the state and its 
component units, and between civil society and the state.” Yet other aspects of the 
happenings in the society contribute towards making the political culture a mixed-bag of 
several issues, like corruption and ethnicity/tribalism. It is instructive to note that in the 
Nigerian society the three work pari passu i.e. corruption-ethnicity-violence. In the First and 
Second Republics, as was discussed earlier, civil rule was on both occasions sacked by the 
military on allegations of corruption and tribalism/nepotism. In the case of the First 
Republic, Isichei (1983) points out in Major Nzeogwu’s address on the day of the coup the 
allegations of corruption and tribalism, which the coup plotters wanted to rid Nigeria of by 
sacking the Republic and eliminating its principal officers. Unfortunately, the composition of 
the coup leaders, all from the South (six from the East and one from the West) gave them 
the same bad image of tribalism, and by implication prone to corruption. But the allegations 
were not entirely wrong about the Republic, even though tribalism and corruption were, 
and still are, part of the larger picture in the country.  
In the years of military rule we also saw how tribalism/ethnicity largely influenced 
the removal of the General Aguiyi Ironsi following a pro-North coup in which he was killed 
and replaced by a Northern although Christian officer in the army, Gowon. Gowon did not 
do much better as his promises to return the country to civil rule yielded no fruit until his 
removal through another coup by General Murtala Muhammed. Muhammed’s effort to 
fight corruption did not last long as he was sacked less than a year after he came to power. 
The same old story continued from Obasanjo, to Shagari, Buhari, Babangida, up until the 
current regime of Goodluck Jonathan. Corruption clearly remains Nigeria’s major problem as 
Richard A Joseph’s (1987) work Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: the rise and fall 
of the Second Republic suggests. Joseph had attempted a critical look at the nature of 
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corruption in the Second Republic and how political offices are seen as a means to amassing 
‘spoils’ and rewarding clients. His findings further confirm the entrenchment of a culture of 
corruption. There’s also Daniel Jordan Smith’s (2007) book A Culture of Corruption 
explaining the various patterns corruption is perpetuated in the Nigerian society. Smith 
(2007: 122) observes that during elections Nigerians vote for the best patrons because they 
are aware that they can only benefit from democracy before politicians occupy public 
positions; once in office their access to political leaders is only through the structures of 
patron-clientelism. 
 Earlier on Falola’s (2009) take on the role of violence in Nigeria’s political culture was 
mentioned. It is necessary to explore this argument at this point. Falola’s (2009) position 
stems from current and past events in the country and it looks at the manner in which the 
entity called Nigeria today was created by Britain in the early 20th century using force. For 
instance, the colony of Lagos was established after it was forcibly annexed in 1906. Then, 
there was the conquest of the Sokoto caliphate, the invasion and destruction of Benin 
Kingdom, the humiliating defeat and humbling of the Ijebu, all through violence. 
Simultaneously, labels were used to cast the invaded people negatively and justify the 
violence meted on them. Falola (2009: 171) states: “They presented the Aro as brutal slave 
traders, the Ekumeku as murderous insurgents, and the Muslims as blood-thirsty crusaders.” 
Since Nigeria regained independence violence has continued to dominate its political 
culture as Falola (2009) notes, arguing that the situation became so severe that the scholar 
Ali Mazrui once expressed a fear of resurrection of the warrior tradition in Africa’s political 
culture. By 1966 Nigeria’s First Republic had violently collapsed and within a year the 
country had been dragged into a costly civil war leading to the death of one million people.  
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The tradition of violence continued after the 30-month civil war although there was 
a brief interlude in the 1970s. In the 1980’s, following dwindling economic fortunes of the 
country, for the first time Nigeria began to witness sectarian violence on a large scale in 
furtherance of that culture of violence. It eventually became a commonplace for violence to 
occur and for followers of the two main religions to pick up arms at the slightest 
provocation as is witnessed today in Plateau State and many parts of Nigeria. The climax of 
all this is the current clear division of the country on the grounds of ethnicity and religion. 
The media, as Hallin and Mancini (2004: 26) have noted, reflect the divisions in their political 
environment and that journalism in any part of the world is not expected to be plainly 
neutral. The media in Nigeria may be, therefore, actively participating in nurturing this 
culture, especially the print media which is the most vibrant strand. However, the picture is 
not entirely gloomy as there might still be some who, despite the inclination towards 
bandwagon, choose to practice ethical journalism.  
1.6  THE SEARCH FOR FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY 
The world is obviously very diverse with states in different parts practising different types of 
systems of governance. In previous discussion of political culture it was noted that social 
scientists were concerned about the reasons for these differences and sought to explain by 
carrying out studies in various parts of the world. David Almond and Sidney Verba (1965) 
were foremost in this search for answers. In the same vein the media in different parts of 
the world are very different since the sort of freedom those under liberal democracies enjoy 
in the course of doing their job is not the same as those under dictatorship, communism or 
monarchy enjoy. The variations stem from the different systems of governance and 
willingness/unwillingness of rulers to grant much freedom, which they fear might 
undermine their hold on power. In order to sufficiently understand how they operate we, 
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therefore, are not able to apply a uniform strategy or theory for studying them in different 
places under different conditions.  
 Acknowledging this difficulty arising from the differences mentioned, in their book 
The Crisis of Public Communication Jay G. Blumler and Michael Gurevitch (1995: 60) note 
that: 
Clearly the relationship of mass media institutions to political institutions is 
assumed in all states to have consequences of major import and is never left to 
chance. All political systems must one way or another regulate the 
performance of media institutions in the political field. 
In order to get round the problem of comparative cross-national analysis of media systems 
they suggest the adoption of certain methodologies, which they refer to as: 
 …a framework, consisting of four dimensions that include: degree of state 
control over mass media organisations; degree of mass media partisanship; 
degree of media-political élite integration; and the nature of the legitimising 
creed of media institutions. (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995: 61)   
It is important to note at this point that while Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) are 
concerned with trans-border studies of media system hence this framework, our study is 
specifically within the precincts of the geo-political entity called Nigeria. It is therefore not a 
cross-national research even though a wide level of diversity exists among the constituent 
units of the federation. In terms of comparison, this study intends looking at the media 
operating in the two main regions North and South (West and East). However, before 
expounding this further it is essential to also introduce the work of Daniel C. Hallin and 
Paolo Mancini Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics (2004). In it 
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they seek to expand and simplify the work of Blumler and Gurevitch (1995). They admit that 
theirs is only an attempt to: 
…build on previous work, refining it based on our attempt to make sense of the 
patterns of difference and similarity we have found among countries covered 
here, and to link these patterns to the social and political context in which they 
evolved. (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 21) 
Against the above backdrop Hallin and Mancini (2004: 21) propose a framework for 
comparing media systems in Western Europe and North America which consists of: 
development of media markets, with particular emphasis on the strong or weak 
development of a mass circulation press; political parallelism that is, the degree and nature 
of the links between the media and political parties or, more broadly, the extent to which 
the media system reflects the major political divisions in society; the development of 
journalistic professionalism; and the degree and nature of state intervention in the media 
system.  
Again, we are back to the issue raised in relations to the strategy earlier 
recommended by Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) as this one also is based on cross-national 
analysis and might not be easily applicable to our specific situation without modification. It 
is pertinent to take into cognisance the political history of Nigeria particularly the pre-
colonial separateness of the people that were forcibly united under colonialism and 
compelled to continue to live a sort of marriage of convenience. It is also essential to 
consider the manner in which the media emerged and the lop-sidedness that characterised 
that emergence. It is equally important to note how the media have been part and parcel of 
the cleavages in the system and might be keen on promoting those. Oyobvaire (2001) has 
noted the transition from dichotomy (North versus South) to trichotomy (North/West/East) 
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and finally multichotomy (36 states). Yet the same old North versus South politics has 
continued to dominate the thinking of the people and the media see themselves and are 
seen from this perspective too. It is also very helpful to understand Toyin Falola’s (2009) 
assertion that Nigeria’s political culture is essentially violence due to the nature of its 
constitution by Britain using force and how that legacy has been bequeathed to the people. 
In addition, other factors have been discussed, like corruption and tribalism, combining to 
make up the country’s political culture. All this will explain how the media have attempted 
to play their watch-dog role in a massively expanding (in terms of population) country like 
Nigeria. It will also help in understanding what roles the media have played in the inter-
religious violence in the country which reached its climax on the Plateau (Jos and other 
towns and villages). 
Finally, it is essential to explain that the main theoretical framework adopted for this 
study is the qualitative phenomenological approach, under which the researcher hopes to 
(based on their own background experience), investigate and interpret the phenomenon 
through the views/experiences of participants in the study. But, since this study also 
involves examining newspaper reports Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) framework for comparing 
the media systems in Western Europe and North America will be contextualised and 
appropriately cited in discussions. Other theories, like the media effects model and critical 
political economy approach, might also be referred to in the course of the discourses. 
However, they will by no means be allowed to influence the emergence of themes or 
direction of discourses. Participants’ phenomenology will be allowed to subjectively 
determine the course of discussions and data representation of their phenomenology will 
be appropriately illustrated wherever required.  
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1.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter is crucial to this study. Hence attempts have been made to lay down a solid 
base in this chapter by situating the variables to be examined within certain historical 
context. For instance we have tried to place the entity Nigeria within a historical context; 
the same thing was done with the media and then sectarian conflicts in the North of the 
country. These are the major issues to be examined: religious violence, the involvement of 
newspapers in it, and within the boundary of Northern Nigeria.  
 In order to understand how things work in Nigeria the country’s political culture was 
also analysed. And to explain why this study needs to be done the aims/objectives have also 
been highlighted, as well as the significance and research questions that must be answered 
in order to achieve the objectives outlined. The background of the study has also been 
explained in order to clarify the context, while attempts have been made to look at some 
theoretical frameworks that might be applied to discussions later in the study. From what 
has so far been discussed it is obvious that religious violence is a major problem in Nigeria, 
but it’s also important to understand the factors that cause, provoke and continue to fuel or 
maintain it. Understanding the role of the media in the crises is essential and could lead to 
further insight into the problem and ways of resolving it. 
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                            CHAPTER TWO                                                              
                                                  Literature Review   
                 Theories and Studies on Violent Conflicts     
2 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter attempts to look at the various social psychology theories explaining aggressive 
behaviours in human beings and the eruption of violent conflicts. This is essential as the 
theories might provide some explanations for the violent crises that have been witnessed 
especially in the last two to three decades. Such theories as basic needs, drive, biological, 
aggression-frustration, realistic conflict, social identity etc. will be explained and examples 
will be looked at by studying some major violent conflicts, bringing out the nature of the 
involvement of the media. First of the conflicts to be studied is the Rwandan ethnic violence 
in which there was ethnic cleansing of the Tutsi minority by the ruling Hutu majority. 
Second, the Bosnian violence will also be looked at to understand the background (root 
causes) and how perceived insecurity by the Serb majority played a role in igniting the war 
and its final resolution. Third, the Darfur ethnic cleansing, the role of the Sudanese 
government as well as factors within Darfur contributing to the violence will be explored. 
Fourth, attempts to understand the genesis of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland will be 
made, bringing out the nature of the polarisation of the system between the Catholic and 
the Protestant and consequent resort to violence. In each the main causative factors will be 
examined and the role played by the media will be discussed. Finally, attempts will be made 
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to look at how the evolution of Nigeria, the emergence of the media and the religious 
violence discussed in Chapter One can be linked to understanding this study by exploring 
previous reporting of the conflicts by Nigerian media. This will further provide the necessary 
gap for the main study in this thesis. 
2.1 THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS 
It is essential to also set a context for this chapter by examining violence and its relationship 
to human beings. Put differently, this section intends considering issues like why human 
beings sometimes become hostile in their environments or in relations to other human 
beings, why people become very aggressive and allow the aggression to climax to violence 
and even the destruction of lives and property. Social psychologists have advanced various 
arguments and theories in a bid to provide answers to these questions, yet many of these 
theories appear to be in conflict with each other and suggest there is no single reason to 
explain violent eruptions in different human societies. For instance, while a particular 
conflict might have features of all or most of the factors, some might just have one. This is 
due to the specificity of each situation and the manner in which the reactions have arisen. 
The terms aggression, violence and conflict will be briefly explained before the various 
theories explaining sources of conflict are discussed.  
Aggression, according to Geen (1990), refers to a number of things that may actually 
mean different things. Kool (2008: 37) argues that aggression involves delivery of a noxious 
stimulus to a victim but such behaviour will be considered aggression if it includes: intention 
to hurt the victim; aversive consequences are expected; and given the opportunity, the 
victim might have avoided harm. However, social scientists have posited that the above 
definition is not broad-based and suggest the use of the term violence rather than 
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aggression. Kool (1993) explains that the term violence is used in group or institutional 
context whereas aggression is used when referring to an individual case. Barak (2003, cited 
in Kool 2008: 37) states: “violence involves an action or structural arrangement leading to 
physical or nonphysical harm to one or more victims.”Conflict, however, could result in 
violent or nonviolent struggles. Conflict in a general sense is described as “a struggle over 
values and claims to scarce status, power and resources” (Boulding 1962: 5; Jeong 2008: 5). 
Conflicts arise as people struggle over scarce or limited resources. Competition results in 
antagonism, ethnocentrism, discrimination and prejudice (Levine & Campbell 1972; Leyens, 
Yzerbyt & Schadron 1994: 46). Violent conflict is particularly caused by deeply embedded 
social grievances. These grievances may be made worse in situations where there is 
perception of discrimination against certain groups, leaders are not seen to be neutral in 
mediation or the political entrepreneurs use rhetoric or inflammatory statements (see 
Bellamy, Williams & Griffin 2007). Explaining how the use of rhetoric or propaganda helps to 
electrify people to violence Zimbardo (2009: 11) writes: 
It requires a ‘hostile imagination’, a psychological construction embedded 
deeply in their minds by propaganda that transforms those others into ‘The 
Enemy’. That image is a soldier’s most powerful motive, one that loads his rifle 
with ammunition of hate and fear. The image of a dreaded enemy threatening 
one’s personal well-being and society’s national security emboldens mothers 
and fathers to send sons to war and empowers governments to rearrange 
priorities to turn plowshares into swords of destruction. 
Human nature, according to some psychologists, is linked to aggression or violence, 
which is usually ignited given the slightest chance. Such theorists try to make analogy 
between humans and animals and claim that the urge to fight and dominate is inherent in 
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human species (Lorenz 1966 & 1974; cited in Jeong 2008). It is on this basis that Jeong 
states: 
In pessimistic views, a violent conflict may be inescapable in human 
relationships due to unconscious motivations alone…or in combination with 
competition for limited supplies of basic necessities.  
The argument that violence is inherent in human nature is further explained by the 
biological theory which comes from the belief that aggressive behaviour is genetic and as 
each human grows older the gene manifests through interaction with the environment and 
such manifestation is instinctive. Freud (1920) explains that instincts of life and death are 
fundamental, with the one for life ensuring life’s preservation through behaviour while the 
one for death causes life’s destruction. In times of conflict humans are forced to channel 
their energies inward or outward and that following an outward reaction, arising from the 
blockage of libidinal impulses, aggression leads to violence - destruction or killing – (Kool 
2008: 41). But this assumption by Freud (1920) has been challenged by other scholars who 
postulate arguments like social and economic factors etc. For instance, Ardrey (1976) has 
opined that human beings are territorial animals that are xenophobic and do not tolerate 
the presence of strangers in their territory. In order to preserve themselves and defend 
their territory they acquire weapons and resort of violence.  
 Another assumption is that previous traumatic experience could galvanize a group of 
people into becoming very aggressive. This school of thought, psycho-political trauma, 
attempts to explain the Israeli reaction as a result of their experience of the holocaust and in 
response to perceived Arab (Palestinian) threat. Another example is the ethnic cleansing in 
the former Yugoslavia which the psycho-political trauma theory would explain as an 
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outcome of the reservoir of trauma from the WWII atrocities in the Balkans (Jeong 2008: 
46). 
 Under the drive theory human beings are believed to be pushed by non-instinctive 
forces into taking actions that might be considered aggressive or violent. The predisposition 
of human beings to violence increases when there is interference with their desire to 
achieve certain goals and not necessarily as a result of human instinct or genes. This position 
was advanced by John Dollard and his colleagues (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer & Sears 
1939). The failure to achieve a goal leads to frustration, which is then vented on the 
blocking source or a weaker target in the form of aggression (Frustration-Aggression 
Hypothesis or FAH). It is essential to note that in a situation like this it is not always the 
blocking source that is targeted but a weaker one is invented and attacked. The explanation 
of this deliberate invention and targeting of a scapegoat has been described as scapegoat 
theory (Leyens et al 1994; Jeong 2008; Kool 2008). One of the men accused of carrying out 
the genocide in Rwanda was quoted thus:  
Our Tutsi neighbours, we knew they were not guilty of no misdoing, but we 
thought all Tutsis at fault for our constant troubles. We no longer looked at 
them one by one, we no longer stopped to recognise them as they had been, 
not even as colleagues. They had become a threat greater than all we had 
experienced together, more important than our way of seeing things in the 
community. That’s how we reasoned and how we killed at the same time. 
(Zimbardo 2009: 15-16) 
Arousal is equally crucial in understanding how people react to situations. For 
instance Zillman (1994) posits that arousal from one source could merge with arousal from 
another source to result in increase or decrease in aggressive reaction to a situation (also 
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see Kool 2008: 47). An example here is a man who spends the whole day on his farm 
working only to come back home and be provoked by an otherwise minor issue. Such a 
person might react in a way that could shock many. In Zillman’s (1994) excitation-transfer 
theory, man’s aggressive reaction follows a mislabelling of a cognitive cue (provocation) not 
the initial arousal. There is also the emotional experience, the psychology of humiliation 
school which provides explanation for violence by suggesting that people could resort to 
extreme reactions when facing such emotional challenges as despair, disempowerment, 
helplessness and a desire for revenge. Given people’s social experiences feelings of hate and 
rage are developed, which end up shaping their relationships with others. 
 Negative moods which result in collective political action often follow the failure of 
government or leadership to live up to their task of providing people’s social and material 
needs. People’s standards of living begin to decline while they face increased burdens and 
threats like rising rate of unemployment, declining material production and scarcity of 
essentials. Jeong (2008: 50) notes: 
Thus, a shift from social and economic progress to a state of recession is 
encountered with a high level of uncertainty and anxiety. Relative deprivation 
arises from a gap between people’s expectations and their actual obtainment 
especially commensurate to capabilities. 
The scenario above usually ends in violent reactions as people who see their situations 
suddenly changing for the worse amidst growing uncertainty become frustrated and 
aggressive. As Jeong (2008) explains the frustration is due to increasing gap between 
anticipated and manifest reality. Basic needs, physical and psychological, if they are not met 
often result in ethnic or identity-based conflict. Such essential needs include security and 
safety (from fear and anxiety), belongingness and love, recognition and acceptance by 
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others, dignity and feelings of personal fulfilment (Galtung 1990; Jeong 2008). Of all these 
needs, seeming threat to or non-fulfilment of identity and security needs lead to conflict 
most often. These are ontological needs that must be met so as to maintain peace and 
stability. 
 In further attempts to understand the role of competition for basic resources in 
precipitating violent reactions realistic conflict theory (RCT) needs to be mentioned. 
Following studies in a summer camp for adolescents in 1949, 1953 and 1954, RCT shows 
how group interactions are established and cohesive groups are formed on the basis of 
competition and conflict (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif 1961). The researchers also 
observed how cohesive groups were easily formed and members became aggressively 
competitive, resorting to name-calling and raids to defend the interests of their newly 
formed groups; while such intolerant competition went on leaders of the groups, clearly 
benefitting from the conflict, did nothing to control their members or restore sanity.27 
 Among the issues mentioned under the basic needs theory are belongingness and 
love. People are quite concerned about others’ perception of them and at the same time 
see their distinctiveness as essential. This often provides a strong motivation for forming a 
different identity. As much as other basic needs are important, the issue of group identity 
and perceived inequalities could precipitate organised violence (Bellamy et al 2008). Identity 
formation results in the creation of in-groups as opposed to out-groups. It is through this 
perspective that issues are seen and interpreted. Any perceived threat to identity leads to 
violent reactions during which boundaries are further defined and fortified. Jeong (2008: 55) 
observes: “Stronger, exclusive identity increases the chances for an in-group to defame, and 
justify discrimination against an out-group with the development of stereotypes.” Identity 
                                                             
27 RCT is further explained in Chapter Seven where it is applied in one of the discussions. 
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provides a strong basis for mobilising support and unifying people under a common culture, 
common heritage or even certain historical myth binding the people together. Identity, 
when politicised, results in the categorisation of people on the basis of religious, ethnic, 
tribal or even occupational differences. This results in the intensification of in-group versus 
out-group competition which eventually results in hostility and potential violence. 
 The group identity formation argument is further corroborated by Stewart (2000: 15-
18; cited in Bellamy, et al 2007: 252) who suggests that mobilisation occurs: where 
members of the group experience a relative similarity of circumstance; leaders must see 
violence as being helpful to their political ambitions and work hard to achieve them, by 
clearly defining group identities which might not be noticed by members unless pointed out 
by outsiders; there is economic and political differentiation among groups i.e. horizontal 
inequality; and a past history of violence contributes to group identities, animosities and 
mobilisation. 
Social identity theory (SIT) contributes to various efforts to explain the role of 
identity and group formation in competition and conflicts (Tajfel 1969). According to SIT 
symbolic and not material resources are responsible for conflicts. And issues like status, self-
esteem and beliefs override objective benefits in importance. Interdependence is central to 
this theory as it says members of a group become aware that their destiny depends on 
interdependence (Leyens, et al 1994). People, therefore, form a group when they are aware 
of the interdependence of their destiny (Rabbie 1991). SIT also discusses in-group 
favouritism, arguing it is usually induced by factors like shared fate or objective 
competition.28  
                                                             
28 SIT is also further explained and applied in one of the discussions in Chapter Seven. 
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South Africa’s xenophobic violence against foreign nationals in 2008 was an example 
of group formation in order to defend the interest of an in-group. The main cause of the 
violence was economic as unemployment rate rose sharply among South Africans while 
immigrants were perceived to be relatively more comfortable. Following a study Steinberg 
(2008) argues that the perpetrators of the violence blamed their plight (poverty) on 
foreigners who were stealing what by right belongs to them. Thus, they see competition for 
resources as a zero-sum game in which foreigners’, particularly Zimbabweans and 
Mozambicans, gain was their loss. The violence represented a vehement resistance to 
economic domination by immigrants. Both RCT and SIT attempt to explain how people 
resort to such resistance, sometimes violently, in order to maintain a status quo or ensure 
that any threat is eliminated. In the next section of this chapter attempts will be made to 
review studies on four different conflicts to understand where some of these factors fit in. 
2.2 STUDIES ON VIOLENT CONFLICTS 
In this section brief review of studies of violent conflicts in four countries will be presented. 
The conflicts to be reviewed include the Rwanda Genocide (1994), the Conflict in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, the Conflict in Darfur and the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. Attempts will be 
made to look at them individually in order to understand the historical basis of the conflicts 
and causes, the protagonists and extent of violence, victims and media 
reporting/involvement in the conflicts. 
2.2.1   The Rwanda Genocide 
Like most African countries Rwanda is a product of the Berlin European Conference for the 
partition of Africa. Following the division of Africa Rwanda (Ruanda) was recognised as 
Germany’s given that it was the first European country to have arrived there (Rwanda) 
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about 100 years earlier (Grunfeld & Huijboom 2007c). Rwanda had existed as a well-
organised monarchy before the arrival of colonialists; it was well-structured, highly 
controlled and hierarchical. Its population was divided into three groups: the Twa (1 per 
cent); the Tutsi (17 per cent); and the Hutu, who constituted the large majority. They were, 
however, not seen as different tribes since they spoke the same language, shared the same 
religion, had the same historical myths and lived in the same places. But their differences 
were mainly in physical appearance. The Twa were very diminutive, the Hutu with Bantu 
features looked broadly built and short, while the Tutsi had taller, thinner, sharper and 
angular features. The Tutsi produced the monarch, chiefs and king’s as well as important 
positions in the monarchy while others, particularly the Hutu, simply obeyed.  
As was the case in most places where there was a structure as organised as that the 
Germans did not tamper with it but introduced indirect rule and boosted the Tutsi 
domination of others. But it was the Belgian colonial policy that contributed immensely in 
sowing the seed of discord that later imploded leading to the genocide in 1994. After their 
defeat in WWI Germany lost Rwanda to Belgium and from 1926 its policy further reinforced 
Tutsi supremacy over the Hutu and Twa. For instance a new policy merged provincial, hill 
and district chiefs’ positions into one and Tutsis were given almost all the slots. A new 
landholding policy favoured the Tutsis over the Hutu, just as a new privatisation rule 
ensured they gained access to land previously owned by Hutus. The Tutsi also had access to 
education which helped them rise higher, over and above the Hutus in terms of positions of 
public authority (Grunfeld & Huijboom 2007c). A major decision that sharpened this division 
was the introduction of ID cards by the Belgians in 1933 to differentiate the three tribes 
(Zimbardo 2007: 14). And with the ID as a guide Hutus suffered more discrimination and 
many fled to neighbouring countries.  
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By 1957, despite a UN pressure on Belgium to allow Hutus access to administrative 
positions, there was a Hutu mobilisation and by 1959 violence led to 2000 deaths. In 1962 
Tutsis dominance effectively ended as Rwanda became an independent country with a Hutu 
president, Gregoire Kayibanda. Kayibanda introduced extreme Hutu nationalism, abolished 
the monarchy and installed a quota system in education and employment giving Tutsi a 
mere nine per cent. He made life completely unbearable for Tutsis who became victims of a 
sustained hate campaign and massacre, and many fled to neighbouring Uganda for refuge. 
Despite the overthrow of Kayibanda by military officer Juvenal Habyarimana in 1973 
discrimination against Tutsis continued although with less violence. By October 1, 1990 Tutsi 
refugees who had joined the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) invaded Rwanda, 
starting a three-year civil war. By that time France had replaced Belgium as Rwanda’s 
European ally and French President Francoise Mitterrand provided military support for the 
small Rwandan army. Despite being beaten back the NRA were later able to regroup, re-
strategize and fight back under the leadership Paul Kagame. 
There is a need to observe the trend here, how the crisis continued to fertilise under 
the watch of various European powers until the genocide. The German and Belgian colonial 
policies encouraged minority Tutsi domination, while the French policy supported the Hutu 
violent suppression of the minority Tutsi and moderate Hutu population. Between 1991 and 
1993 Hutu extremism reached its peak and laid the foundation for the genocide.29 Following 
international pressure Habyarimana allowed multiparty politics and by April 1992 he was 
forced into a coalition government with extremist Hutus from Kayibanda’s party and 
constituency. This led to the reinvigoration of anti-Tutsi hate campaigns and violence, as 
                                                             
29
 Following the invasion by RPF the country‟s defence minister urged people to track down and arrest 
infiltrators. They were also told to burn down houses of „inyenzi‟(cockroaches) and kill Tutsis. Many innocent 
Tutsi elites and Hutu moderates became victims of this hate campaign. 
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well as the formation of a militia, Interahamwe, which enjoyed military training and access 
to arms imported from France. Between January and June 1991 Interahamwe members had 
systematically killed 1000 people. The massacre continued into 1992 up until March when a 
local radio report alleged a plot by Tutsis to kill Hutus and called on the government to act 
by ‘clearing the bush’ (that is, kill the Tutsis) and by the next day a fresh wave of killings 
began leaving in its trail 300 deaths while 1500 Tutsis were forced to flee. This attracted 
international concerns with the Canadian, US, and Belgian ambassadors either urging 
Habyarimana to act to bring the perpetrators to justice or report to their countries indicting 
the government of Habyarimana for using soldiers to carry out the massacre of Tutsis. Their 
French counterpart refused to be part of this action. Despite the Arusha Peace Accord the 
killings continued and towards the end of 1992 it was clear a Hutu racist death squad, 
Akazu, was responsible for the killings and was planning Tutsi extermination, including their 
supporters like Hutu moderates and peace workers. It was also discovered that 
Habyarimana’s wife, Agathe Kanzinga and her three brothers were senior members of the 
squad. France was also said to have continued to sell weapons to the Rwandan government 
despite warning signs of impending genocide. For instance, in the spring of 1992 the Belgian 
ambassador to Rwanda, Johan Swinnen, was said to have reported to his country his finding 
of a secrete group poised on exterminating the Tutsis. 
Early in 1993 a report by an International Commission of Human Rights groups 
revealed the government-backed massacre of 2,000 Tutsis between 1990 and 1992 and that 
more than 10,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates were detained under deplorable conditions. 
They blamed Habyarimana’s government for such Human Rights violation by soldiers, militia 
and civilians. The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions 
Bacre Waly Ndiaye was the first to tacitly mention ‘possible genocide’ in reference to the 
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killings in Rwanda, following his investigation from April 8-17, 1993. In the inter-communal 
violence he said Tutsis were largely targeted for the simple reason of their membership of 
an ethnic group. Ndiaye’s report was published in August 1993 and the HRW published 
similar warnings thereafter and even suggested France’s involvement in the conflict, 
including arms shipment from Egypt and South Africa with France’s support. According to 
HRW: 
France has supported the Habyarimana regime for many years, even sending 
French troops to assist in the army’s actions against the RPF, in October 1990 
and again in February 1993. In Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human 
Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War published in January 1994, Human Rights 
Watch documented French participation in arming and training the Rwandan 
army. Along with Egypt, France has received representatives of the self-
proclaimed government, thus helping accord them respectability in the 
international community.  (HRW, 1994: 16) 
But neither the UN nor the international community took any of the early warning signs 
seriously and the situation was allowed to degenerate. 
2.2.1.1   The role of the media in the genocide 
As early as March 1992 there was a local radio broadcast claiming Tutsis were planning to 
kill Hutus and the report called for a pre-emptive attack on Tutsis. This was followed by 
widespread killings the next day targeting Tutsis mainly, at the end of which about 300 were 
massacred while 1500 fled for safety. Grunfeld and Huijboom (2007: 74) observe that: 
Integral parts of the hate propaganda against the Tutsi minority were the 
hate-inciting radio broadcasts and newspapers articles. Kangura, the most 
racist newspaper in Rwanda, started publishing four years before the outbreak 
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of the genocide and became more violent in its expressions towards April 
1994. 
Another extremist media involved in the genocide was Radio Television Libre des Collines 
(RTLMC) which became prominent in the hate propaganda from 1993. Kangura, which 
means wake others up, published extremely racist articles like the “Ten Commandments” in 
which it painted Tutsis as the enemy and Tutsi women as enemy agents. A prominent 
female government official involved in the massacre, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, reportedly 
encouraged and supervised the rape of Tutsi women. Perhaps it was in line with this enemy 
frame Kangura created of Tutsi women, but one of the reasons suggested for Pauline’s 
action was: 
…the widespread sense of the lower status of the Hutu women compared to 
the beauty and arrogance of Tutsi women. They were taller and lighter-
skinned and had more Caucasian features which made them more desirable to 
men than Hutu women. (Zimbardo 2009: 14) 
Kangura consistently called for the maintenance of the purity of the Hutu race by 
getting rid of the ‘impure’ Tutsi and referred to them as inyenzyi or cockroaches. Apart from 
Kangura and RTLMC there were 42 other journals and 11 newspapers actively involved in 
the enemy campaign and linked to Akazu (Chretien 1997; Grunfeld & Huijboom 2007: 76). 
Both Kangura and RTLMC were owned by Hutu extremists with Akazu members as 
stakeholders. They used pop and street language as a strategy of attracting audience and 
allowed access to people who could express extreme anti-Tutsi opinions. Their hate 
messages were spread to a population made up of over 70 per cent illiterates through 
rumours – someone who read the paper or listened to a report shares with others and even 
70 
 
exaggerates. Allan Thompson (2007: 2) describes the role played by Rwandan hate media in 
inciting people to murder: 
The voice of Hutu Power was the private radio station RTLM, established by 
extremists who surrounded the president. And RTLM was an echo of other 
extremist media, notably the newspaper Kangura. Once the president’s plane 
was shot down by unknown assailants, the message from RTLM was 
unmistakable: the Tutsi were to blame; they were the enemy and Rwanda 
would be better off without them. The killings began almost immediately in 
Kigali through the night of 6-7 April. 
The assassination of President Habyarimana after his plane was shot down was the 
trigger for the genocide, as Thompson (2007) mentioned above. But it was clearly not the 
cause. On board the plane were neighbouring Burundi President Cyprien Ntaryamira, 
Rwandan chief of army staff Deogratias Nsabimana and three French crew members 
(Grunfeld & Huijboom 2007: 153). One thing that has remained a mystery despite its role in 
the genocide is the identity of the attackers of the president’s plane. While no one has 
owned up no serious investigation has been done to reveal those responsible for the plane 
downing. The most popular conspiracy theory is that Hutu extremists hoping to prevent the 
implementation of the Arusha Accord for power-sharing between Hutus and Tutsis carried 
out the assassination so as to also blame it on Tutsis and carry out the genocide. Roland 
Paris (2007: 73) explains that within minutes after the missile had struck the plane near 
Kigali airport members of the Presidential Guard and CDR militias mounted roadblocks in all 
parts of Kigali, killing Hutu and Tutsi politicians, activists, journalists and clerics that had 
supported the democratic transition agreement or criticised delay in implementing it. The 
killings continued for the next three days and spread to other parts, with peasants further 
71 
 
executing the genocide. Within a space of three months about one million Tutsis had been 
killed and an estimated four million had been displaced from their homes (Jones 2001) 
The international media, by being only interested in the early part of the crisis and 
misunderstanding its nature, added to the problem. Thompson (2007) notes that most 
international news media mistook the genocide for a tribal warfare and were only 
interested in the scramble to evacuate foreign expatriates. And by mid-April, when the 
killings reached a peak, only a few were left behind. The only clear evidence of the cruelty 
meted out was captured by Nick Hughes from the top of a building. If there were lots of 
international journalists around to observe and report the killings that would probably have 
changed the behaviour of the perpetrators or mitigated the slaughter.  
2.2.2   The Bosnian Ethnic Warfare 
In order to comprehend the nature of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) that is 
usually referred to as the Bosnian war or Bosnian ethnic cleansing there is a need to look at 
the wider conflict in the federating units constituting former Yugoslavia. President Titos’ 
death in 1980 signalled the gradual disintegration of the country he had held together as a 
communist leader – there were increasing quests for independence and nationalism 
(Trifunovska 1997). Chandler (2000: 19) notes:  
In 1989, Yugoslavia was a federal state consisting of six republics, Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. By the end 
of 1999 only two republics, Serbia and Montenegro, remained within the rump 
of the federation which was undergoing further disintegration with 
Montenegro seeking greater autonomy and Serbia having lost control of the 
province of Kosovo. 
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In June 1991 war broke out in the former Yugoslavia after two constituent republics, 
Slovenia and Croatia, declared their independence from the Yugoslav federation 
(Trifunovska 1997). Fighting broke out between Slovenian nationalists and the Yugoslav 
National Army (JNA) in Slovenia on the one hand, and between Croatian nationalist forces 
and ethnic Serbs resident in Croatia, on the other hand. While in the case of the war in 
Slovenia it only lasted 10 days with JNA forces forced to withdraw from Slovenia, in the case 
of Croatia it raged for quite a few months as ethnic Serb militias enjoyed support and 
supplies from JNA. A ceasefire was only agreed at the end of 1991 after Serb militias and 
JNA had secured control of a quarter of Croatia’s territory (Paris 2007: 97; Chandler 2000).  
 In March 1992, following a referendum Bosnia also declared its independence from 
Yugoslavia. Bosnia’s ethnic and religious divisions need to be understood at this point, 
especially how they came into play in the referendum. In fact the entire disintegration of 
Yugoslavia is blamed on two main factors, namely: the ethnic differences of the constituent 
units; and the territorial ambition of Slobodan Milosevic who became Serbia’s president in 
1987 (Chandler 2000). Trifunovska (1997: 52), emphasising the ethnic and religious factor 
states:  
…those generations, who might remember the creation of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in 1918, the state – made up ‘artificially’ of many 
culturally and religiously different entities – has never been destined to 
succeed. 
For instance in Bosnia, Bosniaks (Bosnian Sunni Muslims) constituted 44 per cent of the 
republic’s population. The Bosnian Serbs (Orthodox Catholic Christians) made up 31 per 
cent, while the Croats (Roman Catholic Christians) were the least in number and comprised 
17 per cent of the population (Steinberg 1993: 41; Paris 2007: 98; Chandler 2000: 24; O 
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Tuathail & O’Loughlin 2009: 1046). The Muslims and Croats wanted independence and 
overwhelmingly voted for it in the referendum, but the Serbs were against it, so they 
abstained.  That development led to further disagreement and sporadic shootings by 
paramilitary supporting the three major ethnic groups (O Tuathail & O’Loughlin 2009: 1046). 
The war witnessed ethnic cleansing as the Serbs were particularly accused of forcefully 
evicting and sometimes executing Muslims and Croats in territories under their control, but 
the Muslims and Croats were equally alleged to have been involved in ethnic cleansing 
especially during the Croat-Muslim war of 1993-94 (Shrader 2003; O Tuathail & O’Loughlin 
2009: 1047). Initially the war was between a coalition of Muslims and Croats against the 
Serbs, but with the collapse of the alliance forces on the sides of Muslims and Croats began 
fighting each other as well as fighting the Serbs. The war became three-pronged, to the 
substantial advantage of the Serbs, who annexed for themselves up to 70 per cent of the 
territory (Paris 2007: 98). 
 Despite a UN mission to protect civilian lives and provide relief material Bosnian 
Serbs were able to blockade and invade two designated safe areas – Srebrenica and Zepa, 
where massive ethnic cleansing took place. More than 7000 Muslim men and boys were 
said to have been executed in Srebrenica (O Tuathail & O’Loughlin 2009: 1047) and 
concentration camps operated by Serbs discovered. In the Trnopolje concentration camp a 
Muslim woman told of how her husband was detained and eventually killed (Clark 2009: 
427). No fewer than 100,000 lives were lost in the Bosnian war while an estimated one 
million people were internally displaced and more than one million became refugees (O 
Tuathail & O’Loughlin 2009: 1047). 
 The conflicts were finally resolved after the Muslim and Croat forces agreed a re-
alliance in the summer of 1995 to reconquer territories Bosnian Serbs had taken control of.  
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At the US-mediated talks in November 1995 at a military base near Dayton, Ohio the Dayton 
Accord for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was produced. It was agreed on November 21 
and signed formally in Paris on December 14, 1995. Among the issues decided were the 
convening of elections for pan-Bosnian political institutions with a three-member 
presidency and a bicameral parliament. It was also arranged that the country would be 
divided into ethnic sub-units: areas controlled by Muslims and Croats would become the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while those under Serbs would form the Republika 
Srpska and each would have their democratically elected political institutions (Paris 2007: 
99). 
2.2.2.1    The Role of media in the conflict 
The most visible role often mentioned played by the media in those conflicts was in the 
manner of reporting, particularly by the international media. This was based on the belief by 
the US forces that they could win the war and lose the media war. Hence the need to 
develop a cleverly mediated relationship with media, in which favourable news is reported 
and the not so good news is “buried” (Skoco & Woodger 2000: 79). Even then, in the latter 
part of the war NATO forces felt they were not fairly represented in the media. However, in 
the early 1990s the press in Yugoslavia were commended for being the closest thing to 
democracy. With a growing new media market they demonstrated a high sense of 
dynamism and even criticised their own governments’ handling of the war. Such privately 
owned media as Dnevni telegraf, Danas, Nasa Borbi, Blic and Glas among others, were said 
to have been influential and rebuffed attempts to censor them (Gocic 2000: 88). 
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2.2.3   The Conflict in Darfur 
The crisis in Darfur can be traced to the 1980s when drought and desertification forced the 
nomadic tribes to abandon their homes and encroach on lands belonging to farmers in 
search of food, water and grazing land. This often triggered clashes between the farmers 
and the nomads, although at a point they were able to devise a strategy of seasonal 
migration to deal with the drought and avoid clashes (Salih 2008: 3). The conflict situation in 
neighbouring Chad is also believed to have impacted on Darfur as arms freely found their 
way to the region with which armed bandits were able to carry out acts of violent 
intimidation. There was also the Libyan factor and this is in reference to the Islamic 
Brigades, five of which were set up by Libya and based in Darfur. Salih (2008: 3) further 
argues that this movement of arms coupled with militarisation resulted in the use of the 
region for covert operations by foreign military forces and organisations under the guise of 
Humanitarian Aid.  
Since the 1960s the government in Khartoum had neglected and politically 
marginalised Darfur and this played a major role in radicalising the people in the 1990s, but 
the rebellion was temporarily crushed. By 2003 the armed resistance had regained 
momentum to continue its campaign. There were attacks on government targets, like 
military forces stationed in some parts of the region.  The attacks by rebel groups, the Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Olsson & Siba 2010: 5), 
provoked harsh government response, thereby escalating the crisis (Salih 2008; Apsel 2008). 
However, even before the 2003 attacks it has been suggested that systematic ethnic 
cleansing were being perpetrated by about 5000 Janjaweed fighters trained and equipped 
by the government of Sudan (Burr & Collins 2006: 292; Apsel 2008: 241). 
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 The SLA and JEM targeting of Sudan’s military led to the government retaliating on 
the people of Darfur through direct military hostility and its proxy armed group, Janjaweed 
(Burr & Collins 2006). Ethnic cleansing was carried out with rape used as a major weapon 
against women while many people were either ousted from their homes or forced to flee 
out of fear. As of 2008 more than four million people were affected in one way or the other 
just as over 2000 villages and hamlets were burned or destroyed (Apsel 2008: 241; 
Markusen 2009: 103). More than one million people are internally displaced and 200,000 
have taken refuge in Chad (Markusen 2009: 103).  
 The killings by Janjaweed also have racial motivation as findings have found the 
perpetrators’ “systematic killing of civilians belonging to particular tribes…large scale 
causing of serious bodily and mental harm to members of the population belonging to 
certain tribes…”  (Markusen 2009: 103). The fact the most people caught up in the violence 
often do not have a choice of what side to belong to has helped in giving the conflict ethnic, 
racial, regional and religious interpretations. Apsel (2008: 242) argues that the population of 
rebel fighting alongside SLA, JEM and other factions has greatly risen since the escalation of 
violence in 2003 due specifically to the extremely atrocious response of the government. 
And that most of those backing the rebels do so in expression of racial and tribal allegiances.  
 The neglect and marginalisation of Darfur and its people was earlier mentioned as 
one of the causes of the conflict, which fuelled the attack on government forces. The rebels 
in Darfur were hoping that since Khartoum was involved in negotiations with the late John 
Garang-led Southern People Liberation Army (SPLA) from the South of the country their 
case would be treated with the same urgency and be included in the talks. But that has not 
been the case and they have suffered much. 
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2.2.3.1   The role of the media in Darfur conflict 
As in the case of the Bosnian war Darfur media coverage is considered here in terms of the 
way the conflict was reported. Arab media in general do not have the kind of press freedom 
that media in the West enjoy. Often they are subjected to censorship, particularly in terms 
of what they report and how they do it. For instance, during the conflict journalists were 
often restricted to doing studio-based news reporting relying heavily on packaged (tailored) 
information. Since the information or press releases usually come from the government 
they are made to present only the sort of information the government is happy to allow the 
public to consume. There is also the use of tough rules and a mixture of religious and 
nationalism sentiments to get journalists to conform to government overtures of making 
sure only what suits them is reported and not the exact reality. A report by the Sudan 
Tribune (March 27 2007) said the Sudanese government had banned the media in the 
country from publishing or reporting details of any criminal cases related to Darfur. The 
message which was circulated to the editors-in-chief of the major newspapers did not give 
any reason for the ban. But this is one of the tactics the government is believed to be 
employing to ensure news about atrocities in Darfur is hushed. There were also reports of 
intimidation and veiled threats against foreign media and journalists by the authorities in 
Khartoum. 
2.2.4  The Troubles in Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland’s Troubles is another classic example of a conflict that has dragged for a 
long while, although there have been long periods of cessation of violence. The conflict has 
its root in the British rule of the 32 counties of the island of Ireland under the Act of Union in 
1801 (Morrissey, Fay & Smyth 1999: 51). By 1916 what could be conveniently described as 
the first rebellion against British rule by the forebears of Irish Republican Army (IRA) was 
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witnessed although the rebellion was crushed and the protagonists executed. This 
development dramatically galvanised the people into rebellion as by 1918 the hitherto less 
popular Sinn Féin – the pro-independence political party – became substantially popular and 
won a massive victory in the elections that year (Morrissey, et el 1999: 51). This laid the 
basis for further struggle, initially against British rule but currently for the unification of the 
islands. 
 The conflict can be traced to the creation of Northern Ireland and Irish Free State in 
1920 under The Government of Ireland Act (Morrissey, et al 1999: 52; Holloway 2005: 13). 
Given the pattern the sectarian division in the island had taken, two highly polarised groups, 
the Protestants and Catholics, emerged. While the Protestants favoured being part of 
Britain in order to escape becoming a permanent minority in an Irish state dominated by the 
Catholic, the Catholic, for obvious reasons preferred independence. In 1920 six of the nine 
Ulster counties were excluded from Home Rule arrangements and the six counties were left 
under the administration of a pro-union majority, with its own government enjoying 
devolved powers while Britain continued to retain final authority (Holloway 2005; 
Morrissey, et al 1999). Although not enjoying absolute independence the Protestant 
majority in the new Northern Ireland were more comfortable with this arrangement than 
being in a united Ireland under Catholic-majority domination. On their part the Nationalists 
(Catholic) became isolated and felt unsafe in a Protestant-dominated state. A Free Irish 
State comprising 26 counties in the South of the island was also created, triggering off a civil 
war between those who felt comfortable with the new face of the islands and those who 
saw it as a betrayal. This paved the way for a series of campaigns of violence in the 1920s, 
1940s and 1950s.  
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 A clear picture of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland began to manifest between 
1920 and 1922 when series of attacks targeting the Catholics were carried out in Belfast 
resulting in the death of over 400 and nearly 2000 sustaining injuries (Foster 1988: 526; 
cited in Morrissey, et al 1999: 52). The leadership did not do much to calm the tense 
situation as they continued to make statements further hyping sentiments. For instance the 
first Prime Minister Sir James, later Lord Craigavon, reportedly described the new 
parliament as “a Protestant Parliament for a Protestant people,” (Morrissey, et al 1999: 52). 
These happenings and domination of the political scene by the Ulster Unionist party 
confirmed the fears of the Catholic minorities and contributed immensely in causing the 
security issues and crisis in the region. This eventually led to the imposition of an emergency 
legislation to deal with increasing security challenges as the Catholic minority were seen as a 
threat and their allegiance doubted. The police and armed reserve forces were militarised 
and mainly had Protestants in their services.  
 Although post Second World War events, including the economic boom experienced 
by Northern Ireland, had weakened anti-partition campaigns by IRA, the Northern Catholic 
population still felt marginalised and were more affected by poor conditions of living 
(housing and unemployment) (Morrissey, et al 1999: 55). Inspired by the civil rights calls in 
the US a Catholic middle class emerged campaigning for social change through peaceful 
means under the aegis of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (Holloway 2005: 16), 
which reached its peak in 1968 during the ‘one man one vote’ protests. It was clashes at the 
protests with the police that gave rise to what came to be known as the Troubles. The 
protests had been improperly handled by the police, while government loyalists attacked a 
three-day civil rights march. This fuelled sectarian protests across Belfast and kindled the 
Battle of Bogside in Derry/Londonderry. With government being unable to effectively 
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handle the crisis troops were despatched from Britain. The troops were soon considered 
one-sided and pro-Protestant, causing the revival of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 
relying on paramilitaries and enjoying a massive support from the Catholic population, 
especially following a wave of sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing. There was also the 
displacement of more than 21,000 people from their homes. From 1972 the crisis escalated 
as Britain imposed a direct rule in Northern Ireland and considered means of putting in 
place a political system acceptable to all (Holloway 2005: 17-18). 
 Violence and bombing campaigns continued until the Anglo-Irish Agreement was 
signed in 1985, bringing in the Irish government to play a consultative role in resolving the 
problem. On August 31, 1994 IRA formally announced its renouncement of violence, which 
was a condition for its inclusion in talks. In the violence that lasted 25 years 3535 lives had 
been lost. Despite the ceasefire more lives were still lost in intermittent bombings and 
attacks; in fact between the ceasefire in 1994 and the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 the 
number of deaths recorded was 69 (Morrissey, et al 1999: 64). And on Friday, 17 April, 1998, 
despite initial difficulties with Ulster Unionists refusing to ‘negotiate with terrorists’ i.e. Sinn 
Fein, the Good Friday agreement was reached. 
2.2.4.1   The Role of the Media in the Conflict 
The role of the media in the entire conflict is not much different from those earlier 
discussed as three main national newspapers have been mentioned for contributing in 
stoking the problem even before the ‘Troubles’ began in 1968. The Belfast News Letter was 
founded by a strongly unionist family in 1737 but later taken over by a group of unionist 
businessmen; the Irish News is a pro-Catholic publication established with the help of the 
Catholic Bishop of Down and Connor, it advocates constitutional nationalism; and the 
Belfast Telegraph, which is a centrist with appeal to both sides and high sales. Of the three it 
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is only the Belfast Telegraph that presents a moderate, more objective view of the conflict. 
Kingston (1995: 205) observes that there are several other local newspapers but often do 
not produce sectarian or propaganda news as those newspapers and journals established 
for the purpose of promoting sectarian and political interests.  
 It is important to note that none of the major parties, the Official Unionist Party 
(OUP) and Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) runs a successful newspaper although 
they rely on those aligned to their side for support. The most extreme publication is the 
Revivalist, founded in 1955, and portraying its founder Rev. Ian Paisley’s anti-Catholic 
feelings. Both the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Irish Republican Army (IRA) had journals 
to promote their propaganda and were immensely used to manipulate the audience. The 
importance of the media to the parties in the Northern Ireland conflict, as Kingston (1995) 
observes is that each side tried to use it to psychologically defeat the enemy and garner 
more support for its cause. On the part of the British press many also wanted to keep up 
sales in the conflict region and usually had separate editions for Northern Ireland. Yet they 
were not seen to be significantly criticising government policies that were unpopular at 
some point. An example is the handling of the prisoner hunger strike in the 1980s in which 
the government of Margaret Thatcher allowed 10 protesting prisoners to die while on 
hunger strike rather than change its position. Although there was criticism of government 
handling of the matter it was not robust enough to bring about the concession the prisoners 
had hoped for. 
2.3 REPORTING SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA 
In this section there is further discussion of how sectarian conflicts were reported by the 
media, whether the reportage was objective, balanced, fair and truthful or not. As was 
mentioned in Chapter One the first of these violence erupted in the early 1980s through the 
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Maitatsine extremist group.  The violence which started in Kano spread to other parts of the 
North and within a few years many parts of the North had been affected. Although at the 
beginning it was an extremist Muslim group against the rest of the population – Muslim and 
Christian – the violence in Sabon Gari, Kano on October 30, 1982 saw, for the first time, a 
direct fighting between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. Usman (1987) describes this 
development as a dangerous and systematic manipulation of religion as opposed to the 
unity of the country. Other similar violent conflicts continued to occur up until 2011. 
 In reporting these conflicts which have come to characterise relations between 
Muslims and Christians in Nigeria one needs to take into cognisance the location, ownership 
and the choice of news values of the newspapers in the country. For instance in the South, 
where most of the newspapers are located and owned by non-Muslim and non-Northern 
proprietors, their reportage is highly likely to be in consonance with their specific situations. 
There is also a need to consider Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) assertion that no media in any 
part of the world can be entirely neutral. Also, the media in the North, given the 
circumstance of their founding are most likely to continue the rivalry with Southern press 
even in terms of reporting conflicts in which there is a clash between Muslims and Christians 
or the North versus the South. The New Nigerian for instance has been described as “the 
voice of the North and also the voice of Islam in the North” (Kukah 1993: 73). During the 
Kafanchan religious crisis of 1987 the New Nigerian was, alongside FRCN Kaduna, accused of 
publishing or broadcasting anti-Christian inciting reports (Hackett 2003; Ibrahim 1989; 
Gofwen 2004: 154-155) leading to the escalation of the violence.  
 In the same vein Southern newspapers allowed their sympathy for Christians and the 
South to determine how they reported the Kafanchan violence. Ibrahim (1989: 68-69) refers 
to the The Guardian of March 14, 1987 that wrote about the ‘Mullahs of easy violence’ and 
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thereby stereotypically painting Muslims as violent people; and the Standard of March, 13 
and The Punch of March 14, both of which ignored the sufferings of Muslims but 
conveniently demanded compensation for the Christian communities.  
 In the sectarian violence that erupted in Jos, the capital of Plateau State, in 
November 2008 despite the killings of 133 mainly Muslim youths by security personnel as 
documented by the HRW report of December 21, 2008, the South-based newspapers 
showed no sympathy as they continued to emphasise the killing of youth corps members 
from the South by hoodlums from the Muslim side. The North-based media like Daily Trust 
were also said to have particularly showed interest in the plight of the Muslim and Northern 
victims alone. This manipulative media reporting later impacted on the clergy who as 
religious leaders rather than being the conscience of the society and criticise wrongdoings 
even by their own followers chose to look the other way. It was against this backdrop that 
Haruna30 notes:  
It is, I believe, the lack of even-handedness in reporting and condemning 
political violence that camouflages as religious violence by both the media and 
the clergy which is the greatest obstacle against the emergence of democracy 
in Nigeria. 
Ishaku (2009: 135) also comments on the manner in which newspapers report religious 
crises in Nigeria as follows: 
What we have been witnessing in the reportage of the ethno-religious conflict 
in northern Nigeria is a form of journalistic recklessness that reflects total 
                                                             
30 Mohammed Haruna is currently a columnist for newspapers in both the North and South and was formerly the 
Managing Director of the New Nigerian. The above comment was published in his article „The Media and the 
Genocide in Jos‟, Daily Trust [Online Edition], Available at: 
http://news.dailytrust.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=349&Itemid=1:testset,   accessed 3 
December 2008. 
84 
 
disregard for the truth or the continuing survival of Nigeria as a corporate and 
sovereign entity. 
Ishaku (2009: 136) goes further to mention some Northern newspapers like the New 
Nigerian and Daily Trust as well as broadcast media like FRCN Kaduna, the Hausa versions of 
international broadcast organisations like the BBC, VOA, Radio France International (RFI) 
and Deutsch Welle (DW) as pro-Islamic North. The international broadcasters Ishaku (2009) 
mentions have their Hausa sections staffed predominantly by Muslim Hausas and this 
means they usually have more access to Hausa sources which might determine the 
perspectives projected in their reports.  
 A broader discussion of the media reportage of sectarian violence in Nigeria will be 
presented in Chapter Four, where critical discourse analysis is applied in studying the 
manner, framing and even frequency of reporting each side in the conflict. This study will be 
presented by analysing the reportage of the November 28-29, 2008 conflict by two Nigerian 
newspapers. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
Lynch and Galtung (2010: 3) argue that “the first victim in a war is not truth: that is the 
second victim. The first victim is, of course, peace.” Truly, with the eruption of any violent 
conflict peace is murdered and in the process of justifying this act falsehood is peddled 
endlessly. The media as the society’s watchdog cannot afford to be involved in peddling lies 
yet they often fall into this trap, especially where they are founded or directly controlled by 
proprietors bent on using them for the purpose of propaganda or inciting hate. In our 
previous discussions of the four case studies in this chapter we saw how in each case the 
media were either used or they struggled to spurn such efforts. By being objective even 
when peace is murdered journalists might be able to mitigate the negative impacts of 
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violence. For instance, in the genocide in Rwanda the international media were said to be 
more interested in reporting the evacuation of expatriates than the actual violence and as 
soon as the evacuation was completed they hurriedly left the country, leaving the victims of 
the conflict at the mercy of the murderers. Thompson (2007) has argued that if only there 
was enough international media reporting of the actual killings as they were perpetrated it 
might have forced the perpetrators to change their behaviour at least, or might have 
resulted in the mitigation of the crimes. But British journalist Nick Hughes was perhaps one 
of the very few that stayed behind and captured the only clear evidence of the cruelty as it 
happened. Its impact remains far more than still pictures of mutilated bodies and if there 
had been more of such the world might have acted faster and more robustly than it did. 
 Objectivity in journalism is a prerequisite for effective, ethical practice. It goes hand-
in-hand with balance and truth to make the combination perfect. Lynch and Galtung (2010: 
51) have noted that: “Objectivity, balance and truth are like motherhood and apple pie.” In 
the same vein Mano (2005: 58-59) has argued that journalists see themselves as 
professionals, whose work is motivated by truthfulness, accuracy, objectivity and balance – 
all essential to give their work credibility (Mano 2005; citing McNair 1998). Jay Rosen (Lynch 
& McGoldrick 2005a: 203; cited in Lynch & Galtung 2010: 51) has, therefore, defined 
objectivity as: 
…the value of fairness, which is extremely important. It’s the ethic of 
restraining your own biases, which is also important…It’s the idea that 
journalism can’t be the voice of any particular party or sect. 
 In all four case studies it is arguable that the above argument about objectivity was let 
down, except in the case of Bosnia where some newspapers struggled not to be 
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manipulated by their governments. Yet there were issues with the international media 
reporting as often a stereotypical picture of the conflict was painted and the NATO forces 
wanted a friendlier reportage. In Rwanda both the RTLMC and Kangura were effectively 
utilised by the Hutu to demonise the Tutsi and encourage the extermination of the inyenzyi 
or cockroaches, as they used such an extreme enemy frame to drive home their anti-Tutsi 
message.  
In Darfur it was clearly a one-way thing as the government had the media in its 
control and simply urged them not to report crimes relating to the Darfur ethnic cleansing. 
With such a blatant censorship Darfur victims were left with no voice to speak out against 
the cruelty they suffered or to tell the world their plight.  In Northern Ireland, the most 
developed of the four, the newspapers were as polarised as the society and this takes us to 
what Hallin and Mancini (2004) mention about difficulty in being neutral and, more 
importantly, the fact that the media could be linked to political parties or become a 
reflection of the cleavages in the society they operate. Both the Belfast News Letter and 
Irish News are linked to the Protestants and the Catholics respectively, just as the SDLP and 
OUP have benefitted from the support of the media. 
The Nigerian context of this analysis has also revealed how the media in sectarian 
violence often rise to the defence of the religion or tribe they are sympathetic to. In the 
North the New Nigerian, Daily/Weekly Trust and FRCN Kaduna were fingered for often rising 
in defence of the North and Islam. In fact, the New Nigerian has been described as the voice 
of the North and Islam. In Southern Nigeria where most of the media are based many 
including the Guardian, Tribune and the Punch were mentioned for their roles in pro-South, 
pro-Christian propaganda while presenting stereotypes of the North.  
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One of the aims of this thesis is to find out how and why the media in Nigeria got 
involved in manipulative reporting, especially in times of religious crises, which we have 
tried to discuss in Chapters One and Two. In Chapters Four, Five and Six attempts will be 
made to further understand this issue particularly through the analysis of specific 
newspaper reports and interviews with both journalists/media owners and the 
audience/readers. Meanwhile, in Chapter Three the methodologies this researcher has 
engaged in this thesis will be discussed.       
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                          CHAPTER THREE                                                              
                                 Research Methodology   
3 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter discusses and describes the various methodologies this researcher has 
employed to carry out this study based on their suitability to the specific nature and needs 
of the study. In the chapter attempts have been made to explain certain philosophical 
paradigms on which research studies, including this one, are based. It takes a look at 
ontology and epistemology and how they can be linked to this study, leading to the choice 
of research design, research methodology and data analysis techniques. By and large, not 
only the choice of techniques used in carrying out the study is discussed but the rationale 
for such decisions is also elucidated. 
Gray (2004) has cautioned against dogmatically grounding one’s study on a specific 
research approach or philosophy as this will mean imposing an avoidable constraint. Thus, 
there might be a need to use more than one strategy and in the process there is a possibility 
of comparing or testing results/findings obtained through one strategy against those got by 
employing another technique. This takes us to the idea of triangulation, which has been 
explained as the use of more than one method or source of data in the study of social 
phenomena (Bryman 2004: 275; Flick 2009; Gray 2004; Davies 2007). Triangulation is further 
defined as the use of “multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, sources of data, and 
methodologies” (Denzin 1970: 310; cited in Bryman 2004: 275). 
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Against this backdrop, this researcher has adopted triangulation albeit with slight 
modification in the sense that the research is based on the application of three different 
qualitative research techniques to compare and/or strengthen outcomes. Given the type of 
phenomenon under study this researcher has adopted the qualitative method and to 
further explore this option an attempt has been made to understand the relationship 
between ontology and epistemology, on the one hand, and how they are related to the 
study, on the other hand.   
3.1  ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY & SOCIAL REALITY 
Ontology is the study of being, the study of the nature of existence or what is (Gray 2007; 
Davies 2007; Grbich 2007). Epistemology, however, is the study of what it means to know, 
the philosophical background to understanding what knowledge is legitimate and adequate 
(Gray 2007: 16; Grbich 2007). Bryman (2004: 3) also describes ontological issues as those 
concerned with whether the social world is considered as something external to social 
actors or something that is in the process of being shaped by people. Creswell (2007: 17) 
suggests that ontological issues are linked to the nature of reality and its characteristics and 
researchers doing qualitative research deal with multiple realities. In the same vein 
epistemology has been explained by Bryman (2004: 11) as concerned with the question of 
what is seen as satisfactory knowledge in a particular field or discipline. Epistemology is 
further described by Grbich (2007) as a Greek word, episteme, meaning knowledge and 
logos, meaning theory. It asks questions about truth or what we accept as truth and how 
this has been constructed. Bryman (2004) adds that a major issue here is whether it is 
possible to study the social world using the same principles, procedures and ethos as the 
natural sciences as an epistemological position known as positivism has argued (Bryman 
2004: 11). While epistemology is useful in helping one choose a research design and 
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analytical processes like positivism, constructivism, postmodernism and post-structuralism, 
Creswell (2003, cited in Creswell 2007:16) outlines five major philosophical assumptions a 
researcher conducting a qualitative study makes. These assumptions, Creswell (2007) says, 
are a position toward the nature of reality (ontology), how knowledge is acquired by the 
researcher (epistemology), the function of values in the research (axiology), the language of 
research (rhetoric) and the method employed by the researcher to do the study 
(methodology). Following the above explanations of epistemology Creswell (2007) argues 
that in carrying out a qualitative study researchers attempt creating as close a rapport as 
possible with the people being studied. 
Epistemology is important in research because it, amongst other reasons, helps in 
clarifying issues of research design through evidence gathered like interpreting the how, 
why and where questions and to have the knowledge of research that will help determine 
which design will work or not (Creswell 2003; Creswell 2007). It also gives one the 
philosophical background to decide the type of knowledge to seek or apply in the process of 
conducting a study (Gray 2004). Having explained the terms ontology and epistemology, it is 
pertinent to mention that this researcher will attempt linking them to a theoretical context 
within which this study may be based. Attempts will also be made to explain the research 
design and methodologies, including the data collection techniques, applied in conducting 
the study. 
Positivism, which urges the employment of the natural sciences techniques in 
studying social reality (Bryman 2004; Flick 2009) is the theoretical perspective that is closely 
related to objectivism (Gray 2004). Objectivism has been defined by Bryman (2004: 16) as 
an “ontological position that asserts that social phenomena and their meanings have an 
existence that is independent of social actors”. And on this basis, a researcher is expected to 
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accept that there is a reality out there which must be discovered at the end of the study. 
Research is therefore about discovering this reality or the objective truth according to the 
positivist/objective epistemological position (Gray 2004: 17). 
Constructivism (constructionism) has been defined by Bryman (2004: 17) as “an 
ontological position that asserts that social phenomena and their meanings are continually 
being accomplished by social actors.” It is opposed to the argument put up by positivism 
about objective reality and argues that rather than just existing in some external world truth 
and meaning are created through interaction with the world; meaning is not merely 
discovered but constructed (Gray 2004: 17). Interpretivism is the theoretical perspective 
connected closely to constructivism (Gray 2004: 20; Creswell 2007; Grbich 2007). 
A view of this study through the prism of objective/positivist explanation of the 
external world or reality may itself become problematic, as in the end one may become 
saddled with collecting and dealing with data through empirical research techniques akin to 
the sciences but alien to the social world. Thus, understanding the strand of epistemology 
that argues that truth and meaning are constructed in the process of interaction (Gray 2007) 
with the world is essential. One should seek to go beyond mere observation of data or 
analysing them by empirical means. Interpretivism (epistemology) and constructivism 
(ontology) recognise that reality is changing and knowledge is jointly created during 
interaction between the researcher and the researched through cooperation (Grbich 2007). 
This approach is more applicable to this study.  
3.2  INTEPRETIVISM AS THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The study is strongly considered a qualitative one and based on Creswell’s (2007) suggestion 
that in carrying out a qualitative study researchers should attempt creating as close a 
rapport as possible with the people being studied, this researcher has had a close 
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interaction with the social world in order to make sense of the situation under study. 
Against this backdrop and from earlier arguments positivism cannot be an appropriate tool 
for this study and steps have further been taken to explain this.  
Interpretivism looks for culturally derived and historically situated interpretation of 
the social reality (world) (Crotty 1998); individuals try to comprehend social reality or the 
world in which they are (Creswell 2007). It argues there is no objective truth out there and 
that meaning is non-existent but created by subject’s interaction with the world or in 
researcher’s interaction with the researched (Creswell 2007; Crotty 1998). It suggests 
further that no objective knowledge is independent of thinking and that reality is viewed as 
socially and societally embedded and existing within the mind (Grbich 2007). In explaining 
the emergence of interpretivism as a school of thought challenging the dominance of 
discourse by positivism, Bryman (2004: 12) states:  
Interpretivism is predicated upon the  view that a strategy is required that 
respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural 
sciences, this means that social scientists need to grasp the subjective meaning 
of social action. 
Bryman (2004) postulates that proponents of this school have argued that the study 
of social world needs a logic of research processes that differentiates humans from the 
natural order. Reality is fluid and changing and knowledge is constructed jointly in 
interaction between the researcher and the researched through consensus. Knowledge, 
thus, is subjective, constructed and is based on the shared signs and symbols that are 
recognised by members of a common culture. And that multiple realities are presumed with 
different people experiencing them differently. To make sense of a situation, therefore, a 
researcher needs to place themselves in the research, with their own peculiar experience 
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and background shaping the interpretation of their findings (Creswell 2007). Interpretivism 
is, thus, sub-divided into five major traditions, namely: symbolic interactionism; 
phenomenology; realism; hermeneutics; and naturalistic inquiry. Each shall be briefly 
explained. 
3.2.1   Symbolic Interactionism  
This tradition of interpretivism emerged from the works of social psychologists like George 
H Mead (Flick 2009) and John Dewey who were frustrated with the irregularities of 
contemporary philosophies and social sciences (Gray 2004). The aim of this perspective is to 
draw from human interaction with the world meanings and interpretations (Davies 2007). It 
emphasises people’s objectives and actions in the world and then acts upon interpretation, 
that is meaning arises from the process of social interaction. Meaning, according to this 
school, is not fixed and is revised on the basis of experience like self or who we are. 
Researchers try to understand the process by studying the subject’s actions, objects and 
society from the perspective of the subject themselves. This entails going to the field to 
observe either by means of ethnography or participative observation (Gray 2004: 21). 
Bryman (2004) has also discussed symbolic interactionism as a tradition that explains the 
development of our notion of self by appreciating how others see us. Despite its influence 
as an interpretative tradition it has drawn a lot of controversy regarding Mead’s concepts 
and ideas that are seen to be consistent with natural sciences (McPhail & Rexroat 1979; 
cited in Bryman 2004). Symbolic interactionism contends that interaction occurs in a 
manner that the individual is consistently interpreting the symbolic meaning of his or her 
environment (including others’ actions) and acts on the basis of imputed meaning (Bryman 
2004; Davies 2004).  
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3.2.2   Phenomenology 
Phenomenology has been described as an intellectual tradition within interpretivism that is 
concerned with the question of how individuals make a sense of the world around them and 
how in particular the philosopher should bracket out preconditions in his or her grasp of 
that world (Bryman 2004: 13). Grbich (2007) adds that phenomenology attempts to 
understand the social reality or people’s experience of social reality. It argues that a new 
meaning emerges if we set aside our understanding of a phenomenon and revisit our 
immediate experience (Gray 2004). Phenomena are understood on their own merit and our 
perception of them does not taint them. It is an exploratory research through personal 
experience and tends to avoid the researcher’s bias. Phenomenology is different from 
ethnography in that it is based on human experiences of the lived world, which uses the 
individual as unit of analysis and based almost entirely on interviews (Tesch 1994; Gray 
2004; Grbich 2007). Bryman (2004: 13-14) explains that phenomenology started from the 
work of German philosopher Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) who has argued that: 
The world of nature as explored by the natural scientist does not mean 
anything to molecules, atoms and electrons. But the observational field of the 
social scientist – social reality – has a specific meaning and relevance structure 
for the beings living, acting and thinking within it. 
Unlike the belief by natural scientists that objective truth exists and can be 
discovered by means of empirical observation, Shutz’s postulation in the above quote 
suggests that reality is actually a product of joint construction during interaction 
between the researcher and the researched. Thus, meaning arises as the researcher 
gets as close as possible to the phenomenon, observers, understands and interprets 
it through the voice of the researched. 
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3.2.3   Realism 
Realism is another tradition under interpretivism and it supports natural sciences (Bryman 
2004; Grbich 2007) as it argues that the picture they paint is true and accurate (Chia 2002; 
cited in Gray 2004: 17). It argues further that cultural, organisational and corporate planning 
exists independent of the observers. Knowledge, it says, is advanced through the process of 
theory-building and discovery adds to knowledge. It adds that while some observable facts 
may be mere illusions, some phenomena can’t be observed but it admits they do exist. Flick 
(2009: 69) also explains that both realism and positivism advocate the use of similar 
principles by natural and social sciences to collect and analyse data and that they assume 
there is a world that is external (external reality) or separate from what is described 
(Bryman 2004).  
3.2.4   Hermeneutics 
Hermeneutics (also known as hermeneutic-phenomenology) argues that social reality is not 
rooted in objective facts but socially constructed. It gives more primacy to interpretation 
than explanation and description (Gray 2004). Hermeneutic phenomenological approach 
involves finding meanings of social action by actors who interpret from their own point of 
view (Bryman 2004; Grbich 2007) and that, like other strands of interpretivism, it rejects 
positivism. 
3.2.5   Naturalistic Inquiry 
Naturalistic inquiry believes that multiple constructed realities should be studied only 
holistically (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Gray 2004). It says that a phenomenon is understood only 
within its setting or environment.  
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Of the five interpretivism traditions explained this researcher is adopting 
phenomenology because the researcher finds it most suitable for the study. Particularly, 
given that phenomenology is an exploratory research through personal experience and 
tends to avoid the researcher’s bias (Grbich 2007). This researcher intends revisiting a 
previous experience, while setting aside a personal bias of the experience, and hopes to 
make a sense of the phenomenon through the interpretation of other people’s experience 
with similar phenomena. Adopting this option of interpretative perspective, which means a 
researcher taking a position from outside the particular social situation under study enables 
the researcher to discover surprising findings or those that may seem surprising (Bryman 
2004: 15). Phenomenology, as Gray (2004) suggests, uses the individual as a unit of analysis 
and based mainly on interviews. The individuals in this case are journalists, including 
reporters and editors, and their readers or audience. Attempts have been made by the 
researcher to do an exploratory study of their reportage, the situation in which they 
work/report and how it impacts on the audience. In this way the researcher also seeks to 
understand the perception of news and news reporting amongst the audience and the 
perception of audience reception of news amongst the journalists responsible for producing 
and selling news to the audience. In the next section of this chapter this researcher tries to 
explain how phenomenology affects the choice of the research design and research 
methodologies that would lead to the successful completion of the study. 
3.3  SUITABILITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
A phenomenological study gives a description of the lived experiences of a concept or 
phenomenon for several individuals and a phenomenologist concentrates on what every 
participant has in common with others as they experience a phenomenon (Creswell 2007). 
According to Gray (2004), phenomenological research is an unstructured method of data 
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collection which focuses on inductive collection of a large amount of data and is likely to 
pick up more factors that are not originally part of the study. Grbich (2007) adds that 
phenomenology attempts to understand hidden meanings, the essence of experience and 
how participants make sense of these. Essence does not exist in time and space like fact, 
Grbich (2007) suggests, but it is known through essential or imaginative intuition involving 
interaction between the researcher and respondents or between researcher and text. 
Phenomenology, therefore, involves in-depth exploration of experiences or text to clarify 
their essence.  
Creswell (2007) discusses two approaches to phenomenology and these are 
hermeneutic, on the one hand, and empirical (classical), transcendental or psychological 
phenomenology, on the other hand. Max van Manen (1997, 1990; in Creswell 2007) says 
research is directed toward lived experience (phenomenology) and interpreting the text of 
life (hermeneutics). van Manen (1990) argues phenomenology research is a dynamic 
interplay among six research activities which include researchers turning to a phenomenon 
that interests them seriously; they then ponder essential themes like what constitutes the 
nature of lived experience; they write a description of the phenomenon, while keeping a 
strong link to the topic of inquiry and balancing parts of the writing to the whole. Apart from 
being a description phenomenology is also considered an interpretative process in which 
the researcher interprets the meaning of the lived experiences (Creswell 2007; Grbich 
2007). van Manen (1990: 26) describes this as the researcher mediating between different 
meanings.  
Grbich (2007) also describes hermeneutic phenomenology as investigating the 
interpretative structures of experience or                                                                                                                                                                                      
text – public and private – art or material forms like building. The interpretative focus is 
98 
 
done either from inside or outside. While the inside involves interaction between researcher 
and text, the outside focuses on objective research. The approach is also about the 
researcher integrating parts and whole, which is essential. It posits that everyday 
transaction predominates and being is revealed through individual activities. It does not 
encourage bracketing but recommends keeping a reflective journal recording the 
researcher’s own experiences, personal assumptions and views. The process also relates to 
the co-construction of the data between one and one’s respondents, which keeps occurring 
and that the outcome involves a continuous conversation.  
Transcendental/psychological phenomenology has been described by Clark 
Moustakas (1994) as focussing less on interpretations of the researcher and more on their 
description of the phenomenon or people’s experiences.  Moustakas (1994) also draws from 
Husserl’s (1981) notion of bracketing – setting aside one’s experience and taking a neutral 
view of the phenomenon to avoid personal biases. Thus, transcendental means “in which 
everything is perceived freshly as if for the first time” (Moustakas 1994: 34). Often, this is 
very hard to achieve. Empirical, transcendental phenomenology explains a procedure in 
which, according to Moustakas (1994), researchers identify a phenomenon that needs 
researching or studying, the researchers bracket out their personal experiences, and collect 
data from several people that have witnessed the phenomenon. Collected data is then 
analysed through reduction of the information to significant quotes or statements and 
finally phrasing themes by combining the statements. In the next step the researchers come 
up with a textural description of the experiences of the participants, (what they 
experienced), a structural description of their experiences (the condition, situation or 
context in which they experienced it) and to convey a total essence of the experience by 
combining the textural and structural descriptions. Husserl (1981: 3) states:  
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To every object there corresponds an ideally closed system of truths that are 
true of it and, on the other hand, an ideal system of possible cognitive 
processes by virtue of which the object and the truth about it would be given 
to any cognitive subjective. (Grbich 2007: 85) 
Another approach is existential phenomenology which, according to Grbich (2007), 
directly poses questions to Husserlian phenomenology (essences) and the layers and 
consciousness associated to it. It argues that essence is not necessarily based on human 
experience of everyday life, but some form of cerebral reconstruction. The proponents of 
this approach are Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heiddegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Clark 
Moustakas (Grbich 2007). Sartre has emphasised a reflection on the construction of 
consciousness using the issues of freedom and choice and the concept of the ‘other’. 
Merleau-Ponty on the hand has focused on bodily selves, embodiment, the body of 
experience and its reflection in the mind. Generally, existential phenomenology emphasises 
consciousness not as a separate entity but as being linked to human experiences, especially 
in relations to the active role of the body and to freedom of action and choices. Essence is 
therefore part of human experience and that people are inextricably immersed in their 
world, which Heidegger calls Dasien or being-in-the-world. It focuses on issues of in-the-
world existence; it precedes existence according to Sartre, especially ‘being’ and provides an 
absolute beyond essence. It argues that Intentionality links humans with their physical 
contexts and within context humans have the capacity to respond and react to situations or 
relationships with others they confront, meet or attach to in their world. 
To existential phenomenology the notion of freedom in this world is individual 
responsibility not a group or society’s responsibility. Choice and responsibility, physical and 
intellectual experiences like action and emotions that eventuate and interconnect 
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individuals in ‘being-in-the-world’ all provide a focus for being, it adds. Nothingness, this 
school argues, comes through death and is the final outcome. But it disagrees with Husserl’s 
view about the process of phenomenon reduction as a necessity in order to alienate one’s 
interconnectedness in the world. Complete reduction is therefore not possible and that 
one’s experience exists; to experience other aspects individuals are inseparable from the 
worlds. Our conceptualisation of any essences is affected by the fact and nature of our 
existence and intentionality is revealed by our involvement in the world, focus on contextual 
relationship and allowing things to sort themselves not through bracketing.  
This approach is a broad movement from Husserl’s abstract to the real and uncovers 
meaning of being, which comes first in contrast to Husserl’s real to abstract. This researcher 
finds the Husserlian proposition of phenomenon reduction as a means of checking one’s 
biases interesting as much as one considers the position advanced by existential 
phenomenology on bracketing valid. One cannot run away from a lived experience and this 
has to be allowed to reflect, even minimally, as the study is undertaken. But how this is 
allowed to reflect in the research as the researcher takes a fresh look at the phenomenon 
depends on the situation when collecting data and the participants. Another point to note is 
that Husserl’s (1981) approach inclines towards either the hermeneutic or existential 
strands of phenomenology. Bracketing may or may not be necessary depending on the need 
to separate essences from human generated discourses that constitute them. According to 
Peter Wills (2004) there is a possibility of more traditional descriptions dulling essences and 
resulting in boredom for readers. In the description of lived experiences, living text is more 
appropriate and using metaphor or drawing closer to the experiences through a range of 
literary approaches like autobiography. Thus, Wills says poetry, fiction and graphic and 
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visual arts are appropriate. Moustaka’s (2004) approach focuses on subjective involvement 
and immersion, incubation, illumination, explication and creative synthesis. 
All three schools of Phenomenology have their pluses and minuses and the 
researcher considers useful those aspects of each of the approaches that may make the 
conduct of this study more appropriate. As was pointed out above, classical 
(transcendental) phenomenology, as much as it differs from the other two, inclines toward 
either of them in some ways too. While existential clearly disagrees with phenomenon 
reduction, hermeneutic phenomenology does not encourage it, neither does it discourage 
it. However, both are opposed to separating essence from experience as has been proposed 
by Husserl (1981).  
3.4  PHENOMENOLOGY & QUALITATIVE METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS 
Earlier on, it was noted that the choice of phenomenology will enable the researcher to 
appropriately apply the qualitative research method of data analysis. But there is also a 
need to understand how this works and other advantages that may result from this choice. 
Under the qualitative method Creswell (2003) explains the various strategies that may be 
applied, while Wolcott (2001) identifies 19 of such approaches including phenomenology. 
The qualitative method offers the researcher an opportunity to apply the content analysis 
(CA) or discourse analysis (DA) technique. Attempts are made in this section to understand 
both CA and DA although this researcher favours the application of a strand of DA (critical 
discourse analysis or CDA), which will be used in analysing newspaper reports within a 
specific period during the phenomenon under study, that is one of the religious crises in 
Plateau State.  
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Gray (2004) describes CA (content analysis) as a relatively modest approach which is 
used to analyse answers to open-ended interviews. Grbich (2007: 112) also describes CA as 
a commonly used method of studying and analysing documents:  
…a systematic coding and categorising approach which can be used to 
unobtrusively explore large amounts of textual information in order to 
ascertain the trends and patterns of words that have been used, their 
frequency, their relationship and the structures and discourses of 
communication. 
Bryman (2004: 181) has equally defined CA as an “approach to the analysis of documents 
and texts that seeks to qualify content in terms of predetermined categories in a systematic 
and replicable manner.” Bryman (2007) adds that it is a flexible method that is applicable to 
various types of documents and often treated as a research method due to its unique 
approach to analysis.  
On the other hand, before discussing critical discourse analysis (CDA) there is a need 
to first define discourse analysis (the parent methodology of CDA). DA is a technique that 
often uses interview material and can exemplify the concept of interpretive repertoires. 
There are different versions of this approach like Discursive Psychology (Edward 1992; Harre 
1998; Potter & Wetherell 1987), which is interested in showing how in conversations 
participants’ conversational versions of events are constructed to do communicative 
interactive work. It focuses more on the content of talk, its subject matter and its social 
rather than linguistic organisation (Flick 2009); and critical discourse analysis (Foucault 
1980) is referred to as Foucauldian Discourse Analysis, which focuses on the critique of 
ideology and power. CDA has its root in linguistics and sociolinguistics (Wooffitt 2005) and is 
associated with scholars like Norman Fairclough, Teun A van Dijk and Ruth Wodak. It is 
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primarily concerned with analysing “how social and political inequalities are manifest in and 
are reproduced through discourse” (Wooffitt 2005: 137). CDA also sees language as social 
practice (Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Wodak 2001) and considers the text of the language 
used as crucial (Wodak 2001c; cited in Wodak 2001; Benke 2000; cited in Wodak 2001; 
Wodak 2001). Kress (1990: 94) has articulated the basic assumption of CDA as: language is a 
social phenomenon, not only individual, but also institutions and social groupings have 
specific meanings and values, that are expressed in language and systematic ways; texts are 
relevant units of language in communication; readers/hearers are not passive recipients in 
their relationships to text; and there are similarities between the language of science and 
the language of institutions, and so on. 
A fundamental question this research seeks to answer is how language is used to 
demonise the other or create stereotypes, particularly in the media. Given the definition of 
CDA and how it could be utilised to understand the use of language, CDA becomes 
appropriate for this study in order to fully comprehend the phenomenon under study. Using 
CDA, attempts will be made in another chapter to look at newspaper reports covering a 
certain period in order to find out how language was used, by whom and targeted at whom.  
3.5   RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESEARCH METHOD 
A research design offers the framework on which a researcher collects and analyses data 
(Bryman 2004: 27). Bryman lists five types of research designs commonly available to a 
researcher as: experimental and related designs, like quasi-experiment; cross-sectional 
design, considered most common form of survey research; longitudinal e.g. panel study and 
the cohort study; case study design; and comparative design. On the other hand Bryman 
(2004: 27) has defined research method as a technique for collecting data like administering 
a questionnaire, doing a structured interview or participant observation. Research method, 
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he explains, is often linked to research design because the latter acts as a guide for applying 
a research method and the analysis of data collected through the process. In the same vein 
Creswell (2007: 42) suggests the consideration of ‘methodological congruence’ (Morse & 
Richards 2002) underscoring the interconnectedness and interrelatedness of the purpose, 
questions and methods of research in order to produce the study as cohesive whole. Against 
the above backdrop, the design employed in this study will be explained in the following 
subsections: 
3.5.1  Purpose/Aims of the Study 
The purpose/aims of the study, which have been stated in Chapter One, are to: (a) critically 
examine the emergence of newspapers in Nigeria and how it might be linked to their 
perception and choice of news values; (b) extensively investigate the influence of ownership 
and control among other issues, on newspapers and how it affects the reportage of 
religion/religious conflicts in Nigeria; (c) carefully determine how it might be possible for the 
media to manipulate their audiences/readers; (d) thoroughly examine the role of political 
and socio-economic factors in the crises; and (e) significantly expose the danger of 
manipulation and its relations to violent conflicts in the country. 
3.5.2   Research Questions 
In the attempts to achieve the above purpose/aims efforts have been made to answer the 
following research questions: (a) To what extent do the media (newspapers) in Nigeria 
provide a platform for promoting religious disharmony? (b) What are the factors that make 
it difficult for journalists in Nigeria not to be biased when reporting religion or religious 
conflict? (c) How are enemy images and stereotypes created in news production and 
reporting? (d) To what extent are the conflicts actually religious? 
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3.5.3   Theoretical Framework 
In view of the earlier decision to opt for a qualitative research method, the theoretical 
framework adopted is the qualitative phenomenological approach and under this strategy 
the researcher set out to understand (based on their own background experience), 
investigate and interpret the phenomenon through the views of participants in the study. 
The researcher was able to get as close as possible to the essence of the experience under 
study and report it in the voice of the researched. Since this study also involves examining 
newspaper reports Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) media system theory, the media effects 
model as a means of focusing explanation of violence on media contents as Gauntlett (1998) 
postulates and the critical political economy argument that the media are, like other 
industrial and commercial organisations, producing and distributing commodities (Murdock 
& Golding 1973) have been considered useful and will be appropriately contextualised and 
cited in the study. This is particularly important because this study is also comparatively 
looking at the reportage of newspapers from the perspective of the North versus South, 
Muslim versus Christian media ownership and/or control and how the audiences/readers 
might be influenced by what they read, leading to violent reactions sometimes. This led to 
the adoption of THISDAY (Southern, Christian) and Daily Trust (Northern, Muslim) 
newspapers for CDA analysis too. 
3.5.4   Data Collection Procedure 
The researcher has also employed three methodologies of collecting data in this study, 
namely: collection of newspaper reports over a period of four weeks, and for this purpose 
THISDAY, a Southern newspaper owned by a Christian, and Daily Trust, a Northern 
newspaper owned by a group of Muslims, are comparatively studied by means of critical 
discourse analysis; the presentation of interview questions through semi-structured 
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technique to 16 journalists, editors, media owners and commentators/stakeholders cutting 
across both religions and regions in the cities of Abuja and Jos; and the presentation of 
questions through focus group interviewing to two separate focus groups in Jos and Kano.  
3.5.5    Data Analysis Procedure 
In the case of newspaper reports data were analysed by means of critical discourse analysis 
using van Dijk’s (1985) framework to identify the use of slant/rhetoric or framing etc., while 
interpretative phenomenological analysis was used to analyse interview data. Following 
analyses there were discussions in which findings were linked to theories explaining the 
phenomenon. For instance attempts were made to understand whether the media were 
actually the cause of the crises or not, and specific situations in which they were involved 
were also discussed, especially the nature of their involvement. 
3.5.6   Significance of the Study 
The significance of the study are to: (a) Profoundly understand the particular challenges of 
reporting religion/religious violence in complex societies like Nigeria; (b) Genuinely proffer 
solutions to the problems discovered; (c) Significantly contribute to discourses on 
ownership, control and use of the media in the study of journalism and society in colleges 
and universities; and (d) Particularly device a framework for critically examining the issues 
highlighted and means by which ethnic, cultural and religious similarities might be 
emphasised while de-emphasising dissimilarities especially in societies with complexities like 
Nigeria, using the media as a conduit. 
3.5.7   Pilot/Preliminary Survey 
Pilot survey questions were initially sent to prospective interviewees through email and 
although six people were identified and sent the questions only two responded. Based on 
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their responses the researcher modified the questions slightly and carried out a pilot survey 
between July 26 and August 7, 2010 during which a number of new discoveries about the 
phenomenon being researched were made, and these are: (a) It was realised that in order 
to properly address the issues being researched there was a need to phrase two different 
set of questions, one set for journalists, editors, proprietors and commentators and the 
other for media audience/readers; (b) there was also a need to tailor each of the questions 
to cover a range of issues to enable more insight into the phenomenon; (c) although the 
newspapers under study are two, it was realised there was a need to speak to people from 
more newspapers located in or owned by proprietors from both regions; (d) following 
suggestion by one of the respondents in the pilot survey, it was decided that there are 
newspapers in the North that do not necessarily share the same ideals with other 
newspapers because their owners are Christians and from Northern minority tribes; (e) the 
researcher agreed that speaking to journalists working with such newspapers and even their 
owners was essential; (f) based on the number of respondents mentioning the use of mobile 
phones to spread rumours it was also realised that in the absence of credible alternative 
media people devise means of reporting stories their own way irrespective of its danger; (g) 
having tried without success to organise a pilot group survey the researcher decided to 
devise another plan taking into consideration participants fears, like security and safety; (h) 
Kano, which was not initially one of the cities to conduct a study was included in the list due 
to its relatively better security situation than Jos; (i) in the case of Jos a neutral venue was 
considered to enable both Muslim and Christian participants feel comfortable/safe; (j) the 
researcher also made provision for local clothes to wear when visiting certain areas to avoid 
appearing different from people in the community so as not to arouse suspicion; (k) more 
time was created to allow interviewees to be late, since people hardly keep to an appointed 
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time; (l) due to suggestion during pilot survey a female stakeholder/commentator from one 
of the flashpoints was added on to the list of interviewees. 
3.5.8  Challenges Faced by Researcher 
Researcher faced a number of challenges in the process of the data collection in Nigeria. The 
first challenge was whether to visit the restive city of Jos or not and the risk involved in this. 
The researcher decided to seek second opinions from people on the ground who gave useful 
pieces of advice and these helped during the visit. First, interviews had to be organised in 
neutral areas, in the case of focus group, since there is residential segregation pattern of 
housing in the city. To ensure the safety of participants the Nigerian Film Institute, Jos was 
used as a venue. There was also the ethical issue of safeguarding the identity of participants 
and it was agreed codes shall be used to represent participants in the study. The researcher 
also had to consider their own safety when meeting individuals for semi-structured 
interviews. There was a particularly risky part of the city that was visited by the researcher 
in which case the researcher had to dress to make them easily pass for a member of the 
community.  
Another major problem encountered was getting people to keep to appointed times, 
as on one occasion an interviewee kept the researcher waiting for eight hours after the 
researcher had driven nearly 200 miles to the venue, and despite repeated reassurance they 
would come on time. Also, in one of the focus groups there was a participant whose English 
was difficult to comprehend and had to speak in Hausa language. The researcher eventually 
translated the participant’s comments into English. There was also a technical hitch on one 
occasion when the mini recorder the researcher was using refused to work and, because 
there was a second recorder, it was turned on to continue recording. Another issue was that 
some people that had initially agreed to take part in the study suddenly withdrew and 
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researcher was left with a vacuum since the notice was short. In one of the focus groups a 
participant did not turn up and in the end it was agreed to carry on with those available. 
3.6  ANALYSIS OF DATA 
In analysing the primary data collected during field study interpretative phenomenological 
analysis (IPA) was applied. IPA took off from the theoretical backgrounds of 
phenomenology, hermeneutics and idiography (Smith & Eatough 2007; Moran 2000; Smith, 
Harré & Langenhove 1995; Palmer 1969). It seeks to explore in full individual personal and 
lived experiences, and examines how participants make sense of their personal and social 
world. IPA is directly concerned with the meaning made by participants of their specific 
experience with an event or phenomenon.  
A fundamental argument of this approach is that since research is a dynamic process 
in which a researcher plays an active role the application of IPA involves a two-way 
interpretation process or double hermeneutic. This means, for example, the participants or 
interviewees making sense of their world just as the researcher also makes a sense of how 
the participants make a sense of their own world. This process, explain Smith and Eatough 
(2007: 35-36), involves the researcher playing a dual role. It also implies that a researcher 
employing this technique tries to fit into the situation of the participants as much as 
possible, while ensuring that the researcher equally steps back a little to ask curious and 
critical questions from the accounts of the researched (further probing). In the same 
manner the researcher makes a connection between what they say and their thinking and 
emotional state, which may not be easily connected. As such the researcher interprets the 
participant’s mental and emotional state from what they say by employing different ways of 
interpretatively considering the data. IPA agrees that any analytical account will be partial 
and cannot be seen to ever be the final word on the topic (Smith & Eatough 2007: 37).  
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3.6.1   Stages of IPA Application in Data Analysis 
In applying IPA a researcher needs to follow a number of steps which include several close 
and detailed reading of the data to obtain a holistic perspective so that future 
interpretations are based on the participants’ account; identifying and organising initial 
themes into clusters and checking against the data; refining, condensing and examining 
themes for connections between them; and producing a narrative account of the interplay 
between the interpretative activity of the researcher and the participants’ account of their 
experiences in their own words ((Smith & Eatough 2007; Smith & Osborn 2003).  
One of the criteria for the choice of IPA is that it was hoped that it would help the 
researcher to appropriately play a dual role in the attempt to understand and interpret the 
situation being studied and from the perspectives of the participants. As such, reading 
through the transcripts availed the researcher with the opportunity to closely look at the 
data and interpret the accounts of the participants to produce reasonable meanings. This 
was so because each interviewee’s account was considered individually and as the specific 
account of the participant’s experience. In the end the themes that were identified were 
rearranged into categories under which major issues in the research questions were 
identified and addressed in narratives (discussions). Thus, having had an initial considering 
about these possibilities the researcher decided to apply IPA and was able to effectively use 
it as explained above. 
3.7  CONCLUSION 
At the start of this chapter this researcher had explained that there might be a need to 
apply triangulation technique, which was applied here through three different qualitative 
techniques. Those were critical discourse analysis, semi-structured and focus group 
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interview methods. This chapter has explained how all three methods were applied in the 
study. 
The chief aim of the discussion in this chapter was to help the researcher come up 
with a comprehensive picture of a methodological approach for the study. In doing this the 
researcher took into consideration the research questions in Chapter One and how best 
they would be answered using certain strategies. The flexibility regarding the researcher’s 
consideration for triangulation comes from a desire to avoid or minimise probabilities of 
errors.  Since the main aim of the study is to identify how the media use enemy images and 
stereotypes to stigmatise others and the reasons for this as well as how this might have 
contributed to the violence in some parts of the country, the choice of methodology was 
clearly made to ensure that the researcher’s biases do not stand in the way and each side is 
given a fair chance to contribute evenly in the discussion. This also explains why both semi-
structured and focus group interview techniques have been employed in addition to critical 
discourse analysis (for studying and analysing newspaper reports).  
Finally, this researcher was aware that any choice of technique or methodology 
made at the initial point might not be by any means a final one, as new circumstances could 
warrant the adoption of new techniques to complement or substitute the ones already 
chosen. For instance difficulties in reaching a participant for any of the interviews could 
result in the researcher either finding someone else to replace them or adopting new means 
of obtaining information from the same participant. In the same vein venues that were 
found to be too risky to access might be changed and somewhere else used even if there 
might be some dissimilarity in the information that were to be obtained insofar as  such 
data were useful for the study and could help in providing answers to the research 
questions. It was in view of all this that a number of changes were made to both the 
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interview questions and the processes of conducting the interviews. In the end, despite the 
challenges faced the interviews were done and no one’s safety was compromised. The next 
chapter of this study will discuss how newspaper reports of the Daily Trust and THISDAY 
were analysed leading to the phrasing of interview questions and discussions about possible 
enemy framing in news reporting etc. This is very crucial to the research because it is there 
that one will be able to identify, if at all there’s any, use of negative language or images 
intended to create stereotypes.    
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                           CHAPTER FOUR                                                              
                          Analysis of Newspaper Reports using CDA                              
4  INTRODUCTION 
Following discussions in Chapter Three this chapter has been devoted to analysing the 
newspaper reportage of one of the sectarian crises in Jos, a city in central Nigeria. In the last 
chapter it was explained that due to the appropriateness of qualitative research procedure 
to this study critical discourse analysis (CDA) has been used to analyse newspaper reports 
during a religious crisis in Northern Nigeria. In this chapter the entire process will be further 
described before showing how it was suitably applied in analysing reports by two Nigerian 
newspapers, Daily Trust and THISDAY, during the crisis. Initially there will be an attempt to 
explain the research process, that is how the researcher collected the 
documents/newspaper copies used in the analysis. This will be followed by a description of 
the process of the analysis, leading to the emergence and adoption of themes under which 
each category of reports was analysed. There will then be a presentation of the analysis of 
the text/headlines of each newspaper’s report over the period mentioned in the form of 
narrative using the themes identified as headings. A discussion section will also be used to 
present and discuss findings and relate them to theories before concluding the chapter.   
In the last chapter both discourse analysis (DA) and CDA were described and there 
was further discussion of CDA. Since this study is not concerned directly with DA, only CDA 
has been further described. As was previously mentioned CDA is a strand of DA (Foucault 
1980) that is referred to as Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. It focuses on the critique of 
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ideology and power and has its root in linguistics and sociolinguistics (Wooffit 2005). It, 
particularly, focuses on analysing the manifestation and reproduction of social and political 
inequalities through discourse (Wooffitt 2005). CDA assumes, basically, that language is a 
social phenomenon, not only individual, but also institutions and social groupings have 
specific meanings and values, that are expressed in language and systematic ways; texts are 
relevant units of language in communication; readers/hearers are not passive recipients in 
their relationship to text; and there are similarities between the language of science and the 
language of institutions etc (Kress 1990: 94). 
Fairclough (1989) explains further that CDA is used to scrutinise the language of the 
mass media as a site of power and struggle and also as a site where language is seen to be 
transparent. While the mass media tend to portray themselves as neutral by providing 
space for public discussion and reflecting the state of affairs without any vested interest, 
Fairclough (2001) illustrates the mediating and constructing roles of the media citing a wide 
range of examples to expose this fallacy (Wodak 2001). Against this backdrop CDA contends 
that language, on its own, is not powerful, but becomes powerful depending on the use it is 
put to (Wodak 2001). CDA poses questions that include: How does language figure as an 
element in social processes? What is the relationship of language to other elements of social 
processes (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 1992, 1995; Fairclough & Wodak 1997; 
Fairclough 2001)? CDA often focuses on language just as visual images like photographs and 
diagrams or body language, gestures and facial expression are also considered (Fairclough 
2001). Fairclough (2001) adds that semiosis means the use of language, body language, 
visual images or other ways of signifying to make meaning. And in order to deal with social 
issues and problems, CDA analyses texts and interactions as well as other forms of semiosis 
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material (Fairclough 2001). CDA is critical in that it is concerned with progressive social 
change; it has been seen to possess an emancipatory knowledge interest (Fairclough 2001). 
In order to achieve its emancipatory goal, Wodak (2001) explains that while CDA asks 
research questions, scholars act as advocates for those who suffer social discrimination.  
4.1   BACKGROUND 
After four years of relative peace Jos was up in flames again from November 28-29, 2008. 
On November 27, 2008 Local Government elections were held in the state and the Jos 
electorate were divided on the basis of religion (Human Rights Watch December 19, 2008). 
The two main rivals were Aminu Baba and Timothy Buba, a Muslim and Christian 
candidates, respectively; they also represented the two main groups, ‘settlers’ and 
‘indigenes’. In the election for the Jos North Local Government chairman position it was 
alleged that the state government had a preference for the Christian candidate, who is also 
the governor’s kinsman and family friend (Weekly Trust November 29, 2008). It was further 
claimed that the governor had planned, in collaboration with the state electoral commission 
officials, to rig the election in favour of their preferred candidate. It was later rumoured that 
the process had been manipulated and supporters of the Muslim candidate went into the 
streets protesting before the results had been officially released (THISDAY November 29, 
2008). It was at this point that anti-riot police and military men were sent to the scene 
leading to the shooting and killing of many of the protesters. The state governor, David 
Jonah Jang, reportedly gave a ‘shoot-on-sight’ order to security officials and by the next day 
reports claimed more than 300 people, mainly from the rival Muslim group had been shot 
dead (Human Rights Watch December 19, 2008). In the midst of it all, results of the 
elections across the state were released, including the one disputed in Jos. 
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Most of the news reports on the crisis were by international media like the BBC, 
CNN, VOA, Islam Channel, Al Jazeera English, Reuters, AP (Associated Press) and FRI (Radio 
France International). The reports were seen to be either balanced or biased depending on 
the prism through which they were viewed. For example, from within the country some 
individuals and groups claimed the BBC Hausa and VOA Hausa services had been heavily 
biased in favour of the Muslims (Daily Trust December 4, 2008). There were further 
allegations that within Nigeria news reports were not very balanced and, to a large extent, 
only reflected certain interests. For instance Daily Trust and its Weekly and Sunday versions 
were said to have mainly focused their reports on the Muslim and Northern victims. In the 
case of other newspapers like the Guardian, THISDAY, Punch, Tribune, The Nation and so on 
their reports allegedly only featured Southern victims living in the North. For example, 
among the victims were three fresh university graduates doing their mandatory National 
Youth Service Corps (NYSC) in Jos. They were allegedly murdered by ‘hoodlums’ from the 
Muslim side. Reports said there were also more than a dozen Muslim school pupils that 
were burnt to death after their schools were invaded and classrooms set ablaze by 
suspected ‘hoodlums’ from the Christian side. Apart from those who lost their lives many 
others were said to have managed to escape with all sorts of injuries. But there were 
allegations that while the graduate victims received sufficient media attention from the 
Southern press, they (the Southern press) ignored victims from the Muslim/Hausa/Fulani 
side. In the same manner the Northern press were said to have given the Southern victims 
little attention. Such allegations of biased reporting will be the subject of this CDA analysis. 
Two Nigerian newspapers, Daily Trust and THISDAY, will be studied and both are 
national daily and weekly publications. THISDAY is a South-based Nigerian newspaper and is 
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one of the largest circulating national newspapers in the country. It was, until the November 
2002 sectarian violence, the largest circulating newspaper in Northern Nigeria. It currently 
has a daily sales unit of 21,70331. Daily Trust is, with a daily sales unit of 11,67232, the most 
widely read newspaper in Northern Nigeria and is owned by a group of Northern private 
proprietors. Both newspapers have offices and reporters across the country.  
4.2 RESEARCH PROCESS 
The process of collecting the newspaper back copies used in the analysis began shortly after 
the crisis. Since each of the newspapers has an online presence it was initially quite easy 
monitoring the reports and copying and pasting on a word document. But it was later 
realised that not all the reports could be accessed online because Daily Trust’s archive 
allowed access to only a few reports. Some of the links were not working properly and often 
led the researcher to the wrong stories. A decision had to be made on alternative means of 
obtaining hard copies of the reports from Nigeria. The researcher then contacted one of the 
editors of the newspaper, a former colleague, who promised to help with making 
photocopies of all the reports needed, which were then listed and emailed to the editor. 
The list contained exactly what the researcher wanted to use for the analysis that had been 
monitored online but could not be accessed or downloaded. Therefore, the editor did not 
influence the researcher’s choice of reports/articles used for the analysis.  
Although the entire process took nearly three months copies of the 
Daily/Weekly/Sunday Trust reports of the Jos crisis of November 2008 were made, parcelled 
                                                             
31 It is very difficult to know the exact daily circulation of newspapers in Nigeria as they are believed to be 
hiding it for reasons best known to them. However, a report by Advertisers Association of Nigeria (ADVAN) 
between March and May 2009 revealed the figures referred to in this section. Most of the papers, including 
THISDAY and Daily Trust have since disputed these figures. 
 
32 Same explanation above applies to this case (see the following link http://m2weekly.com/cover-cover/advans-
newspaper-circulation-report-why-the-figures-remain-controversial/ accessed 23 June 2011. 
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and sent to the researcher through another former colleague travelling to London from 
Abuja. The researcher offered to cover the cost incurred by both former colleagues but they 
declined, insisting that was their own contribution towards making the study a success. But 
the researcher made it clear that neither their contribution nor the researcher’s links to the 
paper would be allowed to influence the analysis. The links include being a former 
Daily/Weekly Trust journalist; a Muslim and from the North of Nigeria; and the assistance 
received from the former colleagues during the research process. This researcher made sure 
he distanced himself from these links during the process of the analysis and specifically 
allowed the data/documents (newspapers reports, articles) to dictate all that happened 
during the entire analysis. 
  Obtaining copies of THISDAY reports was not as complicated as the case of Daily 
Trust. With a properly working archive all its reports on the crisis were accessed online and 
copied and pasted on a word document. The only minor problem encountered in the 
process was a mandatory registration before one is permitted to access their archive. This 
was done after providing the required information. The researcher then printed the 
document in readiness for reading and analysis. There is a need to mention that although in 
the case of Daily Trust hard copies were obtained and used for the analysis while in respect 
of THISDAY online copies were used there was no difference in terms of what the researcher 
could have access to in each of the newspaper’s publications during the crisis under study. 
THISDAY’s online archive allowed access to all the reports and articles the paper published 
on the conflict. In the same vein all Daily Trust reports and articles were accessed and 
analysed.  
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Having obtained copies of both newspapers’ reports for the analysis a decision 
needed to be made on the exact period the analysis should cover and what exactly should 
be analysed. Before agreeing on this the researcher glanced through all the reports in order 
to have a good idea of where to begin and end the analysis. It was based on this the period 
between November 29 and December 26, 2008 was chosen, covering four weeks.  
4.3  ANALYTIC PROCESS 
The actual analysis began with the researcher heeding the advice of Teun van Dijk (2001) 
that no specific, ready-made guideline is available for the application of CDA. Thus, van Dijk 
(2001) suggests the integration of the works of many people from different fields, countries, 
cultures etc. in order to come up with a strategy for its application. Based on the above, and 
in a bid to draw from the works of different scholars, this researcher considered the lens 
offered by Fairclough (1995: 5-6) in which he explains how the analysis of the language of 
media text illuminates three sets of questions on media output. And these questions are: 
How is the world (events, relationships) represented? What identities are set up for those 
involved in the programme or story (reporters, audience, ‘third parties’ referred to or 
interviewed)? What relationships are set up between those involved (for example reporter-
audience, expert-audience or politician-audience relationships)? Fairclough (1995: 5), thus, 
adds that it will be essentially assumed that any text will concurrently represent, set up 
identities and set up relations. Following this process in the analysis of a TV report he 
suggests writing on the left (or producing) a rough representation of visual images in the 
extract, and on the right the language (reporter voice-over).  
 Another piece that caught the attention of this researcher was Carabine’s (2001) 
analysis of the 1834 New Poor Law Act & Commissioners’ Reports by applying the 
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Foucauldian discourse analysis. In the process Carabine (2001: 281) suggests an 11-step 
analytical procedure that includes: selecting a topic (possible sources of data); knowing the 
data (by reading and re-reading to establish familiarity); identifying themes (categories and 
objects of the discourse); looking for evidence of an inter-relationship between discourses; 
identifying the discursive strategies and techniques employed; looking for absences and 
silences; looking for resistances and counter-discourses; identifying the effects of the 
discourse; outlining the background to the issue; contextualising the material in the 
power/knowledge networks of the period; and being aware of the research, data and 
sources. 
 It is essential to recall that the main framework of this study is phenomenology 
although CDA is applied in this specific aspect of the analysis. And since phenomenology is 
an interpretative tradition through which a researcher attempts to make sense of the world 
around them or interprets social reality (Bryman 2004; Grbich 2007) this researcher decided 
to approach the analysis by, first, adopting Fairclough’s (1995) assumption of 
representation, identities and relations situating it within the text (copies of newspapers 
obtained). With that the researcher created an image of each scenario on the left hand side 
of the text as the researcher read through the report, identifying points where there might 
occur any of the three nouns (representations, identities and relations) mentioned by 
Fairclough (1995). Second, the researcher followed Carabine’s (2001) proposition although 
not all 11 steps were taken in. Already the issue to be studied had been agreed and the data 
was available for scrutiny. The researcher then immersed themselves in studying (reading 
and re-reading the newspaper copies several times), which went on for more than two 
months before an initial draft of the chapter was produced. But during those readings 
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Fairclough’s (1995) suggestion of representation, identities and relations became clearer 
and the researcher made a sense of it by contextualising the media representation of the 
conflict (November 2008 crisis), identifying the conflicting parties based on the identities set 
up for them in the reports, and understanding the relationships created between the those 
producing the reports (journalists) and those consuming them (audience). It was based on 
this that this researcher turned back to Carabine’s (2001) guideline again to come up with 
themes and categories under which trends identified in the text would be analysed. For 
instance this researcher identified the attempts by each newspaper to paint pictures of a 
very grave situation and in the process represent each side either as an aggressor or 
aggressed depending on its leaning. There were also attempts by each party to accuse the 
other of being responsible for the crisis and, thus, add fuel to the conflict. Having identified 
reports with such trends the researcher constructed the first theme: Aggravation/finger 
pointing. 
 The second theme was also identified by reading through the texts (reports) and 
trying to identify how each party (especially politicians and leaders aligned to them) was 
reacting to the grave situation painted by the reports and the urgency on the ground. The 
researcher identified two major issues here: first, there were those presented in the reports 
as showing clear lukewarm even after 100s of lives had been lost; and second, there were 
those presented as having no qualms maintaining the situation (grave situation). The 
difference is that while the first group was willing to do nothing to resolve the problem, the 
second group appeared to be doing more to fuel it irrespective of the consequence. From 
this trend the researcher constructed another theme: Indifference/lack of concern. 
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 It is important to also note the polarising role of the media in all this; it was realised 
they were either providing a platform for the representation of a positive image of one side 
as opposed to the other or painting a negative picture of the other. As would be seen in the 
analysis there was outright use of enemy frames or consenting to the use of propaganda. 
On this basis the researcher categorised reports here under the theme: Satire/use of 
labels/rhetoric. A similar inclination noted by the researcher was the cynical attitude of 
some people to the situation. Even journalists were at some point seen to be painting a 
picture of hopelessness. In some instances the situation was deliberately hyperbolised by 
both journalists and politicians and reports identified here were categorised under the 
theme: Pessimism/exaggeration. Finally, recalling Fairclough’s (1995) suggestion of relations 
between the media and their audience and having identified situations in which attempts 
were made to offer solutions (like giving hope or a glimmer of hope) the researcher 
constructed another theme, peacebuilding/conciliation, to categorise and analyse such 
reports/articles.  
 Although these five themes were finally agreed there were occasions the researcher 
struggled with coming to a conclusion on each. At some point the researcher considered 
collapsing some to avoid duplication or creating more themes but decided to allow each to 
stand after examining the amount of documents under each theme. Besides, it was realised 
that some reports could appropriately fit into more than one theme. It was also discovered 
that although the reports being analysed came from two different publishers each of the 
themes could be represented by reports from the two newspapers given the enormity of 
the situation, the newspapers differences, their audience (waiting to be updated) and the 
extent of polarisation (as was earlier discussed).  
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Having identified the main themes, the researcher decided to tackle the issue of 
identifying a framework for analysing each report (text/headlines) on its merit. Although 
Fairclough (1995) provides a framework that appeared quite appealing due to its 
generalised approach, van Dijk’s (2001) socio-cognitive approach (focusing on written texts 
specifically) was adopted. In analysing texts to expose the use of language in a discourse van 
Dijk (1985, 2001; Meyer 2001: 26) recommends the following steps: (1) analysis of semantic 
macrostructures: topics and macropropositions; (2) analysis of local meanings, like the many 
forms of implicit or indirect meanings, such as implications, presuppositions, allusions, 
vagueness, omissions and polarisations etc.; (3) analysis of ‘subtle’ formal structures: where 
most of the linguist markers are analysed; (4) analysis of global and local discourse forms or 
formats; (5) analysis of specific linguist realisations, for example such rhetoric as hyperboles 
(exaggeration) and litotes (understatement); and (6) analysis of context.  
van Dijk (2001: 101-102) argues that discourse topics play an essential function in 
communication and interaction and defines them as “semantic macrostructures derived 
from the local (micro) structures of meaning.” van Dijk (1980) explains that topics symbolise 
the meaning or purpose of a discourse as well as the most important information about it; 
topics also explain the general coherence of text and talk. He adds that topics are usually 
articulated in titles, headlines summaries, abstracts, thematic sentences or conclusions etc. 
Local meanings, according van Dijk (2001: 103), are “the result of the selection made by 
speakers or writers in their mental models of events or their more general, socially shared 
beliefs.” He explains that under the overall control of global topics they are the sort of 
information that most directly manipulate the mental models and, as such, the opinions and 
attitudes of recipients; and that topics and local meanings are easily stored in recipients’ 
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memories and reproduced whenever necessary and could have grave social consequences. 
Subtle ‘formal’ structures are those structures of a text or talk that are not easily controlled 
or hidden by writers or speakers (van Dijk, 2001). They include intonation, syntactic 
structures, propositional structures, rhetoric figures and the numerous properties of 
spontaneous talk like turn taking, repairs, pauses, hesitation and so on. All these suggest 
rather ‘pragmatic’ properties of a cumulative event, such as intention, present mood or 
emotions of speakers, perspectives on an issue of discourse, opinions about persons or 
speakers etc. 
van Dijk (2001) also explains global and local discourse formats by means of 
contrasting them. He, therefore, describes global forms or superstructures as overall, 
canonical and conventional schemata comprising of classic genre categories, for example in 
arguments, stories or news articles. On the other hand local forms include those of (the 
syntax of) sentences and formal relations between clauses or sentences in sequences, like 
ordering, primacy, pronominal relations, active voice, nominalisations. Rhetoric such as 
hyperboles (exaggeration) and litotes (understatement) are used in language to emphasise 
‘our good’ qualities by topicalising positive meanings, through hyperboles or positive 
metaphors and de-emphasising ‘their positives’ and emphasise ‘their negatives’, which van 
Dijk (2001) says is aimed at influencing, manipulating and controlling the mind. Lastly, van 
Dijk (2001) explains global and local contexts and their role in analysing discourse. Global 
contexts, he says, are defined by the social, political, cultural and historical structures in 
which a communicative event occurs. Local context, he asserts, is defined by its relations to 
the properties of the immediate interactional situation that the communicative discourse 
happens, such as the overall domain (politics, business), an overall action (legislative, 
propaganda) and so on. 
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Following the above discussions, particularly van Dijk’s (2001) model that we intend 
applying in the analysis, news reports and articles by Daily Trust and THISDAY will be 
analysed to find out where any of the above features was used. Attempts will also be made 
to establish whether there was any link between such reports and ethnic or religious 
tension or violent crisis. Again, the themes constructed are: aggravation/finger-pointing; 
indifference/lack of concern; pessimism/exaggeration; satire/use of labels/rhetoric; and 
peacebuilding/conciliation. In the end attempts will be made to compare findings and link 
them to theories that were equally identified as appropriate for reference to in the 
discussion. To this end the socio-cognitive model of van Dijk (2001), Hallin and Mancini’s 
(2004) media systems theory and framing theory (De Vreese, Peter & Semetko 2001) among 
others, will be featured in the discussion and such headings as regional cleavages, enemy 
framing, misinformation and peacebuilding will be used to present the discussion. The 
themes under which analysis will be presented were dictated by the data (reading and re-
reading of newspaper reports), while the headlines for discussion also emerged during the 
same process and specifically after categorising reports under themes.  
4.4 CDA ANALYSIS OF THISDAY REPORTS AND ARTICLES 
In the four weeks under study news reports, editorials, articles, opinions and letters 
published by THISDAY newspapers will be analysed under five main themes constructed for 
the purpose of this analysis. These themes are:  aggravation/finger pointing; 
indifference/lack of concern; satire/use of labels/rhetoric; pessimism/exaggeration; and 
peacebuilding/conciliation.  
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4.4.1  Aggravation/finger pointing 
Following the outbreak of the sectarian crisis in Jos on November 28, 2008 one of the 
newspapers that consistently reported it was THISDAY. Its front page lead story of Saturday 
November 29, 2008 had the caption ‘Dozens Killed in Jos LG Election Riots’ and two bullet 
points titled ‘Govt imposes dusk to dawn curfew’ and ‘FG, ACF condemn violence’. Reading 
through the story one noticeable feature of the report is what appears to be the use of 
conclusive and subjective language and the pointing of an accusing finger at one party, while 
corroborating statements by the other without clear evidence of independent check. In that 
report both topics and macropropositions, as suggested by van Dijk (1985, 2001), seem 
used. For example the report alleged that supporters of the opposition party, All Nigerian 
People’s Party (ANPP) became violent after it was speculated “that their candidate, whom 
they said was leading the PDP candidate was about to be declared the looser”. This 
statement appears to be in breach of the rule of neutrality as the paper was subjectively 
pointing an accusing finger at one party while the conflict was still going on and did not cite 
any official or clear independent sources to back its story but relied solely on what it 
referred to as an eyewitness account. The governor of Plateau State, Jonah David Jang, was 
also quoted later in the report blaming the crisis on some thugs that allegedly took the law 
into their hands and warning of dire consequences like ‘security details’ being under 
instruction to return ‘fire-for-fire’ and ‘drastic sanctions’ for those further disrupting the 
peace. There seems, in the governor’s statement as reported by THISDAY, the use of local 
meanings to polarise the conflict and hyperboles/litotes to overplay or downplay the 
problem depending on how one sees it. The paper also gives the impression of providing a 
platform for promoting an interest in conflict with another interest, giving it undue 
advantage over the other or what van Dijk (2001) calls local context. 
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The next day THISDAY, November 30, 2008, had the headline ‘Death Tolls in Jos Riot 
Rises to 350’. The story opened with a statement by Gov Jang in which he continued to 
blame thugs and gave a ‘shoot-on-sight’ order to officers of the Nigerian Army, Air Force 
and Mobile Police Unit to kill anyone found causing trouble or disobeying the curfew he had 
imposed the previous day. It also quoted the governor warning of his readiness to battle 
thugs trying to wreak havoc on innocent citizens. Like the previous day’s story it mainly 
portrayed the government’s view and kept quoting state government officials to confirm 
facts or figures, without independent checks. For instance, the newspaper only mentioned 
the number of deaths it had earlier reported in its headline after paraphrasing the 
governor’s warning to the people. Even then it quickly followed with another statement by 
the spokesman of the governor, James Mannok, claiming that 500 men, suspected 
mercenaries, had been intercepted on their way to Jos. The statement or claim suggests the 
use of words and labels or local meanings to further polarise the crisis and create an 
impression or manipulate the recipients. 
There were conflicting statistics on the number of deaths recorded and in the report 
at least three versions were mentioned. The first, 350, was in the headline which the 
newspaper gave without stating where it came from. There was another from Agence 
France Press (AFP) saying that 381 corpses had been taken to the central Mosque and also 
from the Nigerian Red Cross Society quoting 150 remains taken to the same Mosque. In all 
three cases, apart from the mention of the Mosque that suggests the victims were Muslims, 
nothing further was said about them or how they died. The report quoted two Christian 
Association of Nigeria (CAN) officials, Most Revd Ignatius Kaigama and Eng. Samuel Salifu, 
counting their losses and blaming it on the other. The paper also spoke to leaders of the 
main opposition parties, ANPP and Action Congress (AC); both of whom are Muslim were 
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quoted berating the Plateau State government for its poor handling of the crisis. THISDAY’s 
third publication on the crisis was in the form of a report and an article in which its reporters 
attempted, in the first case, to appease the opposition by mentioning them without getting 
a reaction from the government of Plateau State, and, in the second case do analysis of the 
crisis by looking at evidence from one side – the Plateau government. For example, in the 
analysis the author referred to both Governor Jang and his deputy, Pauline Tallen saying the 
polls were an improvement compared to the ones that were previously postponed.  
THISDAY’s reportage on December 5, 2008 of the crisis dwelled mainly on the same 
issues raised earlier: lack of balance and over-reliance on a single source without double 
checking. In this respect three headlines are considered here: ‘Senators Speak on Solution to 
Jos Riots’; ‘How the Plateau Became a Tinderbox of Ethno-Religious Strife’; and ‘Another 
Agonising Reappraisal’. All three were articles analysing the crisis from the newspapers 
point of view, and in all three there was hardly any positive representation of or input from 
the other party/group. In the case of ‘Senators Speak on Solution to Jos Riots’ the reporter 
paraphrased three senators from one of the sides in the crisis and they were all of the same 
religion, accusing the other side of causing trouble and proffering solutions from their own 
perspective. For example one of the senators stated: “...you would realise that the party 
that has always been violent is the ANPP. I have no doubt about that.” Again, in ‘Another 
agonising Reappraisal’ the author quoted the same statement to buttress a position. The 
other article ‘How the Plateau Became a Tinderbox of Ethno-Religious Strife’ regurgitated 
the same ideas and the author, as suggested by repeated statements, hardly refrained from 
being one-sided. For example, the author wrote: 
During the gubernatorial election, the Hausa-Fulani never gave their backing 
to Gov Jang, whom they felt would attempt to wrestle their political hold and 
129 
 
would be chased away from the area. Instead they voted for the ANPP 
candidate, Hon Victor Lar from the Southern Senatorial Zone. But 
unfortunately for them their candidate lost to Jang. Jang, however, during his 
campaign, had promised not to chase the Hausa-Fulani away as long as they 
behaved themselves...he gave the Hausa settlers a level playing ground to 
freely contest for any position in the area. But the Hausas felt that with his 
power of incumbency as the governor of the state they were going to be short-
changed. 
Further statements in the article reveal what looks like the writer’s immersion in the piece. 
For example, the author wrote that: 
The clergy of most of these Churches, most of whom lived within the Church 
premises were murdered. Other Christians living among the Hausa-Fulani on 
Bauchi Road, Angwa-Rogo, Ali Kazaure, Nassarawa areas of the city, who are 
predominantly Yorubas, were also attacked and murdered. 
The writer made no mention of casualties suffered by the other side nor was any attempt 
made to speak to the other party or include views that differ from the ones expressed in the 
writer’s opinion. Recalling van Dijk’s (2001) earlier warning of the use of topics and local 
meanings, it appears the author was trying to achieve this by appealing to the sentiment of 
readers and using hyperboles and litotes to play up the blame game.  
On December 6, 2008, of the reports and articles THISDAY published at least three or 
four are important for this analysis. They are ‘The Jos Carnage’, ‘Presbyterian Church 
Condemns Jos Violence’, ‘Group Seeks End to Sectarian Crises’, and ‘NASFAT Frowns at Jos 
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Riots’. The reason for beaming the light on these four is that all had headlines that directly 
fall under van Dijk’s (2001) ‘topics’ as they create an immediate impression; one paints a 
grave scenario (of carnage), the other three complement by saying no to it by concurring 
the situation (the violence) is  severe and unacceptable. But the comparison ends there. In 
three ‘The Jos Carnage’, ‘Presbyterian Church Condemns Jos Violence’, ‘Group Seeks End to 
Sectarian Crises’ they seem to be playing the victim on behalf of their side in the conflict. For 
example in ‘Group Seeks End to Sectarian Crises’ the president of Nigeria Christian Graduate 
Fellowship Dr Iheanyi Uwaoma accused the media, specifically the Hausa language services 
of the BBC and VOA, of bias by projecting only the views of Muslims, arguing that the crisis 
was pre-planned and “was only a ruse to carry out well planned attack on Christians.”  
 The next day THISDAY, again, had a story with the title ‘Clark, Daniel, NACOMYO 
Condemn Jos Mayhem’ and like the previous day, the story was about religious groups 
either pointing accusing fingers or trying to be seen to call for peace. The striking thing 
about this one is that NACOMYO – the National Council of Muslim Youth Organisation – 
called on “...journalists to always balance their stories while reporting conflict...” 
 THISDAY report for December 8, 2010 was like previous ones and quite like those of 
December 5 in which it was earlier observed that the authors had immersed themselves in 
the story. On that day the headlines were ‘Plateau Relaxes Curfew’ and ‘Jos North and Its 
Seed of Crisis’ in both of which the authors seem sympathetic to the government and 
appear to have bought the government’s story that they were overwhelmed even though 
they had done everything to ensure violence free polls. In ‘Jos North and Its Seed of Crisis’ 
the reporter referred to one side as ‘settlers’ at least three times, in the opening and 
concluding paragraphs  of the article analysing the crisis. It also appears that the same ideas 
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that were previously used had been recycled and used again. Again, it seems a very small 
effort had been made to get the other side’s account or reflect their view in the article. In 
‘Plateau Relaxes Curfew’ the reporter only rewrote a press release by the state government 
claiming normalcy had returned and the curfew had been relaxed without verifying the 
information.  
 THISDAY’s report on December 11 with the title ‘Plateau: Aliero Faults Call for 
Emergency Declaration’ is important in this analysis too particularly due to a bullet point 
accompanying it, entitled: ‘As Church leaders demand compensation’. The reports follows 
the trend previously seen where religious groups were increasingly given audience on the 
pages of newspapers. For instance in this case the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA) 
was demanding “full compensation for what it described as losses it suffered from the recent 
Jos crisis”, according to the report. It came at a time several others, including individuals had 
incurred losses and peace was yet to fully return to the city. Here also, we see the use of 
both ‘topics’, ‘hyperboles’ and ‘local meanings’ in the report. There was also a report, the 
following day, in which a powerful body, Academic Staff Union of University (ASUU) “came 
down hard on the political class for allegedly sponsoring the recent post council poll violence 
in Jos.” The importance of this report is that it lends support to the theory that such 
violence are the handiwork of invisible hands at the top, manipulating the idle, unemployed 
youths to achieve their objectives. Another report was the one in which some Nigerians in 
the Diaspora condemned what they called “the cowardly, mindless and unprovoked attacks 
on unsuspecting and defenceless citizens” by those the group said were the “elements of the 
Muslim Hausa-Fulani Community.” This appears stereotyping and demonising one side in 
the conflict but published without any reaction from the accused to give a picture of 
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balance. And, there is the use of local meanings to polarise, and rhetoric and language to 
undermine (litotes).  
 On December 18, 2008 THISDAY published a story saying that a delegation sent to 
Jos by the wife of the president had disrespected the office of the governor of Plateau State 
when they visited the latter’s territory without even paying him a courtesy visit. The report 
with the title ‘Turai’s Delegation Visits Jos, Shuns Jang’ made it look like it had been planned 
in such a way that the governor would be humiliated and there are two issues one could 
deduce from the story:  first, there’s the use of topics in the headline and the story to draw 
sympathy for the ‘bullied’ or disrespected governor; and, second, the story seems to apply 
further polarisation and painting a picture of the victimised and victimiser (refer to 
Fairclough’s (1995) representation, identities and relations). 
 The Human Rights Watch (HRW) report published by THISDAY is the highlight of the 
reportage on December 21, 2008, as it (HRW) claimed it had documented evidence showing 
those behind the killings during the clashes between Muslims and Christians in Jos between 
November 28 and 29, 2008. In the report the HRW called on the government to investigate 
and prosecute those behind “the killings, mostly of young Muslim men and from the Hausa-
Fulani ethnic group.” Despite a headline ‘Jos Mayhem: Rights Group Alleges Arbitrary 
Killings’ that seems cautious the reporter did not balance the story by speaking either to the 
police or government officials or someone in a position to react on the side of those against 
whom the allegation was made. In a different report on the same day, however, the 
governor of Plateau state, David Jang, was quoted by the paper describing the violence as 
‘madness’ that should not have occurred in an age of civilisation if only previous 
governments in the state had implemented past reports/recommendations on similar crises. 
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Another story nearly as important as the HRW report was the one in which foreign 
mercenaries were said to have been apprehended fighting on the side of a party in the 
crisis. The story ‘50 Foreign Nationals Arrested over Jos Riot’ looks, like most other ones, 
one-sided and unchecked. The governor stated in the report that “foreign nationals were 
caught in Nigerian military and police uniforms, and were armed with guns.” This further 
suggests both polarising and hyperbolising, like the use of mercenaries by ‘them’ to 
overwhelm ‘us’ and escalate the conflict. 
4.4.2  Indifference/lack of concern 
While the state government was apportioning blames and ordering police and military 
personnel to “shoot-on-sight anybody fomenting crisis or defying the curfew” it imposed, 
government at the centre was mute. Again Plateau State Government (PLSG) was accused 
of gross insensitivity for releasing results of the disputed elections. Opposition Action 
Congress (AC) National Publicity Secretary Dr Lai Mohammed argued the PLSG decision was 
a show of sickening thoughtlessness given that even the disputed result in Jos was released 
amidst serious violence and huge loss of lives and destruction of property. In THISDAY’s 
publication of December 1, 2008 there was a banner headline ‘Pope Condemns Jos 
Violence’ and bullet point ‘Sultan sues for peace’. The significance of the report is that it 
highlights the condemnation of the crisis in strong terms by prominent religious leaders, 
Pope Benedict XVI and Sultan Muhammadu Sa’ad Abubakar III, representing both religions. 
This was a bold attempt to balance the story as political leaders, Senator David Mark, a 
Christian, and Hon. Dimeji Bankole, a Muslim, were also quoted asking the warring parties 
to sheath their swords. However, there was still no strong reaction from the presidency.  
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THISDAY’s report on December 2, 2008 was a complete deviation from previous 
reports of the crisis. For example one of the reports was a news story titled: ‘Jos Crisis: 
Opposition Asks Jang to resign’, and a bullet point ‘Yar’Adua stops governor’s move to 
inaugurate new LG executives’. In the story opposition parties were unusually given enough 
space to criticise the handling of the violence by PLSG. However, the President, who 
appeared mute all along, came out in this report stopping Governor Jang’s plan to 
inaugurate the Local Government Chairmen including the one whose election sparked the 
crisis. President Umaru Yar’Adua was said to have been angered by Governor Jang’s 
“insensitivity as to contemplate inaugurating the councils in the face of the crisis and with 
the tension yet to die down.” There was, however, no attempt to speak to PLSG or FG to 
ascertain the veracity of the story. In the same story it reported the Minister of Youth 
Development, Senator Akinlabi Olasunkanmi condemning the killing of three corps member 
while not saying a word about other victims, like the teenage pupils who died when they 
were attacked in school. It quoted the minister saying “If anything, a corps member 
epitomises a united Nigeria and deserves the protection and support of all at all times.” The 
main observation here is polarisation and the use of language to undermine the effort of the 
governor and then the attempt to make the case of slain youth corps member more 
important might be seen to create a division of ‘us’ and ‘them’ since all the corps members 
were from the South. 
The next day THISDAY attempted correcting its one-sided story of the previous day 
as it reported that Gov Jang had addressed newsmen to deny he planned swearing-in the LG 
bosses. In the same report the paper quoted HRW stating that the crisis was fuelled by the 
state govt’s discriminatory policies against settler communities as opposed to the provision 
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of the country’s constitution. “These discriminatory policies relegate millions of Nigerian to 
the status of second-class citizens and fuel the flames of ethnic and religious violence,” HRW 
Africa Director, Georgette Gagnon, stated in the report. The impact of this HRW statement 
is immense in indicting the state government and suggests the use of context, as suggested 
by van Dijk (2001), or setting to give the allegation some weight. THISDAY columnist Kayode 
Komolafe appears to lend support to the indictment as he accused the governor of 
insensitivity in an article ‘Jos Again?’ Another THISDAY columnist, Yusuph Olaniyonu, blamed 
both Governor Jang and the Nigerian government for allowing the ‘sponsors’ and ‘foot-
soldiers’ in the crisis to go unpunished and, therefore, giving them the incentive to continue 
to “perpetrate this evil act because each time they strike, there is seldom repercussion.” 
Simon Kolawole, a THISDAY columnist, wrote on December 7, 2008 also blaming the 
Nigerian state for all that happened on the Plateau. The headline ‘Nigeria Fails Us...Yet 
Again’ clearly speaks for itself in this regard. Further in the article he explained that the crisis 
was an accident waiting to happen. He stated:  
I covered the 2003 general elections in Plateau State. I toured Jos North while 
voting was in progress. What I saw and learnt was scary. The atmosphere was 
polluted with tension...I realised a weapon of mass destruction had been firmly 
planted in Jos North for decades. 
He went on to explain how the ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide was a ticking bomb waiting to implode, 
while no one did anything pragmatic to stop it from happening or prevent its escalation 
after it occurred. “In summary”, he wrote, “…therefore, we had a potential Armageddon in 
our hands in Jos but pretended it was not there.”  
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4.4.3  Pessimism/Exaggeration 
In THISDAY’s publication of November 29, 2008 Governor Jang’s response to the crisis 
depicts a show of more force than necessary in containing the violence. For instance, the 
paper quoted the governor’s broadcast in which he said “the security details are under 
instruction to return fire-for-fire” to those he had earlier in the speech branded thugs who 
had taken the law into their own hand and therefore deserving of the sternest response 
from the state (use of hyperbole, local meanings). This trend continued as THISDAY’s report 
the next day, despite mentioning 350 lives in the headline, opened the story with an order 
from the governor to security personnel to open fire on anyone found either causing trouble 
or disobeying the ‘dusk to dawn curfew’ he had imposed.  
Another report under this category was the one of December 12, 2008 titled ‘Jos 
Crisis: Opposition Asks Jang to Resign’. The suggestion, coming from politicians, could be 
seen as an attempt by politicians to use people’s misfortunes to outsmart each other and 
score political goals. Another report that could be seen as an exaggeration was ‘Jos Crisis: 
Yar’Adua Shuns Jang’ which sounds like a sympathetic story in favour of the governor who 
had been unfairly treated by the president. “President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua may have 
stylishly shunned Plateau State Governor Jonah Jang as he refused to grant the governor 
audience yesterday,” wrote the paper. It suggests both the use of topics, to draw attention 
and create relevance, and local meanings, to polarise the crisis, while painting a picture of 
an incompetent governor. 
An analysis by a THISDAY correspondent in Jos also attracts one’s attention owing to 
the choice of words in the headline. It was titled ‘How the Plateau Became a Tinderbox of 
Ethno-Religious Strife’. Particularly, the use of the word ‘tinderbox’ appears to portray the 
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people as prone to violence, based on a sort of passion or nature, and potentially 
dangerous. It does not take into cognisance the peculiar situations provoking the violence 
and the fact that the people had lived in peace together for many years.  Another story with 
similar traits is one by the same author titled ‘As Peace Elopes From the Plateau’, which 
seems to give no hope especially when some sentences in the article are considered. For 
example the author stated:  
There is also mass relocation as a result of the crisis. The few Christians who 
narrowly escaped death in Muslim-dominated areas had begun to relocate for 
fear of either another outburst or some silent attack at night. They would 
prefer to live among people of similar faith. The Muslims who dared to live 
among the Christian indigenes too needed not be told that it’s high time for 
them to begin to relocate. 
The writer concluded the article with cynicism writing that:  
One would wonder if Jos can ever know the peace it had paraded in the past. 
There is certainly a sharp contrast from (sic) the Jos that was a home of peace 
and tourism and the Jos of today. 
In an article on December 8, 2008 published by the newspaper, the author described 
the violence as “premeditated carnage skilfully planned and neatly executed...probably to 
propitiate blood thirsty deity.” There was also an opinion article by a contributor from 
outside titled ‘No doubt NYSC is a Waste’, in which the writer blamed the FG and called for 
the restructuring of NYSC33 to prevent further incidents like the one in which the three corps 
                                                             
33 NYSC has been explained in Chapter One. Also refer to http://www.nysc.gov.ng/history.php to read more 
about it. Accessed 4 June 2011. 
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members were killed. There was another article ‘Stemming the Tide of Bestiality’ from an 
outside contributor in which the author compared people to animals (use of label or enemy 
image). 
4.4.4  Satire/use of labels/ rhetoric 
Despite mentioning that dozens of lives had been lost in the violence THISDAY’s report said 
it was “owing to skirmishes” as if downplaying its seriousness through litotes. In the same 
report the word was used twice, suggesting the reporter’s choice of word was deliberate. 
After reporting that the death toll was approaching 400 THISDAY’s report of November 30, 
2008 quoted Governor Jang saying his “government was on top of the situation.” These two 
do not appear to reconcile, rising number of death and a claim that situation was under 
control. Also in another report on December 02, 2008 the paper stated that the crisis was 
provoked when “hundreds of youths from a particular party in the state took to the streets 
to protest an alleged attempt to rig the election in the local government.” This appears 
stereotypical as the paper relied on certain claims and unverified information.  
 In THISDAY’s report of December 3, 2008 there was what looks like the use of slant 
or interpretation that may not be exactly correct as the reporter wrote “President Umaru 
Musa Ya’Adua may have stylishly shunned Plateau State Governor Jonah Jang as he refused 
to grant him audience yesterday.” It was in this report that the newspaper first used the 
word “settler” to label the Hausa who are Nigerians that originate from other parts of the 
country but residing in Plateau State. In an article on the same day columnist Kayode 
Komolafe used the words “indigenes” and “settlers” in quote to show his resentment for 
such labelling. Yusuph Olaniyonu, another THISDAY columnist, used the word ‘local 
terrorists’ to describe the perpetrators of the violence in Jos and compared them to those 
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behind the Mumbai attacks in India – perhaps, use of topics, hyperbole and local meaning to 
exaggerate and create a negative impression. 
 In an article by THISDAY’s correspondent in Jos titled ‘How the Plateau Became a 
Tinderbox of Ethno-Religious strife’ words that are capable of stereotyping and creating 
negative frames of the other were used at least 20 times, for example settlers, indigenes. In 
another article by the same correspondent the next day there was the use of similar pattern 
of reportage and labelling. Labels were used at least 12 times to describe both sides in the 
conflict. In a commentary by THISDAY on the same day, although a background was 
established using phrases like “predominantly Christian Berom indigenes” and “Muslim 
Hausa-Fulani settlers” the rationale for using such divisive labels was questioned by the 
paper as it wrote “...should our politics still be defined in terms of indigene/non-indigene 
dichotomy?” Simon Kolawole, another columnist with the paper, analysed the context in 
which labels are used and the wider implications of such use as well as its role in the conflict 
on the Plateau. The columnist identified other labels linked to such stereotyping like ‘hosts’ 
in reference to ‘indigenes’ and ‘expansionists’ in reference to ‘settlers’ and in the wider 
Nigerian context the ‘majorities’ and ‘minorities’. He blamed the Nigerian state for failing to 
protect its citizens and for allowing the use of such sentiments to polarise the country. 
4.4.5    Peacebuilding/conciliatory effort 
It seems to this researcher that THISDAY columnists did not just apportion blame or offer 
criticisms but also tried to proffer solutions to the problems. All this is shown in Kayode 
Komolafe, Simon Kolawole and Yusuph Olaniyonu’s articles. Komolafe, in his ‘Jos Again?’ 
looked at the problem from the failure of the leadership and security apparatus to foresee 
the problem with the precarious nature of Jos, in particular, and Plateau State, in general. 
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For instance, he wrote: “The governor ought to have been more sensitive at this period of 
the crisis. The action of Jang...smacks of unpardonable indiscretion.”  As a way forward the 
writer suggested tracing the root of the problem, penalising anyone indicted and removing 
incentives for similar crises in the future like poverty and unemployment. 
 On his part Yusuph Olaniyonu in his ‘The Tragedy of Jos’ similarly blamed the 
government and security failure for the crisis. He called for the institution of “High powered 
enquiry” to determine what happened and that those that played one role or the other 
should be exposed and appropriately punished and to find a permanent solution in order to 
prevent reoccurrence. However, the one that stood out was the article titled ‘Nigeria Fails 
Us...Yet Again’ by Simon Kalowole. From the onset the writer, although a Christian, refused 
to align himself with any side and repeatedly blamed politicians for using religion as a 
weapon to set the suffering masses against each other. He also refused to see it as an 
isolated problem in Northern Nigeria but drew examples from other parts of the country 
where such ugly happenings had occurred or could occur. He was also objective and 
pragmatic in proffering solutions. The headline itself is a positive use of van Dijk’s topics and 
macropropositions to put a clear meaning and weight to his message. 
 Apart from articles there were news reports focusing on calls for peace particularly 
by some religious groups and political and religious leaders. There were, thus, headlines like 
‘Jos: Senate Demands Past Inquiry Reports’, ‘Senators Speak on Solutions to Jos Riots’, 
‘Leadership Tussle responsible for Jos Crises’, ‘Group Seeks end to Sectarian crises’, 
‘Presbyterian Church condemns Jos Violence’, ‘NASFAT Frowns at Jos Riots’, ‘Cleric Tasks 
Nigerians on Peace’, ‘Clerk, Daniel, NACOMYO condemn Jos Mayhem’, ‘Aliyu: Crisis Hinders 
North’s Dev’, ‘NIPR, Youth Parliament Flay Jos Killings’, ‘Plateau: Aliero Faults Calls For 
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Emergency’, ‘Jos Violence: ASUU Seeks Prosecution of Sponsors’, ‘Nigerians in Diaspora Task 
Yar’Adua over Jos’, ‘Hunger, Poverty Cause of Jos Crisis’, etc. The irony in some of these 
headlines is that they are misleading as the stories inside are anything but a call for peace.   
4.5       CDA ANALYSIS OF DAILY TRUST NEWS REPORTS AND ARTICLES 
Here also news reports, editorials, articles, opinions and letters published by Daily Trust 
newspapers will be analysed under five themes. The themes are:  aggravation/finger 
pointing; indifference/lack of concern; satire/use of labels/rhetoric; 
pessimism/exaggeration; and peacebuilding/conciliation:  
4.5.1   Aggravation/finger pointing 
The Trust publication on November 29, 2008 was a Weekly Trust cover story running 
through a number of pages including the front page and consisting of news story/analysis 
and interviews. The story focused on how the crisis started following suspicion that the 
results were about to be manipulated by the Plateau State Independent Electoral 
Commission (PLASIEC) to hand victory to a candidate despite what the paper claimed was an 
“unassailable lead” by another candidate. It also mentioned attacks on places of worship 
and schools, categorically naming Al Bayan Islamic School as one of the damaged properties. 
The report also examined Plateau State Governor David Jonah Jang’s broadcast in which he 
said he had kept his promise of a free and fair Local Government Council election and the 
trouble was started by “disgruntled elements testing the will of the administration”. It said 
that the governor claimed the riot started at Ali Kazaure and that police had been ordered 
to “return fire-for-fire”. It also reported conflicting number of casualties ranging from three 
and four (official or government account) to 100 (eye witness). The report also quoted 
Reuters, which put the number at 20, based on figures they obtained from a Red Cross 
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official. In the report the newspaper quoted a ruling PDP official saying it was too early to 
ascertain the number of casualty on their side. But one thing about the report is that it 
appears presumptive and judgmental in line with van Dijk’s (2001) local meanings. And 
there is suggestion of the use of labelling by the governor, ‘disgruntled elements’ to 
describe the protesters and the use of excessive force following the governor’s shoot-on-
sight order to security personnel. The newspaper also featured two interviews, one with 
Plateau State Information Commission Nuhu Gagara and the other with ANPP Secretary 
General in the state, Muhammed Ahmed Nazif; an attempt to strike a balance and give each 
side a chance to be heard. But each of the interviewees tried to defend their side and to 
portray the other as the culprit by appealing to certain sentiments. Again, this shows the use 
of local meanings, polarisation, and litotes by the interviewees to undermine the other, 
using the paper as a platform (context). 
The next day Sunday Trust made a follow-up to the previous day’s reports with a 
bold headline ‘Death Toll Hits 400’ (kicker) and ‘FG deploys more troops’, ‘Gov Jang declares 
24-hour curfew’, ‘Security alerts in Kano, Katsina and Kaduna’, and ‘Sultan, Gowon call for 
restraint’ (riders). Like Weekly Trust, Sunday Trust devoted its front page and a number of 
inside pages to reporting the crisis. It began with an assessment of casualties and quoted its 
correspondent in Jos saying he counted nearly 400 corpses with bullet wounds, suggesting 
they were shot dead by security probably trying to contain the situation but excessively 
used force. It also quoted Radio France International (RFI) correspondent corroborating the 
claim in a report by Agence France Presse (AFP). The RFI correspondent said: “I was at the 
Central Mosque this afternoon and counted 378 dead bodies but just as I was about to leave, 
more bodies were brought in.” What was significant about this report is that it does not only 
suggest that most of the victims were Muslims but it also, by saying the corpses were put in 
143 
 
the Mosque without elaborating or explaining why, gives the impression that there was an 
attack on the Mosque leading to the deaths.  The implication takes us back to van Dijk’s 
(2001) earlier warning that the use of topics and local meanings, as seen here, could leave 
an impression on the minds of the recipients with grave consequences. The newspaper 
quoted the country’s Inspector General of Police Mike Okiro claiming the situation was 
‘overwhelming’ for his men, therefore they needed the help of the military suggesting it was 
like war. This was exaggeration/overreaction or hyperbole that had found the media a 
willing medium to transmit or give the impression that there was a war-like situation 
warranting a much tougher handling.  
There was also a report that the Chief of Army Staff of the country was sending an 
envoy to assess the situation, so as to deploy troops; further confirming or supporting the 
police chief’s claim that they had been ‘overwhelmed’. Sunday Trust also had in its report 
the Chief Imam of Jos (Muslim leader) confirming death toll (of Muslims) and a Christian 
clergy saying the streets were littered with dead bodies (but did not say whether they were 
Christian corpses). All these paint a picture of a very grave situation, capable of creating 
tension in other parts of the country and the active use of topics and macropropositions, 
local meanings and hyperboles. For example, a report titled ‘Victims recount ordeal in the 
mayhem’ was a particular story that’s very likely to provoke reaction or even violence 
elsewhere. In the story the newspaper stated: 
One of the most pronounced of the victims of the violence...one Alhaji 
Muhammadu Mai Gwanjo and 20 members of his family, who were said to 
have been burnt to death inside their house at Rikkos, Jos. 
  In separate interviews with Muslim political or community leaders the common 
trend in the newspapers was the purported gang up against Muslims/Hausa/Fulani by the 
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Christian/Berom. In one of the interviews the interviewee said the crisis was a “deliberate 
and coordinated plan to massacre, maim and destroy the Hausa community”, while in the 
second interview with an MP he said “every Muslim had been sacked from Tudun Wada” (an 
outskirt settlement where Christians are in majority). In both interviews there is the use of 
hyperbole (to exaggerate) and local meanings (to polarise) and at least one of the reporters  
exhibited professional naivety by asking leading questions like “Does it mean that rather 
than bringing the situation under control, the police are making things difficult?” In order to 
demonstrate neutrality he should have simply asked: “What were the roles played by the 
police in containing the situation?” Or, if it’s a follow up question to clarify a previous 
answer the reporter should have asked “How were the police making things difficult?” 
Daily Trust reportage of the crisis the following day was further devotion of a 
number of pages including two front page lead stories: ‘Jos mayhem: FG deploys more 
troops’ and ‘426 victims get mass burial’, both capable of sending the wrong signal to 
readers elsewhere. Daily Trust also published an opinion article from outside tracing the 
violence to an attempt to implement a tribal agenda. The author used words like ‘carnage’, 
‘anarchy’, ‘explode’ and ‘re-ignite’ to stress his points, again painting a war situation. There 
was also an eyewitness account of a Christian man describing how Muslim youths attacked 
Churches, killed four pastors and how Christians decided to go for their own pound of flesh. 
Trust also featured stories on Al Bayan School, where five pupils were killed in attacks, and 
the destruction of 1000 cars in a car sale company owned by a Hausa/Muslim man.  
The next day reports followed similar trend with the paper writing a front page 
comment in which it condemned in strong terms the violence using words like ‘carnage’, 
‘ignoble’, condemnable’, ‘regrettable’, ‘callous’ etc to describe it and its handling, finally 
blaming Governor Jang and PLASIEC. On December 3, 2008 Mohammed Haruna (a columnist 
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with Daily Trust) wrote an eloquent article, in which he traced the whole crisis to Governor 
Jang and his attempt to impose a Berom ethnic agenda and to dislodge the enterprising and 
economically better placed Hausa/Fulani. He also called it a massacre and blamed the 
Southern media for looking the other way. For instance he wrote: “However...we cannot 
hope to end the ethnic and religious bigotry that has bedevilled our politics if our media 
persist in telling only one side of a story.” Haruna appears in this article one-sided by using 
topics, local meanings, hyperboles and contexts. 
Just like Mohammed Haruna’s piece the Trust newspapers published three more 
heavily pro-Hausa/Muslim articles titled ‘Jos and Epidemic Insanity (I)’ by Adamu Adamu, 
Dear “son of the soil” by Bala Muhammad and another by Dr Kabiru Mato (all of them 
Muslim). None of them thought there was any serious fault with their side and how it 
contributed to the crisis. For example Adamu wrote:  
Jang’s plan for genocide, reportedly hatched several months ago, had 
recognisable steps. First, Jang shelved and cancelled the March 2008 election 
that Aminu Baba, the All Nigeria People’s Party candidate, supported by the 
Hausa-Fulani majority, was on his way to winning by a landslide...And as if to 
prove it again, at the rerun of the election on November 27, the same Aminu 
Baba won with a wide margin of more than 30,000 votes; but as arranged, 
Jang had Baba’s opponent, Mr Timothy G Buba, declared the winner. 
The columnist, however, made it clear in the article that the entire Berom people should not 
be blamed for the sin of a few, stating that: 
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The culprits are not even the Berom people that most people will blanket-
condemn...The real culprit is David Jonah Jang and his gang and unless they 
are tried and punished the dust raised will never settle. 
Weekly Trust of December 6, 2008 had a number of mixed reports – some were 
really provocative, while some were quite heart-touching human interest stories. There 
were headlines like ‘Dear son of the soil’ by Bala Muhammad, ‘Jos: Inside story of a tragedy’, 
‘Hausas are settlers in Jos’, ‘Blood on the Plateau: A timeline of carnage’, ‘The failures of 
Jonah Jang’ by an academic and Trust columnist Dr Kabiru Mato and so on. ‘Dear son of the 
soil’ and ‘The failures of Jonah Jang’ are articles written by in-house columnists and those of 
Hausa background and were naturally seen to be biased. For instance Bala Muhammad 
seems, in ‘Dear son of the soil’, more furious over the death of Hausa than other victims. 
Muhammad stated:  
What happened last week in Jos is beyond belief and beyond coincidence. The 
Federal Government as well as the security agencies have no excuse to have 
allowed it happen. They are all culpable. Of homicide. Punishable by death. 
The same death visited on the ‘settlers’.  
The writer also kept using words and phrases like ‘settlers’ and ‘son of the soil’ with inverted 
comas at the beginning and end of each, suggesting either ridicule or disbelief. Muhammad 
appears also one-sided and views the situation from the perspective of indigene-settler 
hate, with the indigene being the culprit and the settler the victim. On their part Dr Kabiru 
Mato did not use as many labels or as much satire as Bala Muhammad, albeit the writer 
sounds also furious at Governor Jang and his Berom tribe as the following suggests:  
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...indeed a lot of Josites did nurse the fear that the possible election of Jang 
was dangerous to the peaceful co-existence of the peoples in the state 
especially in Jos North an area, whether Jang or any other Berom pseudo-
nationalist likes it or not, inhabited by the so-called settlers more than those 
who claim to be indigenes. 
Weekly Trust’s interview with Dan Manjang, Special Assistant on media matters to 
the Governor of Plateau State sounds equally provocative. For instance, in the headline 
phrased by Daily Trust ‘Hausas are settlers in Jos’ attributed to Manjang, it would be 
assumed by readers that Manjang, despite all that happened, is adamant and 
unsympathetic. Yet he did not phrase the headline, the newspaper did. But in the interview 
text, itself, there is a part in which he made such statement and possibly the headline was 
taken from that part. For instance he was quoted thus: “...I cannot go to Lagos, Katsina or 
even Bauchi and then say the fact that my forefathers have been there for 1000 years means 
I am an indigene of that state...the Hausa community in Jos are non-indigenes.” Again, this is 
capable of deepening the cleavages. The newspaper, however, did what looks like a more 
balanced approach in its ‘Jos: Inside story of a tragedy’ in which it covered experiences of 
people from both sides. It had a Muslim boy of 12, recounting his experience in the hands of 
what was suspected to be a Christian mob; there was also the story of a Christian woman 
whose home was invaded by rioters and how she narrowly escaped. The highpoint of this 
story, which was downplayed and buried down in the report, is the role played by 
neighbours, both Christian and Muslim, in saving their distressed neighbours from death. 
The Sunday Trust of December 7, 2008 had in it two reports on the case of the slain 
Youth Corp members from the South whose corpses had been returned to their families for 
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burial. The first report ‘Jos Riot: Wailing as Oyo NYSC takes delivery of dead bodies’ and the 
second ‘Jos killings: God will revenge, Anglican cleric declares as slain youth corper is 
buried’. Both of those are good human interest stories in spite of the lack of enough 
reporting of the other side’s plight by the Daily/Weekly/Sunday Trust papers. Daily Trust of 
December 19, 2008 published a human interest story ‘Jos refugees want their children to sit 
WEAC, NECO’, in which those living in camps requested that their children be allowed to sit 
the yearly exams for pupils in their last year in the High School. This story was reported 
during the wife of the president’s delegation visit to the camp. But the contradiction is that 
while THISDAY only reported that the delegation shunned Governor Jang it did not have this 
angle of the story. And in the case of the Daily Trust it was silent on the issue of shunning 
Jang and reported that it was Mrs Turai Yar’adua that visited not her representative. 
Like the previous week the temperament in the newspaper house could be 
measured by the number of articles by its columnists and the tone in each, thereby 
portraying van Dijk’s (2001) ‘subtle’ formal structures. There were write-ups that included: 
Bark Byte  by Garba Deen Mohammed titled ‘Plateau Genocide: It will happen again, 
unless…’; Issa Aremu’s ‘Jos crisis or crisis of governance’; Adamu Adamu’s ‘Jos and Epidemic 
Insanity (ii)’; Muhammed Al-Ghazali’s ‘Dreams of our Plateau’; Mohammed Haruna’s ‘Still on 
the media and the genocide in Jos’; ‘Jos killings: Failure of politics and leadership’ by Is’haq 
Modibbo Kawu; and Adamu’s concluding part of ‘Jos and Epidemic Insanity’. A common 
ground for all of these apart from their overwhelming leaning to one side is that every one 
of them is an eloquent and highly influential writer. Each of the headlines seems quite 
suggestive of the writer’s point of view in the article.  Here too, there is the use of topics 
(suggestive headlines), local meanings (polarisation), subtle formal structures (rhetoric and 
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tone) and hyperboles (emphasis). Of the seven headlines only ‘Dreams of our Plateau’ 
appears moderate, although it strikes one like another show of artistic use of satire or 
metaphor to undermine the other. For example, the author wrote:  
And last weekend when the gory details of the wholesale genocide in Jos 
began to filter in I found myself dream that what I saw and heard were simply 
not true. I found it hard to believe that even in this internet age cavemen could 
still be in charge in the government house in Jos scene of the atrocities. 
One other thing is that for the first time Bala Muhammed explained their use of 
Hausa to denote all non-Berom, non-Southern victims. According to him: “The very sad fact 
about the Jos crisis is that Hausa in Jos means Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, Nupe and all other 
Muslim types. In fact in a crisis like this Christian Hausa – by association also become victim.” 
Another very relevant piece was a rejoinder to Mohammed Haruna’s article in the Daily 
Trust of December 19, 2008, in which a veteran journalist Jonathan Ishaku took on him. In 
the article ‘Re: The media and the genocide in Jos’ Ishaku appears to show similar venom as 
he attacked Haruna and even accused him of being a ‘religious jingoist’.  He said Haruna 
published, during the Kafanchan religious crisis of 1987, an “incendiary advertorial by a so-
called Council of Ulama calling on Muslims all over the world to take up arms” against 
Christians.  
Like THISDAY, Daily Trust published on December 20, 2008 a report by the US-based 
HRW in which it said it interviewed eyewitnesses in Jos and established 133 cases of extra-
judicial killings in which all but two of the victims were from one tribe, mainly 
Muslim/Hausa. It said the killings followed the governor’s shoot-on-sight order to security 
personnel. Unlike THISDAY, it was Daily Trust’s lead story and entitled ‘Police killed 90 
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youths in summary executions’. It was tied to a story in which the police headquarters had 
ordered mass redeployment of its staff from Jos.  
4.5.2    Indifference/lack of concern 
Daily Trust’s story ‘Yar’adua refuses to see Jang’ of December 3, 2008 - a reference to the 
president’s fury over the governor’s attempt to inaugurate council officials at the wrong 
time - has two implications; that the president did not take the governor seriously due, 
perhaps, to his show of ‘insensitivity’ and poor handling of the crisis, and further backlash 
over the governor’s lack of concern which the paper uses to ridicule him. Another story is 
‘FG ignored my warning over Jos’ in which a former police chief was quoted saying he’d 
previously advised the Federal Government to do something to prevent crisis from erupting 
on the Plateau but it refused. Again, the story exposes government’s lack of concern over 
the plight of the people.  
 In another story on December 22, 2008, the paper reported that the governor was 
planning to swear in the elected LG bosses despite previous warning from the president and 
the fact that the situation was still unstable. Although the newspaper claimed no official of 
the state was ready to be quoted in the report, it said one of the elected officials told them 
they had been invited to be sworn in. There is a sort of show of lukewarm on the part of the 
governor and journalistic carelessness on the part of the paper since it said the story was a 
speculation and no single source could be openly identified. There was a response to this 
report the following day as PLSG refuted claims it planned inaugurating the elected 
chairmen. The paper quoted an official of the state saying it would amount to insensitivity 
to do so, given the mood in the state. This suggests Daily Trust probably worked on 
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speculation when it published the previous report. This also shows the use of local 
meanings. 
4.5.3   Satire/use of labels/rhetoric 
The most prominent issue on this day, December 2, 2008, as reported by Daily Trust was 
how the president stopped the inauguration of LG bosses. The headline ‘Yar’adua orders 
Jang: Don’t swear in Jos LG boss’ employed both topics and macropropositions and 
metaphor to give weight to the story and ridicule the governor, as if saying “He was ordered 
like a small boy by his boss.” The story stated:  
Attempts by Plateau State Governor Jonah Jang to hurriedly inaugurate the 
state’s new local government council chairmen whose elections sparked off an 
orgy of violence in which 500 people died in Jos were yesterday halted by 
President Umaru Yar’Adua... 
Another headline by Daily Trust titled ‘How crisis began, by two sides’ was either 
deliberately so improperly coined or it was the job of inexperienced or careless reporter and 
reviewing editor(s). Reading through the story one would find Gov Jang and one of his 
commissioners contradicting each other on the genesis and causes of the crisis.  In his article 
of December 6, 2008, Bala Muhammad, wrote in the Weekly Trust using satiric words like 
‘son of the soil’. In fact the headline ‘Dear son of the soil’, with the son of the soil written in 
between inverted comas suggests ridicule. Again, being an eloquent writer the columnist 
employed words that could be described as labels either in mockery of the other or in 
mockery of how the other group perceives his people, like son of the soil, settler, indigenes 
and others. Dr Kabiru Mato in his Weekly Trust column of December 6, 2008, like 
Muhammad, employed the use of labels, perhaps in mockery of the other. For instance he 
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used the phrase ‘pseudo-nationalists’ to describe the Berom, but unlike Muhammad 
refrained from continuously using words like ‘indigene’, ‘settler’.  Daily Trust of December 
19, 2008 had in it Jonathan Ishaku’s rejoinder to Mohammed Haruna’s ‘The Media and the 
genocide in Jos’ in which he used labels like ‘irredentist’ and ‘religious jingoist’ to describe 
Mohammed Haruna. For example he said: “What a self-righteous pontification from a man 
who has made a life-time career as a religious jingoist!” 
4.5.4    Pessimism/exaggeration 
Just as THISDAY reported Daily Trust had a report in which it quoted the Gov of Niger State 
Dr Babangida Aliyu saying “Jos could soon become a ghost town”. Although he sounded 
quite pessimistic and was probably exaggerating (use of hyperbole), the reality on ground 
was that people were getting fed up with incessant instability and might look elsewhere for 
peace and safety, especially people from other places.  
Another story in which the paper might be seen to have gone a bit too far was the 
one titled ‘Yar’Adua refuses to see Jang’, which began thus: “Gov David Jang of the crisis-
torn Plateau State got an unusual taste of President Umar Yar’Adua’s anger when he arrived 
at the State House, Abuja, yesterday to brief the president...” The story appears biased and 
presumptive because of its claim to a source that was not named. Even the headline 
suggests bias against the governor and an opportunity to ridicule him after he had been 
shunned. Apart from stereotyping the story of December 6, 2008 by the newspaper appears 
to further complicate the problem by incensing tempers. It was titled ‘Hausas are settlers in 
Jos’ and credited to one of the governor’s aides. His claim that even if one lives in a place for 
one thousand years it does not make one an indigene of the place sounds exaggerated and 
provocative. ‘The mess called Plateau council polls’ was an article by Sunday Trust 
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(December 7, 2008) correspondent and it tends to be one-sided and exaggerated. Other 
headlines with similar undertones included: ‘Blame Jang, police for Jos crisis, says MSS’ – a 
story in which the Muslim Student Society of Nigeria accused the governor and police 
commissioner in Plateau State of complicity and features use of topics, local meanings and 
contexts. Also, the headline ‘Police Killed 90 Youths in Summary Executions – Report’ 
published on December 21, 2008 seems conclusive even though it was only a report by a 
neutral organisation documenting eyewitness accounts that were either accurate or 
inaccurate. The newspaper should have presented it as an allegation that needed to be 
proven.  
 4.5.5   Peacebuilding/conciliation 
In Weekly Trust’s report ‘Jos: Inside story of a tragedy’ there were stories of lucky escapes 
from death by people who were saved by their neighbours. One Christian woman told of 
how she and her daughter were saved by a Muslim man and his in-laws. Another person, a 
Muslim, recounted how their neighbours for 20 years saved them from the jaws of death by   
keeping them in a safe hide-out until soldiers took them away to a safer place. But stories 
like these ones are often given less prominence compared to those likely to provoke 
negative reactions. 
In the week beginning December 7, 2008 Daily Trust published  a number of pro-
peace reports, adverts and articles like ‘Jos Mayhem’ by National Council of Muslim Youth 
Organisations (NACOMYO), putting its weight behind calls for peace and positive use of 
topics and context; ‘Nigerians in US set up committee on Jos crisis’, which was a positive 
move from those abroad to contribute to the reconciliation and rehabilitation process; 
‘Council visits victims of Jos crisis’, a visit by Plateau Council of Ulama to victims, whom they 
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urged to remain calm and peaceful; ‘Jos crisis: We don’t crave vengeance, says Yoruba 
Northern council’, was a move towards healing and forgiveness despite their losses; and 
‘Sultan wants end to communal, religious crises in Nigeria’, another bold effort by the clergy 
to ensure a move to end the violence.     
4.6    DISCUSSION  
This section is concerned with discussing the findings in the analysis in this chapter and 
relating to theories that are connected to the themes analysed. For this purpose four 
headlines, regional cleavages, enemy framing, misinformation and peacebuilding have been 
constructed through which the discussion will be presented. 
4.6.1    Regional Cleavages 
In this section two reports by each newspaper will be discussed, using the model developed 
by van Dijk (1985, 2001). The stories are ‘Dozens Killed in Jos LG Election Riot’, ‘Death Toll in 
Jos Riot Rises to 350’ (by THISDAY) and ‘Plateau: Scores killed in council polls violence’, 
‘Death Toll Hits 400’ (by Daily Trust’s stable-mates Weekly and Sunday Trust). All four stories 
were earlier discussed briefly in the analysis but will be discussed in more detail here. A 
common trend identified in the entire reports studied over the period chosen was the 
tendency by each side to promote their interests over and above the collective or national 
interests and public good. In order to properly understand how this developed over the 
period the crisis was reported it is essential to draw our attention to some meanings of 
news. Babalola (2002: 404) has defined news “as any fresh thing reported in the various 
fields of human endeavour.” While Stephens (1988: 9) says news is “new information about 
a subject of some public interest that is shared with some portion of the public, or, in short, 
what is on a society’s mind.” The second definition brings out the issue of public interest, 
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which is of essence in this discussion. And Rosen (1993: 53) describes public (interest) 
journalism as “a theory and a practice that recognised the overriding importance of 
improving public life.” Mano (2005) also sheds more light on sociological discussions about 
the role of journalists in either sticking to serving public interest or not. Expounding 
argument about their (journalists) obvious contribution in the transformation of their 
society Mano (2005; citing McNair 1998) posits that the journalism profession is critiqued 
within the sociology of journalism through two concepts:  the competitive and dominance 
paradigms. While the competitive is linked to “a more normative approach, an idealistic 
concern with how the media ought to be” (Mano 2005: 57), he argues that the dominance 
paradigm is more interested in the gaps between what is and what ought to be in journalism 
(that is real and ideal). Although Mano (2005) posits further that both schools overlap and 
are combined in reality, their main argument relevant to this discourse is the enunciation 
that journalists are servants of public interest by the competitive paradigm, while the 
dominance school sees them as representing the interests of the dominant, private, selfish 
interests of a society divided on the basis of class, gender and ethnicity among other issues. 
(Mano 2005: 58). Having these perspectives on mind it is essential to return back to how 
news/reporting was handled in the crisis. 
 As was mentioned earlier our analysis revealed how both newspapers seemed to 
have played into the cleavages in the society, allowing them to reflect in the news they 
reported during the crisis. For example THISDAY’s first report on the crisis (November 29, 
2008) was titled ‘Dozens Killed in Jos LG Election Riots’ and stated:  
Dozens of people were feared dead yesterday owing to skirmishes in the Jos 
North Local Government Area of Plateau State over the result of the council 
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polls widely believed to have been won by the candidate of the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP), Barrister Timothy Gyang Buba. 
It is instructive to note the phrase “polls widely believed to have been won” despite 
attempts by the writer to hide their immersion in the story. The phrase, based on van Dijk’s 
(2001) model, suggests the use of both local meanings (to promote polarisation), ‘subtle’ 
formal structures, (to disguise the author’s immersion), and local context, consenting to or 
providing a platform for propaganda, (on behalf of a party in the conflict). This is so because 
a party had complained of manipulation of the polls result leading to protest, and all 
opposition parties had corroborated the claim. But the report, by implication, had denied all 
this. In the same report the paper wrote that the crisis was started by supporters of the 
opposition All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP) because they realised “that their candidate 
whom they said was leading the PDP candidate was about to be declared the looser.” Again, 
apart from uninterrupted immersion in the story the reporter took side by, without an 
independent check, concluding who the aggressor/aggressed was. The paper mentioned an 
‘eyewitness account’ as its source; the fact that it was a single source i.e. there was no 
further corroboration or police report on the allegation or reaction from the opposition 
party made the claim more suspect. This part of the story also appears to embed ‘topics’ (by 
drawing attention to), as well as polarisation and exaggeration (use of hyperbole). 
  Daily Trust (Weekly Trust November 29, 2008) also carried the same report but had 
its own version. According to the paper in its cover story titled: ‘Plateau: Scores killed in 
council polls violence’: 
…trouble began at the counting centre when it became apparent that a 
candidate of one of the three major parties has secured an unassailable lead. 
At this point, a representative of one of the parties who thought his candidate 
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was losing the election announced that results from Tudun Wada ward was on 
the way but others protested, saying all results were in. 
Like THISDAY, Daily Trust’s reporter was already part of the story from their use of such 
phrases as ‘it became apparent’ and ‘an unassailable lead’. They both suggest the reporter 
was convinced the candidate’s lead was irreversible and unquestionable. Yet, they did not 
mention a single credible source to support their claim nor did they mention doing an 
independent check but merely said “Weekly Trust gathered”. There appears to be the use of 
topics and macropropositions, (suggesting manipulation of polls results), local meanings, 
(polarising the conflict) and local context, lending itself to being a platform for propaganda. 
But unlike THISDAY’s this reporter did not attempt to veil their immersion in the story as the 
use of such strong words as ‘apparent’ and ‘unassailable’ arguably show. In the same cover 
story the paper, although they tried to balance by mentioning that both Churches (and 
Christians) and Mosques (and Muslims) were victims, emphatically used the example of 
Albayan Islamic school, which it said was attacked by rioters and many pupils affected. It is 
also pertinent to note that this is a Muslim school and by stressing its case the paper was 
both immersing itself and polarising the situation, like Muslim versus Christian.  
THISDAY’s story of November 30, 2008 ‘Death Toll in Jos Riot Rises to 350’ needs to 
be discussed here too. The report began as follows: 
The Plateau State Government has ordered security operatives comprising 
men of the Nigerian Army, Air Force, and Mobile Police to ‘shoot-on-sight’ 
anybody fomenting crisis or defying the curfew order imposed on the state 
capital. The order was the government’s latest response to end the riot in Jos, 
which death toll, as at yesterday evening, had risen to 350. 
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The first thing that might come to a reader’s mind is the high level of casualty i.e. death 
reported in the headline but missing in the opening sentence showing it was of less 
importance compared to the order by the government to use more brutal force to quell the 
riot that had cost hundreds of lives in a space of two days. The headline, itself, suggests the 
employment of van Dijk’s (2001) topics and macropropositions to quickly summarise the 
content, which although downplayed (litotes) in the intro, immediately draws the attention 
of a reader. The state government, through its response to the crisis, seems to also 
hyperbolise the entire picture and overreact by such a massive use of force as if full scale 
war had erupted and it needed to deploy the military (the Nigerian Army and Air Force – 
with armoured tanks and jet fighters) and Mobile Police force to mow down the 
perpetrators (enemy). THISDAY wrote further that the state government said “it would not 
sit back and watch thugs wreck (sic) more havoc on innocent citizens.” This part of report 
suggests both the government’s attempt to polarise the crisis (local meanings, labels) by 
drawing a battle line between the government (on behalf of the innocent, good citizens) and 
the defaulters (thugs) and justify their action, suggesting the society was better off without 
those thugs. In another part of the report the paper stated:  
THISDAY also gathered that security operatives yesterday intercepted about 
500 men armed with weapons on their way to Jos. THISDAY could not however 
independently verify the figure…The arrest was a sign that the warring groups 
are regrouping. 
Here again three main features of van Dijk’s (2001) model appear present: local meanings 
(presupposition), specific linguistic realisations (use of hyperbole) and local context 
(promoting propaganda). The paper perhaps, by saying it gathered without disclosing an 
independent source (other than later mentioning the Governor’s Director of Press James 
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Mannok, who’s an interested party) consents to being used as a platform for propaganda. It 
also appears to help in exaggerating the situation by reporting the interception of “about 
500 men armed with weapons on their way to Jos” although it confessed not independently 
verifying the figures (not the story), which implies it was sure of the veracity of the story. 
The use of the word “intercept” (like capture) has a military undercurrent and could 
exaggerate as if saying an enemy or a missile had been intercepted. It further shows a 
possible immersion in the story by stating, as if absolutely sure, that “The arrest was a sign 
that the warring groups are regrouping.”  
In the case of Daily Trust its story of November 30, 2008 titled ‘Death Toll Hits 400’ 
started thus:  
At least, 400 persons, most of them yet to be identified, have been killed as the 
violence over local government elections in Plateau State last Thursday 
entered its second day yesterday. 
Although the introduction appears not to be subjective the same may not be said about 
later parts of the report like “…several eyewitness reports put the figures at well more than 
400 persons who were killed from gunshots,” and “Our correspondent…in Jos, yesterday, 
said, he counted close to 400 bodies deposited at the Jos Central Mosque.” In both cases, 
unlike the introduction, it appears that the sort of neutrality earlier demonstrated was 
beginning to give way to subjectivity. For instance the paper mentioned several 
eyewitnesses saying most of the victims were killed by gunshots without elaborating. It did 
not say who shot them, thus, leaving the reader to assume either the conflicting parties had 
access to guns with which they fought each other or one side had been armed to carry out 
the killings or a third party, maybe military and police officers, had in the process of trying to 
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control the situation used excessive force as the report by HRW of December 21, 2008 had 
suggested. In the other statement identified the report seems to suggest that, by claiming 
its reporter counted nearly 400 corpses  put in the Mosque, the victims were either killed in 
or around the Mosque or they were all Muslim, although in the opening paragraph it had 
claimed most of the victims were “yet to be identified”. This also reveals the possible 
attempt to draw meaning and polarise. In both quotations there appears the use of local 
meanings (vagueness, omission and presupposition), topics and macropropositions (drawing 
conclusions) and local context (acting to promote one side’s interest or position).  In another 
part of the report the paper wrote:  
Sunday Trust gathered last night that as a result of the scale of violence, the 
Inspector General of Police Mike Okiro confessed to President Umaru Musa 
Yar’adua that his men were overwhelmed and sought the intervention of the 
military.  
While the above statement confirms the earlier suggestion that the situation was 
overpowering (very serious) it also gives credence to the argument for a robust handling 
warranting the deployment of the military as if it was a war situation. It, thus, appears to 
also hyperbolise, and by saying it gathered, the paper was omitting something and making 
the report questionable.  Like THISDAY the paper mentioned that “about 500 persons have 
been arrested in connection with the crisis,” and “some of the suspects were arrested in fake 
military and police uniform”, but it contrasted THISDAY by saying its source was the Plateau 
State Commission for Justice Edward Pwajok, an executive member of the state and a likely 
interested party. There was no independent check. It did not, unlike THISDAY, mention the 
issue of arms allegedly found in the suspects’ possession. The implications are either of the 
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two or both papers are either exaggerating or peddling misinformation or concealing 
information or aiding the achievement of all three.  
 Recalling our earlier definition/explanations of news/journalism it is essential to ask, 
based on the analysis of these two newspapers’ reports, whether the qualities mentioned 
have been satisfied. In respect of furnishing the audience with fresh information, one might 
be able to say yes based on the regular updates provided. But given the issues raised it is 
difficult to say whether the information provided in all cases were accurate or factual, thus 
the test of objectivity and public interest journalism becomes suspect here. It is essential to 
also observe that Hallin and Mancini (2004) have argued that a feature of the media is their 
link to political parties or reflection of the divisions in the system. They have also asserted 
that “no analyst would argue that journalism anywhere in the world is literally neutral” 
(Hallin & Mancini 2004: 26). Based on the discussion in this section and, particularly, the 
illustrative quotes from each of the papers’ reports it is deducible that the positions of both 
Daily Trust34 and THISDAY35 newspapers can be explained in terms of their links to and 
reflection of the cleavages in Nigeria. Each was, probably, trying to defend the region/tribe 
and religious faith of its proprietors and audience and, despite attempts to be balanced, the 
cleavages were often obvious as was analysed in the discussion. In the process little efforts 
were made to satisfy ethical provisions (like objectivity and public interest journalism).  
                                                             
34 Daily Trust has been variously mentioned in this thesis as a newspaper belonging to Northern/Muslim 
proprietors and based in the North, and therefore seen as defending the North and Islam. 
 
35
 THISDAY is owned by a Christian from the South of Nigeria and considered protecting the interest of the 
South and Christians. 
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4.6.2     Enemy Framing  
In furtherance of the argument that the media cannot be totally neutral, as advanced by 
Hallin & Mancini (2004) and explained in various ways by van Dijk (2001) and Fairclough 
(1995), there will be attempts to explain how neutrality might have been jettisoned, leading 
to the possible use of enemy images and stereotypes. Two articles, one each by THISDAY, 
‘How the Plateau Became a Tinderbox of Ethno-Religious Strife’, and Daily Trust, ‘Dear son 
of the soil’, will be discussed. They had both been mentioned briefly in earlier analysis.  In 
the meantime, the terms enemy images36 and stereotypes37 will be explained briefly. Enemy 
images consist of painting a meek picture of a rival party’s “motivations in both substantive 
and normative terms,” (Alexander, Brewer & Richard 1999: 78). Also, Green (1993: 327) 
explains that once the enemy is constructed as an outsider, they are then imagined as 
devoid of humanity, more of an animal clothed in human skin. Lippmann (1922; cited in Hall 
1997: 258) explains that stereotypes:  
…get hold of the few simple, vivid, memorable, easily grasped, and widely 
recognised characters about a person, reduce everything about the person to 
those traits, exaggerate and simplify them, and fix them without change or 
development to eternity. 
In order to comprehend the use of both terms in this discussion articles/reports by THISDAY 
and Daily Trust will be analysed here too, bringing out specific use of manipulation in each 
case using van Dijk’s theory. First, Daily Trust columnist Bala Muhammad’s ‘Dear son of the 
soil’ (Weekly Trust December 6, 2008) began with: 
                                                             
36
 Enemy images are to be used in more detail in discussions in Chapter Seven. 
 
37 Stereotypes/stereotyping are also explained in detail in Chapter Seven. 
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Last week in Jos, as ‘sons of the soil’ marauded around Gangare and Dilimi 
downtown on a murderous rampage, they were communicating with each 
other in Hausa, the language of their victims, the ‘settler’. Again, listening to 
the rulers of Plateau State, speaking in almost fluent Hausa on the media, the 
massive irony of it all is lost only on the most naive. 
In that opening statement, including the headline, at least four of van Dijk’s features could 
be noticed. There appears the use of topics and macropropositions (reference to 
marauders), local meanings (presupposition, labelling and polarising), hyperbole 
(marauding, murderous rampage), litotes (using stereotypes to demean) and formal 
structures (rhetoric, uncontrollable mood/opinion). As was earlier mentioned, it was an 
excellently written article in which satire was used with precision, yet the mood and tone of 
the author could still be noticed. The headline, itself, suggests a degree of mockery and 
labelling, since the ‘indigenes’ often used the Hausa term ‘dankasa’ (literarily meaning son 
of the soil) to refer to themselves, although it means indigenes or aborigines. So, the term 
was used in the piece to possibly label and mock them. The word ‘marauded’ must have 
been coined from marauder (meaning a raider, looter or an intruder - enemy images) to 
paint a negative picture of the ‘son of the soil’. It therefore seems both degrading and 
hyperbolising. There was stereotyping as the entire people were presented at murderers, 
raiders intent on raiding and, perhaps, exterminating their victims, the Hausa. The hallmark 
of it all is that the article could easily polarise and leave a deep impression (negative) of the 
other. Following a complete analysis of the article it was realised the author used negative 
terms in the forms of labels/enemy images/stereotypes etc 41 times. They are as follows: 
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son of the soil (9), settler/settled/migrant (24), rulers (1), so-called Middle Belt (1), 
indigene/indigenous (6). 
As for THISDAY the article authored by its correspondent in Jos on December 5, 2008 
will be discussed in the same way here. Under the headline ‘How the Plateau Became a 
Tinderbox of Ethno-Religious Strife’ three separate quotes are considered below: 
Mercenaries from Kebbi, Katsina, Sokoto and Niger Republic turned out in 
large numbers to kill citizens of the state...  
Over eighty houses...belonging to the Igbos and other citizens were razed 
down.  
…and members of the PDP who felt that the Hausa-Fulani had no locus standi, 
as they are not originally from Jos-North, and indeed not from Plateau State. 
In this case too there were the use of topics and macropropositions (mercenaries, kill 
citizens), local meanings (labels, not original, no locus standi), ‘subtle’ formal structures 
(uncontrollable feeling/tone), hyperbole (mercenaries in large number), litotes (not original, 
no locus standi) etc. The headline appears intended to create a grave picture and the use of 
hard enemy imaging like ‘mercenaries’ helps in making a success of that. There is also veiled 
stereotyping of people from Katsina, Sokoto and Kebbi States and neighbouring Niger 
Republic as they are presented as persons willing to be rented to carry out mass murder. In 
the same way there is polarisation as the author presented one side as the aggressor and 
the other the aggressed. The use of the term ‘no locus standi’ (Latin word) to refer to Hausa 
appears patronising as it is a legal term to mean having no ground or credibility or right to 
something. Hyperbole, it seems, is also applied in the claim that mercenaries were imported 
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to give a picture of an invasion or a raid, just like Bala Muhammad’s use of ‘marauded’ in his 
article. On the whole the author used enemy framing, polarising or stereotyping words at 
least 20 times in the article. These words include indigenes/indigenous/citizens of the state 
(8), settlers/settlement/settle (7), migrants/migrate (1), originally (1), mercenaries (1), other 
Christians/other citizens (2). 
Referring back to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) theory explaining the tendency of the 
media to be partial and reflect the divisions in their society one might be able to argue at 
this point, based on the few examples cited in the above discussion, that enemy framing 
through labels or images and stereotypes aimed at shaping attitudes as both van Dijk (2001) 
and Hackett (2003) have warned seems to have been used by both newspapers. And, as was 
previously explained, the background of the two papers might have been influential in 
helping to coax them into being tribal/regional propagandists and cheerleaders rather than 
promoting the common good or public interest. Furthermore, Green (1993) has explained 
the manner in which an enemy image is created, as one devoid of humanity, like an animal 
pretending to be human. Both writers (in THISDAY and Daily Trust) were cited trying to paint 
dehumanising pictures of the other for example using such terms as ‘marauders’ and 
‘mercenaries’.  
4.6.3   Misinformation 
In our earlier analysis there were a few occasions when certain information/news appeared 
to be not only one-sided but misleading. In the attempts to expound this argument further 
there is a need to refer to framing theory which argues that journalists acting under the 
influence of “frames sponsored by multiple social actors, including corporate and political 
elites, advocates and social movements” turn news stories into a forum for frame contests 
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wherein those actors struggle to define political issues from their own perspectives (Ryan, 
Carragee & Meinhofer 2001: 176). It is also essential to consider the De Vreese, et al (2001: 
108) suggestion that: “The central dimension of a frame seems to be the selection, 
organisation, and emphasis of certain aspects of reality, to the exclusion of others.” And, 
very importantly too, is the position that: “Omission is the most powerful source of 
distortion” (Davies 2009: 37). Again recalling our earlier explanation of what news and 
public interest journalism are, there is a need to look at how certain forms of distortions 
were allowed to go unchecked by both newspapers. In the light of this it is imperative to 
consider Davies’ (2009: 51) statement that: 
Journalism without checking is like a human body without an immune system. 
If the primary purpose of journalism is to tell the truth, then it follows that the 
primary function of journalists must be to check and to reject whatever is not 
true. 
To discuss the above assertions further THISDAY’s report ‘Turai’s Delegation Visits 
Jos, Shuns Jang’ of December 18, 2008, and Daily Trust’s story ‘Jos refugees want their 
children to sit for WAEC, NECO’, published December 19, 2008, will be applied. The two 
stories were also mentioned in the analysis. First, on December 18, 2008 THISDAY reported 
the visit by a delegation of the wife of President Yar’adua to Jos to distribute relief material 
to victims of the crisis who were camped in refugee camps in Jos. But the paper introduced 
the report both in its headline and opening paragraph by suggesting the delegation had 
disrespected Governor David Jonah Jang of Plateau State. The headline ‘Turai’s Delegation 
Visits Jos, Shuns Jang’ is catchy and suggestive on its own.  It immediately draws one’s 
attention to the plight of an embattled governor, following the violence in his state and the 
lack of sympathy from the federal government, now facing another humiliation from 
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representatives of Mrs Turai Yar’adua, wife of the president. This whole scenario, as the 
headlines tries to capture, seems to depict the use of local meanings to make an assumption 
and topics to draw attention to the main point, later put across by the opening paragraph of 
the report. According to the introduction: 
A delegation of the Nigerian First Lady Hajiya Turai Yar’Adua, yesterday visited 
Jos, Plateau State capital to distribute relief materials to the victims of the 
November 28 riot, in which many lives and property were lost, and many 
people displaced. The delegation, however, either deliberately or otherwise 
refused to visit the governor of the State, David Jonah Jang. 
The above quote suggests the position of the writer (and paper) was one of 
sympathy to the governor, since courtesy demands that a delegation as important as the 
one despatched to the state by the president’s wife should have paid the governor a 
courtesy visit. But by concluding they had refused to do so without explaining why seems to 
imply taking the sympathy a bit too far. The opening paragraph explains the headline clearly 
and summarises through topics and macropropositions the supposed intent of the report, 
projecting one side’s view and polarising the situation. The report also stated that “a 
delegation of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua…had also shunned Jang during an earlier 
visit,” further confirming what might be perceived as a well planned gang-up by the 
president, his wife and their representatives to disgrace the governor. There was no point in 
the report that any mention was made of contacting someone in a position to refute or 
react to the allegation before going to press. Thus, apart from the paper working on 
assumption to arrive at a conclusion, it appears, there was nothing else to back its report or 
make it look balanced or satisfy the test of credibility.  
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 In contrast to the above story Daily Trust’s version, ‘Jos refugees want their children 
to sit for WAEC, NECO’, published December 19, 2008, reported that the visit was by Mrs 
Turai Yar’adua and not by a delegation on her behalf. The report did not even mention the 
refusal of the delegation to pay the governor a courtesy visit. It took a different angle as it 
stated:  
Refugees in Plateau State have appealed to the Federal and Plateau State 
governments to help facilitate how their children who missed the November-
December WAEC and NECO exams because of the Jos crisis will sit for the 
exams. 
This is a clearly different perspective from the one offered by THISDAY. Mention was made 
of the First Lady in next sentence that:  
The refugees made the plea yesterday at the Plateau State Police 
Headquarters before the First Lady Hajiya Turai Yar’adua who was in Jos to 
distribute relief materials to the victims of recent crisis. 
               In this report too one might notice the subjectivity of the reporters as they tried to 
show as much sympathy as they could to the refugees, many of whom are from their own 
side. This might probably explain why they were silent on the issue of the governor’s 
humiliation raised by THISDAY. But the main issue this researcher finds with this report is 
that it came a day later than the one published by THISDAY on the same event, suggesting 
the reporters were late in sending the story to the paper’s editors in Abuja or for some 
reasons the story failed to make it the previous day and was eventually published two days 
after it happened. If the report was stale, as this researcher suspects, then the paper or 
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gatekeepers (editors) should have changed the date mentioned in the story (yesterday) to 
the correct date. The second issue is the claim that Mrs Yar’adua was in Jos herself, which 
contradicts the first story by THISDAY, making it difficult to tell which of the two stories 
could be trusted. While this story by Daily Trust also seems to play into the divisions in the 
conflict by its show of sympathy to one side and refusing to mention where the other had 
been unfairly treated, that is shunning of the governor, the two cases of misinformation 
cited make it difficult for it to pass the credibility test. Nonetheless, it remains quite difficult 
to prove which side of the story regarding who visited Jos to distribute relief material is true. 
One might conclude here that there might have been an attempt to peddle falsehood by 
either of or both papers.  There might have been, as such, acts of omission, which Davies 
(2009) has described as the biggest form of distortion, while, in line with De Vreese, et al 
(2001) suggestion, there seems to have been attempts to use frame to select, organise and 
emphasise certain information and exclude others. 
4.6.4   Peacebuilding 
Although the issue of the transformation of the conflict to peacebuilding will be adequately 
dealt with in latter discussions in Chapter Seven attempts will be made here to look at how 
the two papers tried to provide a platform, in spite of their connections with the divisions, 
for some aspects of negotiation. It is pertinent to understand that in the event of war it is 
usually peace that becomes the first victim and truth the second (Lynch & Galtung 2010). 
The most practical way of dealing with the difficult experiences of and getting past any 
conflict is through reconciliation and healing the wounds or damage done based on the 
offering and acceptance of forgiveness (Staub & Bar-Tal 2003; Noor, Brown & Prentice 
2008). In discussing the roles played by THISDAY and Daily Trust newspapers in the process 
two reports/articles by each will be discussed. These are THISDAY’s ‘Jos Again’, of December 
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3, 2008 and ‘Nigeria Fails Us…Yet Again’, of December 7, 2008, as well as Daily Trust’s 
(Weekly and Sunday Trust, respectively) publications ‘Jos: Inside story of a tragedy’, of 
December 6, 2008 and ‘Jos Mayhem’, of December 7, 2008.   
First, THISDAY’s publication on December 3, 2008 titled ‘Jos Again’, which in spite of 
its rather gloomy headline has suggested pragmatic solutions. The author Kayode Komolafe 
wrote: “The tragic events of last week were a confirmation that the basis of the conflict is 
yet to be removed. It requires deft political engineering to remove the cause of the conflict.” 
It is particularly impressive that the writer thought that unless the problem was uprooted it 
would happen again. And to achieve that there was a need for a clever effort by leaders. In 
our previous study of the causes of violent conflicts several issues were identified, some of 
which might be similar to those in Jos. Komolafe’s suggestion that unless they were dealt 
with thoroughly the problems will only temporarily disappear to resurface again is quite 
valid. This thorough solution will, therefore, depend on how leaders are able to skilfully, 
genuinely and seriously administer solutions, some of which the writer suggests as: a proper 
investigation into the underlying causes of the conflict; ensuring that perpetrators do not go 
unpunished to deter would-be trouble makers; reviewing the conduct of the troubled LG 
elections; and tackling the material basis of the crisis, like the rising rates of poverty and 
unemployment. Tackling the material causes is very essential as a major cause of organised 
violence is perceived inequality in the society (Bellamy, et al 2008).  In the second article, 
‘Nigeria Fails Us…Yet Again’ by Simon Kalowole, the writer argued there were plenty early 
warning signs of the crisis that were ignored until it happened. According to him:  
You can actually worsen it when you ignore the real problems and the 
undercurrents. People don’t just wake up one day and start butchering their 
neighbours if there had not been a latent factor. 
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The writer therefore advocated a resolution of the underlying problems by means of 
dialogue as he stated: “I believe strongly in the power of negotiation and mutually-designed, 
mutually-agreed roadmap to peace.” Kolawole, thus, urged the government to broker 
reconciliation while ensuring the protection of lives and property across the country; the 
entrenchment of citizenship while de-emphasising ‘indigeneship’; and the accommodation 
of “minorities in our midst.” 
In ‘Jos: Inside story of a tragedy’ Weekly Trust did a thorough investigative reporting 
and analysis of the crisis and even interviewed some victims on both sides. A Christian 
woman who was saved by a Muslim man said: “It is high time for us to stop drawing a line 
between our differences and learn to respect other people.” What that woman, perhaps, 
meant to say was a need to de-emphasise differences and respect each other’s culture, so 
as to promote better understanding and harmony. Another survivor, a Muslim, told of how 
they were saved by a neighbour, stating: “We stayed with them until the following day when 
soldiers came and took us out of the area.” The second publication, ‘Jos Mayhem’ was, in 
fact, an advertisement by NACOMYO condemning the crisis while advocating a mutual 
resolution and bringing the culprits to justice. In the advert the group called on Muslims and 
youths “to remain calm and show understanding in accordance with Islamic Injunctions as 
the highest Muslim leadership and Christians have shown concern and have taken up the 
matter.”  Although appealing to Muslims and youths, the missive is clear: a call for peace. It 
is essential to note that all the examples cited here suggest genuine calls for the 
transformation of the conflict and the positive use of both topics and local context to 
highlight that. The whole process, that is the calls for calm and peace, lays the basis for the 
‘resurrection’ of peace, which Lynch and Galtung (2010) say is the first victim in any war or 
violent conflict. It also paves the way for reconciliation and healing and a possible 
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transformation of the crisis, if everyone genuinely and responsibly offers and accepts 
apologies, as Staub and Bar-Tal (2003) and Noor, et al (2008) have suggested. 
4.7  CONCLUSION 
In the analysis in this chapter 160 news reports, articles, comments, opinions and letters (to 
the editor) published by two Nigerian newspapers from November 29 to December 26, 2008 
were analysed through critical discourse analysis. From the analysis it was realised that the 
newspapers were linked to and promoted the divisions in the polity. In order to be able to 
discuss this further four headlines namely, regional cleavages, enemy framing, 
misinformation and peacebuilding were constructed. In the discussion that followed van 
Dijk’s (2001) model was extensively used to analyse the use of language and various 
theories relating to each theme was used to guide the discussion.  
 It is imperative to state the following findings: (a) both newspapers differ on how 
they perceive and report news; (b) their links to the cleavages which polarise the country, as 
explained in both Hallin and Mancini’s theory and Framing analysis, often determine news 
values and the perspectives from which they are reported; (c) the crisis escalates by feeding 
on the fuel provided through media propaganda even though journalists or the media might 
not directly have ignited the crisis; (d) journalists in both papers do not appear to think of 
objectivity as essential as they appear to show preference for immersion in the story; (e) 
editors and publishers, being part of the divisions (and perhaps agenda), allow stories to be 
planted and published without checking; (f) politicians are aware of the links the media have 
to the cleavages and exploit this weakness; and (g) although certain factors might have 
influenced all this, especially conformity on the part of journalists, they might be 
understood after the collection and analysis of field (primary, interview) data. 
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 Against the above backdrop this researcher has also argued that the analysis serves 
as a sort of springboard to a comprehensive primary field research to answer some aspects 
of the research questions. In the next two chapters primary data obtained through semi-
structured and focus group interviewing will be analysed using interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA) in attempts to finds answers to unanswered questions. 
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              CHAPTER FIVE                                                               
Analysis of Semi-Structured Interview Data and Findings 
5. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter data collected by means of semi-structured interviewing in Nigeria are 
analysed. In all, 16 semi-structured interviews were conducted with respondents in Jos and 
Abuja. Among the respondents are 5 senior reporters/correspondents (2 bureau chiefs and 
3 political correspondents), 3 editors (two serving editors including a female, and one ex-
editor), 2 publishers38, 2 columnists, 2 General Managers of newspapers, 1 Human Rights 
activist and commentator, and 1 policy maker and commentator. They represent both 
religious and regional divides which are the most important yardsticks for understanding 
sides to which the media and their audience belong. The interview questions, as earlier 
discussed, were formulated following a study of the news contents of two major 
newspapers in the country by means of critical discourse analysis (CDA). The newspapers 
studied were THISDAY and Daily Trust. The analysis followed a discussion of the interview 
processes like places/venues, manner of interviews, duration and even transcription. The 
analytic process is explained, bringing out how key (superordinate) and minor (sub) themes 
were arrived at, based on the dictate of the data.  
5.1  RESEARCH PROCESS 
It is essential to explain the manner in which the interviews were conducted. The choice of 
Jos and Abuja was because of the importance of the two cities as places where most 
                                                             
38 Both publishers are regular columnists. One writes for their own paper, while the other, whose magazine is 
now defunct, writes for a couple of Northern and Southern newspapers. 
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mainstream media are based in Nigeria, apart from Lagos. Although Lagos was initially listed 
among places to visit and conduct the study but for reasons that would be explained in 
Chapter Eight (Limitations of the Study) the idea was eventually dropped. Nonetheless, 
representatives of key newspapers in Lagos were accessed and included in the study in both 
Jos and Abuja. In Jos six of the interviews were held and in most cases they were conducted 
in offices, except in the case of R7, who requested that it should take place in their home; it 
was both for their convenience and safety reasons and the researcher had no problem with 
agreeing to do so.  
In the case of the other five there was only one major problem particularly with 
visiting R5’s office in one of the riskiest parts of the city. There was a particular concern for 
the research assistant who would be easily identified as a stranger and he might be 
attacked. So the researcher went on that occasion alone and in an attire that conformed to 
the situation of the venue (community). And since the researcher was alone things like 
monitoring the recorder, which was usually taken care of by the research assistant, had to 
be done by him. There was also a minor issue with visiting R11’s office because it was a time 
when they (MPs, one of whom R11 was) were at loggerheads with the state Governor and 
the atmosphere was charged. So, the researcher had to endure waiting and made several 
repeated visits before finally getting them to talk for 45 minutes. In all other cases the 
atmosphere was mutually conducive and interviews were quite smooth and lengthy. On all 
occasions (except R5’s) there was a research assistant to help with monitoring recorder and 
other minor needs (with the consent of interviewees). At least on three occasions there was 
a request that research assistant should briefly leave the room while participants made 
important (confidential disclosures), given that they had been reassured of maximum 
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confidentiality. As such, on all occasions the interaction was a direct one between the 
researcher and the researched. The information disclosed was sensitive and important for 
the study. The researcher realised that as he tried to make sense of the experiences of the 
researched they were also trying to make sense of the role played by the researcher in the 
process. This, perhaps, explains the rapport established between the researcher and the 
researched. 
 In Abuja 10 interviews took place. In all cases but one they were done in offices 
where the researcher was alone with the interviewees, except on two occasions where they 
were happy to allow research assistant and one time when an interviewee requested junior 
colleagues to wait and observe. Interviewer did not have any problem with any of these 
requests, given that none of the observers tried to influence (directly though) the pace or 
pattern of the interview. The most difficult of the interviews was the one the researcher 
waited eight hours before the participant became available. The interviewee later 
apologised to the researcher and explained he had a very busy programme. But it was one 
of the most rewarding interviews and well worth the wait. The only interview conducted in 
a private home was the one with a former publisher; it was originally scheduled for the next 
day but brought forward because the participant had a new plan that took up the initially 
agreed time slot. It was quite convenient for the researcher as they felt there was no risk 
involved. It also turned out to be clearly an important interview!  
 In terms of duration most of the interviews lasted between 45 minutes and one hour 
15 minutes; in fact, all but one (R11’s) lasted one hour or longer. Since the researcher was 
expecting participants to relay their experiences (phenomenology) the questions were 
structured to kick-start the process and let them go on talking while the researcher 
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observed, including body language, and threw in follow-up questions where necessary. For 
instance, as Storey (2007: 53) suggests the researcher had to do this to “strike a balance 
between ensuring that the issues specified on the interview guide/schedule are covered and 
allowing the participant to identify and pursue issues relevant to the research topic” that the 
researcher had, somehow, omitted while compiling the guide/questions. What the 
researcher found really impressive was the mutual confidence that had been built with the 
researched from the time of first contact by telephone/email to the actual interview. This 
has reflected quite well in the transcript, as they spoke openly and with passion about their 
experiences. 
 Transcription had been expected to be the most difficult key stage in the entire 
process. But the researcher was able to bring their previous journalistic experience into play 
here. A strategy initially planned but failed due to the failure of transcription 
software/equipment was to transcribe each interview on the same day; since it was fresh in 
researcher’s memory they had hoped to easily do it in a short space of time. But 
transcription was left until researcher was back in the UK in mid September, 2010 and was 
done usually very late at night or early in the morning to avoid any form of distraction. This 
hugely reduced the length of time it took to complete it; on average it took much less than 
the usual four hours it takes to transcribe a one-hour interview. Despite a few health issues 
the entire transcription was completed by late October, 2010. As will be seen in the analysis 
participants have been represented with the codes R1-16 (R meaning Researched) for the 
purpose of confidentiality. 
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5.2  ANALYTIC PROCESS 
Following transcription of interviews data were saved in a word document for reading and 
analysis to commence. Like most qualitative studies the researcher was concerned with 
understanding and making sense of the subjective experience (phenomenology) of the 
researched and not necessarily wanting to impose preconceived variables or meanings 
(Willig 2001: 9; Storey 2007: 51). The researcher had intended interacting with the 
researched to effectively understand and interpret the experiences of the researched from 
their own points of view (Grbich 2007). During the process of initial readings the researcher 
tried to identify through IPA key issues in the data (like superordinate themes). Since it 
usually involves an iterative process of reading and re-reading a transcript in order to have a 
good feel of the interviews and identify such themes that would sum-up the main ideas 
(Storey 2007: 55) the researcher chose to trust the data to lead the way. But the researcher 
was also concerned about their personal experience coming in the way as they might 
identify with some of the emotions of the researched. Grbich (2007) has explained 
phenomenology as an exploratory research that avoids one’s bias and the notion of 
bracketing, setting aside one’s experience and taking a neutral view of the phenomenon to 
avoid a personal bias (Moustakas 1994; Husserl 1981) was considered essential here too. 
Based on this the researcher was able to overcome their initial reaction to some suggestions 
like the use of the carrot/stick tactic to cajole journalists into conformity and other factors 
compelling compromise that they had also experienced as a journalist. During the initial 
readings/analysis notes were made in the left-hand margin of the transcript sign-posting 
issues or questions that arose at certain points. For instance some of those appeared 
confusing or contradictory although they kept resonating in the views of different 
participants. An example was when R1 mentioned that: 
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 All the time journalists are in a matchbox except that it is a very big matchbox 
in the sense that it is not like you either toe this line or get fired. They give 
them some leeway so long as their own bottom line is not threatened…in any 
case there is no where you find absolute freedom. (Lines 228-233) 
It was difficult understanding how someone in a matchbox, no matter how big it is, could be 
expected to be objective especially  where there was a choice between public good and the 
interest (a bottom line that might be threatened) of an employer who ‘pays the piper’.  
 With notes as sign posts the researcher returned to the transcript for further 
readings but this time to also make more sense of the transcript and produce themes in the 
right-hand margin. At this stage there was a great caution to identify relevant themes only 
from the data (participants’ words, experience) and link to theoretical underpinnings but 
also ensuring there is a clear connection between the two; the data actually dictates the 
emergence of the themes and use of theories. Storey (2007: 55) describes the process of 
analysing participant’s phenomenology through theoretical constructs as an analytical 
progression that takes the researcher a step beyond a journalistic summarisation of the 
interview transcript. To achieve this using IPA it was suggested in discussions on two 
occasions with the researcher’s supervisor (after reading the transcript) that the researcher 
should identify some themes from the data and separately apply theories when discussing 
the findings resulting from the analysis of participants’ experiences at a later part or section 
of the chapter. Again, it was meant to prevent the theories from influencing the analysis in 
an overt manner. Thus, the researcher identified a number of potential theories to be used 
and made sure the choice of such theories was dictated by the data. For instance many of 
the participants argued the crises were not due to religious reasons and the media took 
sides because they are owned or controlled by people who happen to be on either sides of 
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the conflict. In line with this explanation realistic conflict theory was considered a suitable 
theory here. It was also based on this explanation and other similar views that a conclusion 
was reached on the adoption of nine superordinate themes that include: public interest 
journalism; publisher interest; corruption in the media; economic causes of the conflict; 
social causes of the conflict; biased reporting and peddling of falsehood; the creation and 
maintenance of enemy images; attempts to fight corruption in the media; and 
recommendations for transformation. 
 The themes were eventually connected, merged and collapsed into six to avoid 
duplications while those that could not stand as superordinate were transformed into sub-
themes. Against this background the final themes adopted are: public interest journalism; 
causes of the conflicts; the North/South divide; the creation and maintenance enemy 
images; ideal versus reality; and recommendations/peacebuilding. The next stage was the 
attempts to produce a summary table of themes, including illustrative quotes. Thus for the 
superordinate Theme One, Public interest journalism, are sub-themes that include publisher 
interest, corruption in the media, and conformity pressure. An example of illustrative quote: 
“…one other thing that makes that difficult is your employer. As much as you try to represent 
public interest you get frustrated when your editor suppresses a story.” 
Theme Two: Causes of the conflict. Sub-themes are: religion as a badge of 
convenience; economic factor; group formation; and media maintaining the conflict. An 
example of quotation: “One fact about Nigeria is that even those that claim to defend ethnic 
or religious interest are only fighting to preserve or promote their commercial interests.” 
Theme Three: North/South divide, with sub-themes like regionalism, biased reporting and 
misinformation/ignorance. A quote cited as an example is: “The media are taking ethnic 
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lines, Northern journalists work for Northerners newspapers and Southerners work for 
Southern newspapers.” Theme Four: The creation and maintenance of enemy images. Sub-
themes include stereotyping and creation of enemy images, while illustrative quote is “It’s 
rare that you’ll find journalists that would acknowledge if there’s a wrong on the side of 
those they support…whereas all the time they try too often to demonise the other side.” 
Theme Five: Ideal versus Reality has sub-themes like clientelism/corruption in the 
media and personal safety. An illustrative quote is: “Journalists collected the money and did 
the bidding of the government. One thing that comes to one’s mind is why should any 
credible journalist collect bribe to kill or downplay a story? But again we need to ask whether 
journalists are properly remunerated?” And finally, Theme Six: 
Recommendations/Peacebuilding. Sub-themes include education, inter-group contact and 
open access. An illustrative quote is: “I will advocate for cultural training for journalists and 
cultural exchanges so that reporters can work in different newspapers across the country 
and foster linkages.” 
5.3  PRESENTATION OF ANALYSIS IN NARRATIVE FORMAT 
A presentation of the IPA analysis of the transcript is made here in a narrative form, bringing 
together themes and related quotations. It is important to note that this presentation was 
not done in the order in which the data were recorded or transcribed but in a way to 
demonstrate analytic coherence, beginning with a superordinate theme, then using 
illustrative quotes to support each sub-theme, followed by a brief interpretation.  
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5.3.1  Theme One: Public Interest Journalism 
This theme presents discussion of how the respondents perceive the news produced and 
retailed to consumers. And at various points they express their views about the interests 
that are represented at the expense of the public good:  
5.3.1 .1  Publisher interest 
Although there are some attempts to practice public interest journalism in Nigeria, in reality 
this has been difficult. Often publishers, editors and other bosses are fingered for arm-
twisting reporters into doctoring reports to suit their taste or interest. A journalist, R3, 
reporting for a South-based newspaper argues that both newspaper proprietors and editors 
work in collusion and constitute a major stumbling block to public interest journalism. R3 
states:  
…one other thing that makes that difficult is your employer. As much as you try 
to represent public interest you get frustrated when your editor suppresses a 
story. 
R3’s frustration is in reference to situations whereby while working for a Christian publisher 
any negative report against people of the same religion as the publisher is not published. It 
is a similar picture in most other media organisations, including those owned by Muslims, as 
certain interests are protected in violation of journalism ethics and to the frustration of 
journalists. 
To buttress their point on publisher interest dictating what gets reported the reporter adds 
that bosses instruct reporters to write reports and leave them to choose what to do with 
them:  
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The management has made it clear to us to send stories the way they are and 
they decide whether or not to publish it (sic). It lies squarely with them. 
The above instruction implies that reporters or even bureau chiefs do not have the power of 
discretion. The probability of reports filed from bureaux to be published depends on what 
the reviewing editors at the head office decide. As such an important story that is 
considered unfavourable to their interest might end up in the trash bin. 
Quite a few times the saying “he who pays the piper dictates the tune” was invoked by 
interviewees to drive home their point that publishers decide what is published or binned. 
R1, a former publisher and editor who is now a columnist with a number of newspapers in 
Nigeria recounts that on a few occasions attempts were made to censor their articles: 
On one or two occasions a newspaper has done that – there was a time I said 
things that would put their publisher in a bad light and they edited it and I told 
them it was the last I would take it from them. Since then they have not edited 
my work. 
R1’s reputation in the profession and the possibility that publishers are aware of the cost of 
losing a writer of R1’s standing probably helped them in standing their ground successfully. 
Not many journalists are able to do the same. And many would rather succumb to 
censorship in the hope that at least their income might not be tampered with. 
R2 is a publisher from Northern Nigeria. R2’s newspaper is one of the most respected in the 
region, although it is only a few years old.  The publisher explains they subscribe to internal 
censorship due to the sensitive nature of the environment where they publish. This seems 
to suggest it is not always publishers’ interests that determine what is published: 
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It is not everything that we publish here. I don’t know what happens 
elsewhere. But we see others carrying such stories that we choose not to. This 
is because as we publish in the North we have developed certain reflexes and 
are aware of the effect of our publication. 
There were crises that reports by the media were directly accused of fuelling, like the 
‘THISDAY crisis’39 (2002). Perhaps this is one of the reasons why R2 thinks there’s a need for 
them to be cautious. 
R6, a former female editor corroborates the above position, saying they are mindful of what 
they publish in spite of their in-house guidelines:  
We have editorial policies definitely; there are things we don’t toy with, there 
are things we don’t over identify with. 
R6’s newspaper is perceived by non-Muslims and Southerners as too pro-Islamic and anti-
South. Its owners, although claiming to be independent of Northern politicians, are accused 
of supporting ‘anything’ North including the controversial rotational presidency or zoning.40  
                                                             
39
 The conflict referred to as the „THISDAY crisis‟ followed an article by THISDAY‟s style writer, Isioma 
Daniel.  Daniel had reportedly lived in Britain and was probably not quite aware of the sensitive nature of 
religion in Nigeria. In a bid to advance arguments to support the hosting of the Miss World Beauty Pageant the 
journalist wrote in the article that even Prophet Muhammad (SAW) would not mind taking one of the 
contestants as a wife. Most Muslims saw it as very derogatory and offensive. But hoodlums took advantage to 
unleash mayhem. The newspaper‟s office in Kaduna was torched and many lives were lost too. 
 
40
 In Nigeria, Southerners widely believe they are politically dominated by the North, as 9 of the country‟s 15 
presidents (both military and civilian) were from the North. In 1999, as a return to civil rule was discussed 
following nearly 20 years of military rule politicians under the aegis of the largest political party in the country, 
PDP, agreed the rotation of major political positions, including the office of the president between the North and 
the South. But following the death of a Northern president and succession by his Southern deputy, an attempt by 
the deputy to contest the next election was opposed by Northerners. Daily Trust was accused of championing 
this opposition because it is a Northern newspaper. 
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An important reason for publishers’ seeming overbearing influence in deciding what is 
published and what is not might be their commercial interest. In explaining this, a reporter 
says: “But often newspapers cast headlines to attract readers and sales.” 
A Human Rights activist and stakeholder, R7 adds that some newspapers go as far as selling 
false stories to please their audience so as to make them part with their money: 
It has become business in Nigeria and you only sell your paper when you 
fabricate a story or publish falsehood or when you blackmail and backbite. 
R7’s position is in line with the respondent’s experience in the Plateau conflict, where they 
claim stories are deliberately fabricated or exaggerated to arouse emotions.41 
R8, who is a young bureau chief working for a North-based newspaper, suggests that there 
is a strong desire to fulfil financial interest while professional ethics suffer and this is a 
general phenomenon: 
Every media is out to make money and often when there is a choice between 
attracting sales and public interest journalism what usually prevails is that 
urge to make money through readers. 
R8 further argues that some newspapers are founded to portray certain viewpoints:  
…I think in the Nigerian context if you look critically at the ownership pattern 
you will find out that some are established to protect certain views and certain 
interests. 
                                                             
41
 Following the outbreak of sectarian violence in Jos, Plateau State on 17 January 2010 the then Plateau State 
commissioner of police was said to have addressed the press claiming that the crisis was due to an unprovoked 
attack on Christian worshippers by some Muslim youths in Jos. The statement was reportedly broadcast by 
Plateau Radio and Television (PRTV) and some newspapers without editing it. And this was said to have 
provoked violent reactions the next in some parts of the state leading to a high number of deaths and destruction.  
CP Greg Anyantin was relieved of his position as a result of this. 
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The pattern R8 refers to in the statement above could mean a number of things, like 
newspapers being regionally owned or religiously inclined.  
R15, a journalist and media commentator, posits that the main problems are the media 
ownership pattern pitting the North against the South, and overreliance on blame game: 
It’s been difficult for newspapers in Nigeria to demonstrate a sense of public 
interest in their coverage largely because of the ownership structure of most of 
the newspapers and the dichotomy known as the Lagos-Ibadan axis press 
against the others. Emphasis has been placed on reporting blames, ‘who killed 
who’ and the casualty figure of the different divides rather than focusing on 
the value of life and emphasising on uniting both divides. 
R15 in the statement above re-echoes earlier positions that the media face undue pressure 
even from within. 
Publisher interest could be taken a step further to vent anger on even old foes. R4, an 
Abuja-based journalist that has worked with both Northern and Southern newspapers 
recounts their experience:  
I worked with the Punch and was once told never to write anything positive 
about IBB42, and that was because there was a conflict between the Chairman 
of the paper and IBB and it was under IBB that the paper was shut down. So 
your editor doesn’t allow you to write anything positive about this man even if 
it is the truth. 
                                                             
42
 IBB is General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (retired) who was Nigeria‟s military ruler from August 1985 to 
August 1993. He is noted for brutal press censorship characterised by the closure of media houses, arrest and 
detention of journalists using military decrees to gag the press. 
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The issue R4 refers to above was the proscription of some newspapers, including the Punch, 
during the military regime of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida 1985-93. IBB, being a 
Northerner, was perceived as anti-South although he was more interested in protecting the 
interest of his junta.  
On some occasions the interest of the publisher and the government may be the same and 
opposed to the public interest. When this happens the issue of who pays the piper dictates 
the tune again comes into play as this reporter, R9 suggests:  
A colleague was recently forced to change her story headline because her 
reviewing editor was not comfortable with publishing something that would 
embarrass the government even though it is the truth. 
The above statement adds weight to earlier arguments that some newspapers have links to 
individuals and groups, including powerful government officials. Reports critical of the 
government or its officials are suppressed, while those favourable are sometimes 
manufactured.  
Sometimes politicians found complicit in religious crises are given a leeway and the press, 
maybe because of their connection with such politicians look the other way. This R13 
explains in the following way: 
Very rarely do newspapers subscribe to public interest journalism because of 
the influence of politicians who are often involved in the crisis or they hijack it 
for certain reasons and media practitioners find themselves taking sides and 
eventually colouring reportage most times for the worst. 
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R4 paints a picture of overt pressure on proprietors or editors to compel reporters to quash 
a story that someone finds uncomfortable: 
…in some cases as soon as you begin a story and you are trying to get more 
fact by talking to someone highly placed he suddenly gives your editor or 
publisher a call and you are forced to kill the story. 
Publishers are not to blame alone for this lapse. The editor of an Abuja-based daily, R12 
suggests reporters and the system that produces them share as much blame as editors in 
some cases: 
It boils down to the kind of training people have, because we are really 
constrained and people don’t have the necessary exposure and reviewing 
editors are not doing their jobs well.  
The issues raised in R12’s statement relates back to the case of THISDAY’s writer, Isioma 
Daniel, earlier mentioned. The writer had little experience writing in Nigeria and when the 
article they wrote passed through gatekeepers they (the gatekeepers) either by means of 
commission or omission allowed it to pass through, and it provoked violence.  
But R12 also adds that some publishers deliberately violate ethics to protect their interests:  
Some of the censorships are due to the nuances of the owners who 
deliberately censor themselves due to certain interest they want to protect. 
Perhaps agreeing with R12’s argument that there is something wrong with journalism 
practice in Nigeria a broadcaster and newspaper columnist, R16, thinks reporters don’t 
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understand what public journalism means. At the same time bosses and proprietors take 
advantage to give it the definition that suits their interest: 
If you were to ask “What is public interest journalism” to ten journalists you 
are unlikely to get half of your respondents correctly defining what public 
interest journalism is. Public interest is quite subjective and is defined by the 
owner or editor (or both). 
5.3.1.2  Corruption in the media 
Despite the presence of rules like the Journalists Code of Ethics and attempts by the Nigeria 
Union of Journalist to discourage its members from involvement in corrupt practices 
corruption amongst journalists is believed to be rampant. Various reasons have been 
advanced for this, some of which might be linked to the clientelistic culture of the society in 
which they operate or certain beliefs hitherto alien to journalism, as this statement 
attempts to explain: 
 There is this trend now, citizen journalism, where you are supposed to 
immerse yourself in the issue at the same time as you report. You can debate 
these issues but the thing is whatever form of journalism you practice there 
are guidelines as to fairness, as to objectivity, as to being accurate. 
Although the above quote from R1 does not imply that by being part of the story citizen 
journalists are corrupt or accept some form of inducement, it nonetheless suggests that this 
brand of journalism seeks to justify emotional attachment to the story and by extension 
unfairness.  
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Apart from the issue of non-neutrality, a major problem in Nigeria is that journalists are 
either underpaid or unpaid by their employers. In some cases they are even encouraged to 
depend on bribery for survival. R1 states: 
In practice some newspapers don’t even bother paying their reporters at all, 
they encourage them to use their business cards and that’s why we have this 
so-called brown envelope syndrome, which is just a metaphor. It goes beyond 
collecting some little money in brown envelopes… 
The brown envelope syndrome is a metaphor for bribery. Journalists are offered money in 
return for a favourable report. Politicians are believed to be the biggest beneficiaries of this 
corrupt practice, although many others are said to be involved.  
R2 explains that although they are aware of its existence, there is little they can do to 
prevent corruption in the media: 
 …as far as professionalism is concerned there isn’t much anyone can do stop 
people from using their sentiments or collecting brown envelopes. But we 
monitor them to make sure it is not allowed to happen. 
Supporting the above view R3 argues that some reporters find it difficult to decline 
inducement in the course of their professional duty because their wages are unpaid for 
months and people are willing to offer them money to influence their reports: 
There are times salaries are delayed for up to a month or two and then it is 
eventually paid all at once. At times people try to get me to suppress a story in 
various ways, like asking me to come and get their own version or reaction as 
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they call it, with a promise that if it is published I will be rewarded. It will be 
really tempting not to accept it. 
R4, however, opines that employers have no basis for asking reporters to shun corruption 
when they have failed to fulfil their own part of the bargain, like ensuring wages are paid 
promptly and improving employee welfare: 
It is a 24-hour job but one is hardly well paid… Some publishers tell their 
reporters that ‘they have given you an ID card and do what you feel like doing 
with it, but you don’t get paid salary at the end of the month.’  There is no 
moral justification to ask a reporter not to accept gratification (sic) when he 
has not been paid his wages. 
R3’s position comes against the background that only a few proprietors pay reasonable 
wages and at the appropriate time of the month.  
Although equally blaming employers and non-payment of wages, R5 thinks imposters 
infiltrate the profession and complicate the problem:  
But even all those that break all the rules of journalism in order to get money 
are mostly fake journalists, every day you hear about fake journalists being 
apprehended. 
Apart from the menace of impersonators R5 supports the view that journalists are not well 
looked after by their employers which forces many to resort to corrupt practices in order to 
survive: 
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But if a journalist is not paid for four months even their families would be 
asking them what public interests are you defending when you have not been 
paid for four months or when your children are at home when other children 
are in school. This is one of the regrettable things about Nigerian journalism. 
R8, citing the Jos violence of November 2008 as an example, opines that politicians easily 
take advantage of the poor welfare of journalists to influence stories by bribing them: 
On the day the crisis of November 2008 broke out, early in the morning on the 
29th, government officials came with a lot of money to the NUJ press centre 
and shared money to journalists to make sure the story was downplayed so 
that the federal government would not intervene. Journalists collected the 
money and did the bidding of the government. One thing that comes to one’s 
mind is why should any credible journalist collect bribe to kill or downplay a 
story? But again we need to ask whether journalists are properly 
remunerated? 
There is a need to take seriously the questions raised by R8 in the above statement if any 
meaningful progress is to be made in the fight against corruption in the media. For instance 
we need to know whether journalists are well paid and if not what is the ideal pay that 
would make them shun corruption. 
R8 explains further that many fraudulent publishers employ unqualified reporters with the 
intent of not paying them wages. They encourage them to demand bribe and accept 
fictitious stories: 
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…many of those parading themselves as journalists here are not even qualified 
or credible journalists; they have been employed by dubious proprietors who 
don’t even pay them any salary and they are asked to fend for themselves by 
filing all sorts of reports. There are some media houses where their reporters 
allow stories to be planted through them and the stories get published. 
This probably might explain why there are many stories published by newspapers that turn 
out to be false but nobody takes the pain to do a proper check.  
R16 does not think all the blames should be apportioned to employers for low or unpaid or 
delayed wages. Rather, the focus should be on the society and the kind of orientation 
journalists grow up with: 
Pay is important, but it hardly ever helps to disabuse the mind of someone 
whose stereotyping of other people is ossified in his brain and whose circle of 
friends holds the same point of view. 
This statement takes us back to the questions earlier raised by R8 and poses further 
questions whether journalists would be at peace with their conscience, knowing full well 
they’d allowed themselves to be used in peddling falsehood, perpetuating injustice and 
fuelling violence that led to the death of thousands of fellow humans, and whether anyone 
would blame a journalist whose wages are not paid and now resorts to corruption in order 
to survive. 
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5.3.1.3   Conformity pressure 
Apart from the problem of corruption caused partly by poor remuneration of journalists in 
Nigeria most of the respondents have also suggested that the society imposes certain 
constraints on journalists and the media: 
R2 thinks some journalists always have their minds pre-made on what to write or report:  
…columnists in newspapers stoke these problems. There are some papers in 
Nigeria that some columnists believe only one side is wrong. Let’s face it, the 
media can reduce or stoke the problem. But very few have risen above these 
sentiments of religion. And they continue the problem. In 95 per cent of the 
time they just can’t. 
R1 also believes some of these reporters’ minds are made to malign one side at all times. 
They peddle stereotypes and so on and so forth. Once there is a riot the first 
thing especially the Nigerian media, which is dominantly Southern and anti-
Islamic, they already take the position that the guilty party must be Muslims. 
They don’t go deeper than that to see the issues that are at the bottom of all 
that. 
The use of sentiment in reports may not be unconnected with the lopsided distribution of 
newspapers between the North and South of Nigeria, R3 opines:  
…there are so many newspapers that emerged in the South like Punch, 
Guardian and the North felt marginalised so the New Nigerian and later Daily 
Trust came up to represent the Northern interest. You don’t blame them, the 
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owners of the other newspapers were probably not giving their region enough 
attention so they had to provide their own voice. 
Explaining how the North/South, Islam/Christianity divides affect reportage in Nigeria, R3 
says reports are usually not published when considered critical of the religious group 
publishers seeks to protect:  
If I report against the indigenes, because my publishers are Christians like the 
indigenes, it is sometimes not reported and it dampens my morale. I know of 
reporters who write reports against the Muslims and because their publishers 
are Muslims such stories are not published. 
Although the reports are seen to portray the North versus the South or Islam versus 
Christianity divisions, R4 argues that the main issue is poverty and the struggle for survival 
among the people and in Nigeria even the media are recruited and used to promote 
cleavages:  
“I am also from Zangon Kataf where the Hausa live and they have prospered 
and this is the bone of contest – their prosperity is seen at the expense of the 
native who are quite poor. The Hausa are seen as oppressors. The truth is that 
people fail to understand the cause of their poverty and religion is used. The 
media are seen as defending certain interests. The South-West newspapers are 
seen as sympathising with Northern Christians, while the New Nigerian 
Newspaper is seen as defending the Caliphate and seeking to Islamise the 
North. There are certain interests that often ensure their line of thinking is 
portrayed. 
196 
 
Journalists belong to the same society where these conflicts consistently arise and are seen 
to be promoting the views of one side or the other as R5 attempts elucidating: 
It is a very difficult task for journalists to report religious crises because even 
though they try to be neutral sometimes the environment prevails and in a 
way shapes their perspectives on the issues involved in the crisis either 
because they belong to one of the contending groups either they are Muslim 
or they are Christians… 
Such sentiments, R5 adds, easily manifest due to the sort of sources journalists are able to 
reach for comments or to support their stories with their views during violent conflicts: 
… because of, probably, their in-built bias trying to defend or being seen as 
defending a particular religion it beclouds their objectivity and also other 
environmental issues involving their community, they begin to ask questions 
from people they know or they have access to and invariably they become 
accessible to people of their own religion and because of that they project this 
view more than the other side.  
R6 claims journalists do not do their homework and end up reporting falsehood or 
exaggerate facts. 
I don’t think some of them go out of the way to ensure two things. One is a 
very emotive issue so you have to be as close as possible to report what is 
closer to fact than fiction. But unfortunately what happens is because most of 
them report on their religious bias. 
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In the Plateau crises R7 posits that the media got involved to the extent that they are openly 
identified with groups in the conflict: 
…the media were divided on the basis of certain sentiments like saying these 
are my people and I don’t care about the others. So the warring parties could 
only make their plight known to the world through the relationship they have 
with a particular section of the media. 
R8 believes that by continuously and openly immersing themselves in the story the media 
have confirmed their complicity. Thus, R8 states:  
The media are part of the society they have not been able to remove 
themselves from these accusations. 
And that such bias may not be unconscious as earlier argued because they appear to 
deliberately want to be seen defending their religious faith. R8 also adds:  
They are aware of the implications of their reports but often they want to be 
seen defending their religion than not doing anything because they fear other 
journalists who are of different religious faith may take advantage and project 
their view as the right one irrespective of the adverse implications like bloody 
conflicts and so on. 
R13 lends support to the position that the intent to allow sentiments dictate the pattern in 
which reports are packaged could be due to poor research:  
Some journalists do not really go out of their way to research the cause of the 
crisis and understand the socio-political mood of the place so at the end of the 
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day they sensationalise and report things that are not true. And the 
consequence is that they hype tension and emotions in other parts of the 
country and there are instances where that has led to the outbreak of conflicts 
in other parts of the country as well. 
In the following quote R16 attempts to explain that bias is inherent in humans and often 
perfected over the years and put into practice if one eventually becomes a journalist: 
By the time people ‘graduate’ to become journalists, their habits are formed, 
their stereotyping is already entrenched, so they just go out and live and write 
what they have been brought up to believe in. 
5.3.2  Theme Two: Causes of the Conflict 
Generally, respondents are of the opinion that religion may not directly be the cause of the 
conflict but often used as a tool of convenience: 
5.3.2.1  Religion as a Badge of Convenience 
R3 suggests that religion is easily manipulated in order to swell the ranks of those in conflict 
and that each side is guilty of that: 
Now, from this if there is a conflict you see the Hausa man appealing to his 
Muslim brethren, claiming this is happening to him because of his religion. And 
the Plateau man would also appeal to other Christians by claiming that the 
Hausa man is here to wage a jihad. Even though it was originally not religious 
it now takes that form and people buy into it. 
The main reasons for the abuse of religion in this manner are to swell the ranks of those in 
conflict and also because religion is easier to manipulate than ethnicity or any other 
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identity, as R1 buttresses: “People use religious identity because it is more amenable to 
manipulation.” R7 also argues that religion only comes in because those fighting are 
adherents of the two main religions in the country and use that platform to draw the 
sympathy of their brethren across the country. 
People hide under the cover of religion to attract sympathy and therefore use 
religion. But when you give it closer look you find out all the reasons that make 
it not religious are there. The only thing is that the people fighting against 
each other belong to two different religions. 
R4 suggests too that some Nigerians use either religion or ethnicity to promote their own 
economic gains: 
One fact about Nigeria is that even those that claim to defend ethnic or 
religious interest are only fighting to preserve or promote their commercial 
interests. 
R8 explains that because religion and ethnicity can be easily linked it results in ethnic issues 
interpreted as religious: “Most crises often start as ethnic problems and because people 
easily connect the two it ends up as religious”.  
5.3.2.2  Economic Factor 
R5 argues that the struggle for scarce resources is a major fuel to the violence seen in the 
North of Nigeria: 
I have heard people say poverty contributes to violence and I agree with that 
completely. If you look at the mass poverty in the North you will see it is one of 
the attributes or a major cause of the violence. 
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But instead of seeing it as an economic conflict, R3 thinks Nigerians are too blinded by 
religious fanaticism to realise they are dragged into economic conflict in the name of 
religion: “Nigerians are too fanatical about religion and they allow themselves to be dragged 
into such conflict, which is originally economic.” R1, arguing along the same axis says religion 
is dubiously used in fighting for economic gains: 
Personally I think they are just ostensibly religious. In other words, people just 
use religion as a cover, but deeper down it is just an economic thing. This is my 
belief. 
R1 further posits that in the attempts to garner for themselves as much of the scarce 
resource as possible people use every means fair and foul, including religion and ethnicity, 
which they dress up in the garment of religion: 
At the bottom of it all I think it’s economic, it’s material. It is the struggle for 
what people think is scarce resource so now people fall back on the ethnic 
group or their religion to try and grab as much as they can for themselves. 
R6 also agrees with the argument that poverty is responsible largely for the conflicts in 
Northern Nigeria, saying that the same people who lived peacefully as neighbours for 
several years have now turned to killing each other because there is massive poverty and 
survival of the fittest becomes the main focus: 
It is better to call it socio-economic than political and ethnic. People have been 
living together for decades, long before these crises became recurrent 
phenomenon. And I remember when our people were living in relative 
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prosperity; by this I mean we still had a few wealthy merchants but the 
majority of the people were not living in abject poverty as we see today. 
And in a bid to survive at all cost, with no hope for the future, R6 adds that youths are 
manipulated and used to cause havoc: 
But now if you look around our towns and cities you see the hopelessness 
among so many young people…And I think that degree of economic alienation 
– there is no future for you, there is nothing to look forward to – is what makes 
it easy for all these boys who take up arms and to be brainwashed. 
With respect to the crisis in Plateau State R7 opines that it is difficult to pin-point one single 
cause of the violence, despite poverty being a major factor: 
The crisis we have in Nigeria, especially on the Plateau, is very complex. 
Sometimes when you think it is the failure of leadership it fits into the 
description of political crisis. But when you look at the way people are 
impoverished and because many of the populace are illiterates and maybe as a 
result of that 70 per cent or more live below poverty level minor things ignite 
serious crisis among the people. 
5.3.2.3  Group formation 
Another dimension to the conflict, according to respondents, is the influence of politicians 
who use their position to manipulate and unite sections of the society against others and 
encourage them to take to violence, using religion and or tribe as an excuse. Debunking the 
factor of religion R2 states: 
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They become religious even if they were not at the beginning. The Jos crisis 
was not religious. The governor is known to be tribalistic even among the 
various groups in the state, even in his normal life he is known to be tribalistic. 
The Zamfara State violence following the introduction of Sharia43 was another instance 
when politicians manipulated sentiments to their advantage irrespective of the looming 
danger. The editor of a weekend newspaper in Abuja, R14 explains:  
…the religious crisis in Zamfara State due to the implementation of Sharia law 
which many people opposed but the governor insisted on implementing 
because he campaigned on it and got elected...but actually it was not about 
religion but politics. 
Politicians are again blamed. A journalist based in Abuja, R10, says they usually fall back on 
ethnic and religious support when they fall out of favour with the political class:  
People have been impoverished by politicians so whenever a political leader 
falls out with the political class he comes back to tell the people that he is 
being marginalised because of his ethnicity or religion. And with some little 
mobilisation, like peanuts, you’ll see an army of idle young men unleashing 
havoc. 
Religion and ethnicity have been successfully used and people have bought such 
explanation almost too willingly. R8 argues that this is because the structure of the country 
creates a thin line between religion and ethnicity: 
                                                             
43 Following his election in 1999 Governor Ahmed Sani Yerima introduced the Sharia legal system in Zamfara 
State in Northern Nigeria. This was in spite of protests from the non-Muslim minority population in the state. 
This galvanized other states in the region to follow suit. But it became clear after a few years that it was a 
political scheme as the policy was marred by allegations of injustice. 
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In Nigeria it is very easy for the ethnic factor to come into religion because the 
geo-political divide is such that you demarcate and say this is where people of 
certain religious affiliations are. For instance you can say Southern Nigeria is 
predominantly Christian, while Northern Nigeria is predominantly Muslim. In 
Plateau State for example you can say the Berom are predominantly Christian 
while the Hausa are predominantly Muslim. 
5.3.2.4  Media maintaining the conflict 
The media are seen as part of the conspiracy as R5 claims, positing that while people 
struggle to control resources using religion and ethnicity, newspapers provide a platform for 
fighting such battles: 
Virtually everything in Nigeria is a kind of struggle, including appointment in 
federal departments. It is reduced often to a thing or religion or ethnicity and 
when you look at the things newspapers report in Nigeria they are less 
mundane things and project religion and ethnicity virtually in everything. That 
is why even in the best of times when you read newspapers in Nigeria it seems 
there is war going on between the religions and the ethnic groups. 
R13 argues that the kind of situation explained by R5 above happens due to careless 
reporting and poor knowledge of an issue and eventually the wrong information is relayed, 
on which others act and unleash havoc: 
Some journalists do not really go out of their way to research the cause of the 
crisis and understand the socio-political mood of the place so at the end of the 
day they sensationalise and report things that are not true. And the 
consequence is that they hype tension and emotions in other parts of the 
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country and there are instances where that has led to the outbreak of conflicts 
in other parts of the country as well. 
Another editor in Abuja concurs with the above position and adds that crises like the one in 
Plateau State are made to look religious because of the religious beliefs of the parties in 
conflict and the failure of journalists to investigate independently: 
So clearly, it is well known that the recent crisis in Jos is not religious but 
because the parties are from the two main religions and also because most 
journalists are not aware of the situation and have not researched it, they sit 
far away from where it is happening and tell you this is religious. 
Also blaming the media, R15 suggests that they have failed to live up to their role of 
impartial reporting and promoting harmony in the society: 
In the real sense, if one looks at the facts that the issues plaguing the nation 
have no ethnic or religious colouration, one might understand that it is also 
because the media have not played a better role in their reportage which 
ordinarily should have been more on mediation, resolution and peace building. 
R2 agrees with the suggestion by R15 that the media amplify the problem and particularly 
points accusing fingers at newspaper columnists: 
I have also found out that columnists in newspapers stoke these problems. 
There are some papers in Nigeria that some columnists believe only one side is 
wrong. Let’s face it, the media can reduce or stoke the problem. But very few 
have risen above these sentiments of religion. And they continue the problem. 
In 95 per cent of the time they just can’t. 
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R7 posits that the crises continue to happen because journalists have allowed some people 
to use them to achieve certain goals: 
In fact if not for the way they do the reporting many of these recurring crises 
would not have been recurring. Perhaps they are used by politicians to achieve 
their goals. 
5.3.3 Theme Three: North/South Divide 
Nigeria is divided along regional and cultural lines into the North and South.44 This structure 
plays into news reports especially on politics and religion and largely determines audience 
perception: 
5.3.3.1  Regionalism 
In explaining the impact of the lopsided development of the media on practice journalism in 
the North, R2 says there is still a shortage of quality journalists from the region: “In the 
North we don’t have enough qualified staff” and they normally rely heavily on those hired 
from the South.  
The above position is elaborated by R4, who thinks in addition to the shortage of manpower 
in the North there is also the tendency for journalists to feel more comfortable working for 
publishers from their own part of the country. According to the reporter: 
The media are taking ethnic lines, Northern journalists work for Northern 
newspapers and Southerners work for Southern newspapers. But the North 
needs manpower while there is too much of it in the South. 
                                                             
44 In Chapter One Nigeria‟s history was discussed and divisions along regional and religious identities were 
highlighted. 
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In a bid to fill up the vacuum created by the wonky media ownership in the country, R3 says 
some newspapers have emerged to provide a platform for the North’s ‘marginalised’ voice 
to be heard. 
…there are so many newspapers that emerged in the South like Punch, 
Guardian and the North felt marginalised so the New Nigerian and later Daily 
Trust came up to represent the Northern interest. 
This division between the media in the two regions is portrayed by the manner in which 
some newspapers present their reports, particularly aimed at defending their sectional and 
other interests, R4 suggests: 
The Tribune was established by the Awolowo family, but it goes to every 
length to defend the interest of the South-West. Here in the North the Daily 
Trust is seen as the emerging strong voice of the North, but then it is still seen 
as pro-Islamic, it promotes Islamic interests. But every newspaper is protecting 
certain interest and they all have certain agenda. 
R5 supports the argument that the defence of regional/sectional or ethnic interest is one of 
the things some newspapers attempt to do or are doing: 
…there are many newspapers that are set up with very specific objectives and 
interests that they set out to defend. Sometimes it is not emphasised but at all 
times it is their undercurrent. We have newspapers like the Tribune, of course 
we know they project the Yoruba interest45, Daily Trust protects the Northern 
                                                             
45 In Chapter One the Tribune was mentioned as a newspaper organisation belonging to the family of Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo. Due to its ownership and South-West location it is seen to be projecting those interests. 
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interest and the Islamic perspective. The Standard was established to give a 
voice to Northern minorities46 in the early 70s. 
While not denying their regional link, R6 insists that their newspaper is fair to all and often 
go the extra mile to ensure balance in their reports: 
We are even referred to as a regional paper by some people who claim we 
champion anything North. But we still go out of our way to ensure that we are 
not stereotyping. Some people see us as thoroughly Northern, thoroughly 
Islamic but we know that when it comes to practising the ethics of journalism 
as it should be, even by international standards, we can hardly be beaten in 
this country. 
But R4 dismisses claims of links to ethnicity or religion as the determinant of some 
newspaper reportage as just speculations: 
For example the Leadership newspaper was seen as a voice for the Northern 
Christians but it is not true, because without the Caliphate the paper can’t 
survive. So, one has to be very careful. Caliphate controlling the media is just a 
perception. 
On the contrary R7 does not think claims of ethnic bias are just speculations given that 
South-based newspapers hardly see anything wrong with their region and North-based ones 
also think everything is well with their own part of the country: 
                                                             
 
46 In the Middle Belt part of Nigeria the ethnic groups there are considered minority although they are 
categorised as part of the North. They claim being marginalised by the Muslim majority ethnic Hausa/Fulani 
and the Standard Newspaper was founded in the early 1970s by the Governor of the defunct Benue Plateau 
State the late Commissioner of Police Joseph Gomwolk to give the Northern Christian minorities a voice.  
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Well, it might be my own perception, but with the happenings around they are 
not just perceptions. One does not have a choice but to conclude that they 
have agendas. Even in the country generally you see that while some papers 
only report positive news about the South, some equally do so, on behalf of the 
North and nobody is doing anything about this. 
R9 does not see newspaper’s link to a religious group as an aberration: 
Like the Daily Trust is often accused of propagating Islam and speaking for the 
North. But even then you cannot totally delink religious sentiments from 
reports; at least even in the faintest manner there is bound to be such 
sentiments. 
R10, while also concurring, points out that some newspapers claim of a national outlook is 
false and that many journalists present fiction as fact because they have no access to first-
hand information about the people or places they write about: 
Many of those calling themselves national are actually not national and 
support even militant groups. Daily Trust is termed a Northern newspaper 
because it came at a time the North needed a voice. Some people who have 
never been to the North sit in Lagos or somewhere in the South to write about 
the North. 
R6 believes the audience/readers get a wrong picture of people from other parts of the 
country because their knowledge of others is shaped by what they read in newspapers:  
Those in the South have a very negative impression of the North and this is due 
to what their papers publish. Some Southern reporters who have never been to 
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the North just sit down there and write a lot of negative reports about the 
North, but it will change the whole situation if they come and see for 
themselves and get positive reports about here, which will in turn reduce the 
whole prejudice they have for the North. 
The division highlighted in this North/South media dichotomy in Nigeria is also blamed for 
the erosion of public interest journalism, as R15 argues: 
It’s been difficult for newspapers in Nigeria to demonstrate a sense of public 
interest in its (sic) coverage largely because of the ownership structure of most 
of the newspapers and the dichotomy known as the Lagos-Ibadan axis press 
against the others. 
With such degree of polarisation R7 posits that one is only able to know the exact truth 
about happenings in the country by reading newspapers from both divides and make one’s 
own deduction: 
Each is protecting the interest of those behind it and where they come from. 
They are neither neutral nor objective and to get the true picture you have to 
read papers from both parts of the country and find out which is telling the 
fact. 
5.3.3.2  Biased Reporting 
With the ethno-religious violence in Plateau State as an example, R1 explains how, in their 
opinion, sides are taken and parties demonised or defended: 
Like the November violence, even though Muslims were the victims they made 
it look like it was the Muslims that started it. Even when there were hundreds 
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of Muslims that were killed they focused on a few Southern victims like the 
NYSC boys. They had intensive interviews with their families.  
The media are accused of bias because they hardly try to hear from both sides before 
rushing to publish, according to R11, a policy-maker and commentator in Plateau State: 
They often rely on one side’s information without verifying and this is why they 
are often accused of bias. In Plateau we have been given a bad name 
irrespective of religion due to the reports written about us. 
R14 also supports the argument that newspapers are generally biased especially when 
reporting religion: 
It is often one-sided toward Islam or Christianity depending on the region from 
which the newspaper comes. 
R6 cites a case from one of the Plateau violence where the media downplayed the case of a 
victim simply because of the victim’s ethnicity and religion to support their claim that 
religious and ethnic sentiments contribute largely to bias: 
A very wealthy relatively known Hausa man lost the warehouse in which he 
displays cars. Everyone knew he was the victim. All the Southern newspapers 
published pictures of the burnt warehouse but they were attributing it to the 
activities of Muslims that attacked Christians. 
In the same vein R2 argues that journalists fuel the crisis by failing to be neutral: “There are 
some papers in Nigeria that some columnists believe only one side is wrong.” And R8 also 
points accusing fingers at newspaper columnists, adding that, usually, their articles are tilted 
211 
 
towards their own opinion: “Whenever we are accused of bias it is usually not our reports 
but the columnists from outside that are cited as examples.” 
But R3 tries to make a distinction between those who are fair and those who choose to 
immerse themselves in the story, arguing that not all of them are the same: 
It is not fair to make a sweeping statement that newspapers are not balanced. 
Of course there are those that allow certain sentiments to clearly show in what 
they report but it is not the case with all of them. 
The environment, R5 suggests, also plays a major role in creating the problem of objectivity:  
It is a very difficult task for journalists to report religious crisis because even 
though they try to be neutral sometimes the environment prevails and in a 
way shapes their perspectives on the issues involved in the crisis either 
because they belong to one of the contending groups either they are Muslim 
or they are Christians… 
R5 also blames proprietors for such a bias, citing the examples of two newspapers defending 
specific, sectional interests: 
So whereas the New Nigerian projected the Northern and Islamic point of view 
the Nigerian Standard projected the minority and Christian point of view. So 
you can say that part of the influences or in-built bias comes from the 
ownership per se. 
R8 agrees with R5 that ownership plays a significant role in tailoring reports, particularly 
those affecting religion: 
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For example if a newspaper is owned by a Muslim the reports tend to paint 
rival religions in bad light and the same thing happens if the paper is owned by 
Christian proprietors. 
Sensational headlines, according to R12, are used by owners to ensure that they achieve the 
objectives that suit the publishers: 
Some of the newspapers really tend to take sides, depending on the group they 
belong to you see sensational headlines, depending on what suits the owners 
of the media organisations. 
In a bid to achieve their aim of promoting certain interests, R5 argues that some publishers 
make sure they employ only people with similar mind-sets to do the job according to 
specification:  
You can hire people as you want and sometimes you seek people with certain 
viewpoints to appoint as columnists because you think they are projecting your 
point of view. So they have no qualms about balancing their story, they have 
no qualms about fair play and all manners of people are joining… 
But R6 also thinks reporters have their own bias which shapes what they report: 
I don’t think some of them go out of the way to ensure two things. One is a 
very emotive issue so you have to be as close as possible to report what is 
closer to fact than fiction. But unfortunately what happens is because most of 
them report on their religious bias. 
213 
 
R16 adds their voice to the opinion that journalists allow their biases to infiltrate news 
reports even subtly: 
The average reporter/editor reflects his/her religious or ethnic bias either 
overtly or covertly in their reports. It is not difficult to pin-point the exact 
cleavage of most reporters or medium as you pore through the pages. 
R12 believes that journalists are influenced by their own background and the religious and 
cultural background of their publisher, which affect the way they report: 
…our nuances, our cultural and religious backgrounds tend to affect the way 
we do things and since you have a newspaper or a broadcast station set up by 
somebody from a particular religious background, occasionally you find out 
that people tend to allow personal sentiments to overwhelm the professional 
thinking when they do their jobs. 
However, R16 opines that some reporters try to win the confidence of their editor or 
publisher by ensuring that a certain bias is maintained in reports: 
Largely, reporters gauge the ethno-religious allegiance of their 
editors/publishers and tailor their news gathering and subsequent reportage 
to what they perceive would be acceptable. 
On the contrary, R7 views the problem through a different prism, blaming the government, 
the media and even journalists as well as the environment. 
The government and the media are taking sides. People are not sincere and 
are biased. People who work in the media are people like us and come with 
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their prejudices which they allow to reflect in their work. Responsibility as 
journalists is secondary to promoting religious and ethnic interests. 
Just as it has been observed a number of times by interviewees, ‘he who pays the piper 
dictates the tune’, and it is on this note that R10 thinks the media succumb to being used in 
biased reporting because they are owned by politicians, who pursue their own interests. 
There are only a few newspapers that are not owned by politicians in this 
country. So the agenda is already set. The media are gullible and protect 
ethnic, tribal and religious interests. 
Although blame has been apportioned to different parties, one thing worthy of note is the 
quality of journalists producing news for the audience/readers’ consumption. R13 thinks 
they lack sufficient knowledge and should be apportioned a huge share of the blame: 
There is a lot of bias in the reporting of religious conflicts and essentially it is 
partly because there is a lot of misunderstanding of the situation by journalists 
before they are reported. 
Although it seems that neutrality or fairness is quite an issue in the Nigerian media, R4 tries 
to look at the situation with some hope, that one day fairness will prevail: 
I am looking forward to media (sic) that would provide level playing ground on 
which all people are allowed to play equal roles. 
5.3.3.3   Misinformation/ignorance 
The lack of adequate reliable information is a major factor contributing to fuelling conflicts 
in Nigeria, especially in the North. Often people rely on rumours and even the media retail 
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rumours as facts. And R1 argues that Nigerian journalists often do not make effort to 
understand a situation before reporting through stereotyping: 
Once there is a riot the first thing especially the Nigerian media, which is 
dominantly Southern and anti-Islamic, they already take the position that the 
guilty party must be Muslims. They don’t go deeper than that to see the issues 
that are at the bottom of all that. 
Rumours usually begin with some people making false insinuations and getting others to 
accept their story and further spread it. R3 explains that a conflict which begins as ethnic is 
easily manipulated and sold to others as religious in order to recruit supporters. 
…if there is a conflict you see the Hausa man appealing to his Muslim brethren, 
claiming this is happening to him because of his religion. And the Plateau man 
would also appeal to other Christians by claiming that the Hausa man is here 
to wage a jihad. Even though it was originally not religious it now takes that 
form and people buy into it. 
Further using stereotypes fiction is sold to the audience as fact as R4 explains: 
To the South-West media the Hausa/Fulani are generally seen as the bad guys 
even when they are not and the impression has been created on the minds of 
their readers. When you keep on repeating something that is not true it comes 
to be accepted as the truth. 
R6 also paints the same picture, claiming that a story is exaggerated and blown out of 
proportion until it leads to violence: 
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For instance when they say something has happened in an area which is 
predominantly Muslim, newspapers owned by Christians will go out of their 
way, even if a Church is not destroyed, and say Muslims have destroyed 
Churches in so and so place. And this adds to the trouble because others in 
other areas will pick up their arms and avenge… 
R6 adds that conflicts are amplified by the media when they violate codes of practice: “…the 
way they easily abandon the ethics of the profession is really what fuels and make religious 
crisis a recurring phenomenon especially in Northern Nigeria.”  
The media are also accused of writing negative reports to suit the taste of certain readers, 
eventually causing bitter divisions in the society and fuel or intensify conflict, as R7 suggests: 
They have done very well in promoting divisions and problems between and 
among people as people rely on the media to get information and they take 
advantage of this. The papers only write what their audience like, like the 
Southerners wanting anything negative about the North and vice versa. All 
these reports also amplify the crises as people often act on the basis of what 
they have read, like the violence of 2010. 
5.3.4 Theme Four: The Creation and Maintenance of Enemy Images and Stereotypes 
The use of enemy images to create stereotypes, encourage prejudices and fuel conflicts is 
common in Nigeria:  
5.3.4.1  Stereotyping  
Stereotyping, R1 argues, begins at the point where journalists rely on the information 
provided by one side to conclude who the erring party is: 
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They peddle stereotypes and so on and so forth. Once there is a riot the first 
thing especially the Nigerian media, which is dominantly Southern and anti-
Islamic, they already take the position that the guilty party must be Muslims. 
They don’t go deeper than that to see the issues that are at the bottom of all 
that. 
According to R1 journalists always do not think the side they support is fallible: 
It’s rare that you’ll find journalists that would acknowledge if there’s a wrong 
on the side of those they support…whereas all the time they try too often to 
demonise the other side. 
In one of the violence in Plateau State journalists were said to have taken sides by failing to 
see that a party that had been previously attacked was retaliating. R3 was among journalist 
that reported the crisis and notes that: 
…when we hear about the attacks on Dogo Na Hauwa village we jump to 
conclusions and fail to look beyond the surface. But have we asked ourselves 
what happened previously? Fulani were massacred in Kuru Karama and the 
killings in Dogo Na Hauwa were reprisals for the killings of Kuru Karama.  
The violence R3 refers to above caused a huge uproar within and outside Nigeria, especially 
the Dogo Na Hauwa attacks.  
R10 explains that a section of the media has successfully created an indelible negative 
picture of others: 
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To the South-West media the Hausa/Fulani are generally seen as the bad guys 
even when they are not and the impression has been created on the minds of 
their readers. 
This negative campaign, R7 says, cuts across the media in both divides as each sees things 
from their regional perspective.  
If you read a paper owned by Southerners they never say anything good about 
the North. And if you read one that is owned by Northerners they say negative 
things about the South.  
R6 claims religion also plays a role in the use of stereotypes as some people are negatively 
branded due to their religious beliefs: 
…nothing good is reported about Muslims…Even Southern Muslims are getting 
the same treatment. It is like if it is a Muslim don’t celebrate him. In that 
respect you see that stereotype phenomenon. 
The media seen to be defending each religious group are accused of creating or reinforcing 
stereotypical sentiments either by underplaying or overplaying certain reports. R8 states: 
If there is a crisis, newspapers take advantage of what happens during the 
period to portray the other side negatively… If it affects your religion you 
emphasise, otherwise you de-emphasise it. 
R10 claims the South-based journalists deliberately create stereotypes about the North even 
without adequate knowledge of the North or Islam. 
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Some people who have never been to the North sit in Lagos or somewhere in 
the South to write about the North. There are many that are anti-sharia but 
have never been to Zamfara. 
Regardless of one’s religion stereotypes are used to negatively present one. R11 claims that 
this affects everyone but adds the media should not be entirely blamed given the spate of 
violence in the state. 
In Plateau we have been given a bad name irrespective of religion due to the 
reports written about us. But also we can’t blame those that have a negative 
impression of us when often you see people in 100s killed. 
5.3.4.2   Creation of Enemy Images 
Name-calling and labelling are common in the media especially newspapers in Nigeria. R4 
says metaphors are negatively used to refer to people based on what they are thought to be 
or represent: 
There is the use of names that paint a bad picture. Like the Hausa/Fulani seen 
as metaphor for political domination. And there are words like militants, area 
boys and all these are negative reference to create an image of violent 
persons. 
Just like the above position R5 explains that the use of enemy images contributes to 
reinforcing prejudice against certain people and increases the possibility of violence towards 
them, as they are seen through the picture painted of them: 
You have already demonised some people when you say Fulani people just 
think of Dogo Na Hauwa and see all Fulani as people who kill women and 
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children. Or when you say Berom some people link them to people poisoning 
ponds to kill cattle or attack Fulani in their hamlets. If you continue to report it 
that Berom attack or Fulani attack you are just piling hatred or perpetuating 
violent behaviour against certain groups. 
The audience/reader’s opinion is shaped by the media and journalists need to exercise more 
caution in practising their profession, R6 counsels: 
This is why the longer you stay in this profession the more you realise that we 
actually mould opinion. The things we do impact on people’s lives more than 
we think. This is why we need to practice the profession bearing in mind the 
ethics of the profession. A single report can make a lot of difference to the 
ordinary reader and sometimes even to policy-makers. 
R8 claims that the impact of such pictures, particularly those painted by contributors from 
outside, is so negatively enormous that innocent people’s lives are put at risk when they 
travel to other parts of the country: 
…some of our columns or opinion articles have caused people to be prejudiced 
towards certain people, like the Beroms to the point that when government 
officials or representatives of Plateau State, even sport people, travel out of 
the state they fear that they could be mistreated on the basis of what people 
read about Beroms. 
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5.3.5 Theme Five: Ideal versus Reality 
Despite pointing accusing fingers at journalists for compromising ethics it is essential to 
ponder the opinions of many participants that the biggest problem faced by most journalists 
in Nigeria is that they are underpaid or unpaid, in addition to numerous other risks:  
5.3.5.1  Clientelism/Corruption in the media 
Corruption among journalists is a major issue. Newspaper owners claim they are addressing 
this huge problem, although the brown envelope issue cannot be totally prevented. This, 
according to R1, is because reporters are hardly paid wages by their employers: 
In practice some newspapers don’t even bother paying their reporters at all, 
they encourage them to use their business cards and that’s why we have this 
so-called brown envelope syndrome, which is just a metaphor, it goes beyond 
collecting some little money in brown envelopes… 
Agreeing with the above opinion, R5 adds that delay in or non-payment of wages 
encourages corruption as journalist struggle to survive: 
This hits at the heart of journalism practice in this country because if you don’t 
pay journalists or you don’t pay them at the right time you end up having them 
doing all sort of things to get food for their families at the end of the day and 
to get the roof over their head. It gives rise to the journalism of the pocket. 
There is also pressure from the society, rife with corruption, on journalists to accept gifts 
and comprise professional ethics. R3 says people try to get them to write stories that would 
favour them and be compensated: 
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At times people try to get me to suppress a story in various ways, like asking 
me to come and get their own version or reaction as they call it, with a 
promise that if it is published I will be rewarded. 
But measures taken by some newspapers are ensuring that corruption in the media are at 
least reduced and controlled, as R4 suggests:  
I have seen those in Punch, Daily Trust and here. You don’t accept money, you 
must balance and must be fair and objective. You cannot bring a one-sided 
story and expect the editor to accept and publish it. 
R2 also says they have introduced rules to regulate behaviour and prevent such fraudulent 
acts: 
…we have code of conducts. They are normal rules that apply elsewhere, like 
people must not collect money to influence their reports. But we sack here a 
lot, people talk about it. 
There have also been efforts by journalists’ umbrella organisation, Nigeria Union of 
Journalists (NUJ), to tackle the problem but R5 laments that there is still not enough 
attachment of importance to professional rules. 
…indeed the NUJ in Abuja conducted training for journalists for three years 
and there were many campuses across the country. They did this to make 
practising journalists aware of the ethics of the profession and yet there is no 
evidence that there is little professionalism. 
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In-house training is another measure to deal with the problem, as explained by R6, and that 
experienced journalists are used to mentor new and inexperienced reporters. But the effort 
sometimes is unable to yield the desired result: 
We have gatekeepers over the place and we keep training people to know the 
potential for libel in what we report and the potential for causing havoc. Yet, 
once in a while you get a very careless editor who only cares about getting a 
scoop for a sensational headline. 
In some media organisations employees are paid reasonable amounts in wages and at the 
appropriate time so as to discourage incentives for requesting or accepting bribe. R6 
elaborates: 
Our pay day is usually the 25th of each month and inevitably whatever 
happens they get paid on that day. And for that reason people are happy that 
they get paid, unlike in some media houses that owe salaries months-on-
months. The issue now that followed was what salary they get paid to make 
them comfortable, something that would discourage the brown envelope 
syndrome, or asking to be paid before they report a story. A decision was 
therefore made to make the package more attractive. 
While some pay reasonable wages and at the appropriate time some don’t. R8, while 
confirming that politicians bribe journalists to get favourable reports, wanted to know why 
journalists would not solicit and accept money to influence reports if they are not paid 
wages. 
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Journalists collected the money and did the bidding of the government. One 
thing that comes to one’s mind is why should any credible journalist collect 
bribe to kill or downplay a story? But again we need to ask whether journalists 
are properly remunerated? 
5.3.5.2  Personal safety 
Due to poor welfare package journalists are hardly willing to take risks or go the extra mile 
to do their job. It is against the above backdrop that R3 tells of their experience on one 
occasion when there was a need to be out in the field checking a story but could not take 
the risk because their safety could not be guaranteed: 
Journalists also need to be insured. For instance I was to cover a violent aspect 
of the Jos crisis but I was very hesitant travelling to Riyom where I risked being 
attacked by hoodlums. I should have gone to investigate and come back with 
first-hand information but I had no insurance and didn’t want my family to 
lose me. 
R3 adds that such handicaps make it very difficult for them to meet up the challenges of 
their profession. 
Sometimes it is not easy to even investigate a story properly in a chaotic 
situation like this, for instance when hoodlums were stopping vehicles and 
attacking and killing innocent travellers. 
R2 also explains that in the crises in Plateau State they were accused of bias because their 
reporter, fearing for their safety, could only speak to one side and report their version, and 
based on that the reporter could not balance reports: 
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In the last crisis in Jos I was accused of being against the Christians.  I actually 
found that because we took one reporter and there was tension he could not 
go around freely for fear of his life and was covering the views of one side. We 
balanced by sending a Christian to the other areas. 
5.3.6 Theme Six: Recommendations/Peacebuilding 
Participants’ responses reveal a need for not only resolving the crisis but also ensuring 
peacebuilding:  
5.3.6.1  Education 
The use of education in reorientation is paramount in that previously held negative 
impressions/beliefs might be discarded or corrected. R1 believes that journalism training in 
Nigeria is currently up to standard and does not contribute to the problem of practice. But 
the main problem is that journalists do not practise what they are taught during training: 
I don’t see anything wrong with the way journalism is taught in the country. 
These are universal guidelines on how people should report. That is how they 
teach it everywhere. It is the practice that is always the problem. All too often 
we practise our journalism in breach of all those things we learn in the 
classroom, which is to report accurately, talk to both sides, don’t use abusive 
language… 
But education can be useful in enlightening people on how to avoid being manipulated by 
politicians who’re bent on using them to cause religious or ethnic violence, says R1: “The 
followers should not allow people to come along and exploit their prejudices and this is 
where the education thing comes in.” R2 also does not think poor training is to blame for the 
low quality journalism practice in Nigeria, but people’s attitude to work: “No, it is not 
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training. The quality of people is low. It is because people are not serious. It is a general 
thing.” 
However, in order to widen the horizon of journalists R5 recommends cultural training, a 
situation whereby journalists can study other cultures to help them have a better 
understanding of the people they write about. 
I will advocate for cultural training for journalists and cultural exchanges so 
that reporters can work in different newspapers across the country and foster 
linkages. 
R6 also suggests cultural education as a way forward, saying that journalists who 
understand why certain things are done in certain ways in some places and in different ways 
in other places would be able to appreciate the differences: 
A journalist, who has studied in Kano, even if he is not a Muslim or Northerner, 
will understand why a woman who passes through prayers in Mosque is told 
to go back. But a journalist who has never been to the Mosque would dismiss 
this as extremism. 
Against the above backdrop R6 adds that adding on courses on culture in Mass 
Communication studies might be able to reduce the chances of stereotyping in the media: 
In Nigeria for example, it will be quite important if a Mass Communication 
student from Kano is made to understand the cultural and religious 
ceremonies of the Yoruba and Igbo. In this way we will know and appreciate 
our similarities and differences, which will prevent stereotyping. 
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 On the contrary R7 does not see journalism training or practice as the main issue but faults 
the system in which journalists are brought up and where they practice their profession: 
In my opinion what we need to overhaul is the way the society is, generally, 
and then we will live better and happier. The journalists here are only 
reflecting the picture of the society that produces them. So they are easily able 
to grow up with certain prejudices and allow those to influence their 
professional life. 
Perhaps due to reasons that suggest some journalists are more interested in things that 
could divide rather than unite the country, some suggest the inclusion of courses that would 
educate them to be more committed to putting the nation first: 
I will want a course like patriotism to be introduced as part of journalism 
training and every journalist should be made to have certain level of 
journalism training. 
A reporter admits that more training is needed to improve their journalistic skills: “We also 
need more training to enable us properly report sensitive issues like politics, religion, culture 
etc.” 
Rather than producing journalists who won’t be able to relate theory to praxis a respondent 
suggests the inclusion of more practical courses in journalism training: 
There should be pragmatism in journalism training. Graduates need practical 
experiences so they can do things like differentiating news from opinion/view. 
The syllabus should be widened to include practical. 
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Abiding by professional ethics is very crucial to resolving this problem of poor journalism 
practice. But this can be achieved through improved education, R11 opines: 
Journalist should strictly abide by the ethics of their profession. They must 
learn to balance their stories and avoid exaggeration. There should be better 
training for journalists. 
R12 believes most journalists do not have sufficient knowledge of news values and more 
training is needed to improve this situation: 
We need serious trainings on news values, accuracy and national security 
implications. We need workshops to enlighten us on these and how to be 
mindful of passions our report might inflame. 
In spite of the huge importance of training and further training to improve skills of practising 
journalists, R13 says less prominence is attached to this by the media: “I think there is a 
need for training and retraining, which most newspapers or media organisations hardly pay 
attention to.” 
Expanding the curriculum to include emphasis on corruption-free, responsible journalism 
etc. is essential, R14 suggests: 
We need to be more morally responsible and a more rigorous training that 
would emphasise doing away with corruption. We need to highlight the good 
more than the bad even though the two are bound to exist side-by-side. And 
all this needs to be included in the curriculum for journalism training in 
Nigeria. 
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In the same vein R15 recommends a minimum training that would emphasise specialism, 
professionalism and cultural awareness: 
I would suggest a basic education that requires a working knowledge of one’s 
area of reportage, the culture, beliefs and norms, an understanding that 
promotes fairness and objectivity in reportage. 
In addition to improved journalism training in Nigeria, R16 suggests compulsory study of 
religions and cultural exchanges: 
It won’t stop at journalism schools or its curricula; it would start at civics and 
perhaps a compulsory course in inter-religious understanding and inter-ethnic 
visitation. 
5.3.6.2  Inter-group contact 
From the discussions in the previous sections, there appears to be a general lack of 
sufficient knowledge about each other’s culture amongst the people of Nigeria. Journalists, 
being part of the society, are caught in this contradiction too, which affects the way in which 
they do their job. One way this problem can possibly be dealt with is through inter-group 
contact. And a respondent believes improved journalism practice will need this to suffice: 
…we need to encourage unbiased reporting, create dialogue in which all sides 
talk, and let people have the true perceptions of victims and aggressors. Allow 
people to come with ideas and say it openly and media to keep to objective 
reporting. 
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The use of workshops and talk-shops has been highlighted by R6 who believes the media 
can organise such a round table whereby people from both divides can be brought to sit 
down, dialogue and chart a new course: 
…apart from reporting we can even go out of our way to create workshops and 
talk-shops where the media can organise forum where Hausa and Berom 
youths would sit in Jos and say we have made up our mind that no matter 
what anybody comes to tell us we will not take up arms against each other. 
While not overemphasising the relevance of formal journalism training for would-be- 
journalists R6 suggests the addition of cultural inter-links and exchanges: 
…it will be quite important if a Mass Communication student from Kano is 
made to understand the cultural and religious ceremonies of the Yoruba and 
Igbo. In this way we will know and appreciate our similarities and differences, 
which will prevent stereotyping. 
In the same manner R13 opines that given that some journalists write about people or 
places they know very little about there is a need for them to make their reports/stories 
more credible by learning more about others before writing or reporting: 
Sometimes we write about people without knowing them or checking the 
facts. But learning about other cultures before writing about them will make 
our jobs easier and more acceptable. It will build more confidence. 
Graduates of tertiary institutions in Nigeria are required to take part in a one-year 
mandatory corps service, NYSC. R16 thinks there is a need for pre-NYSC orientation to 
enrich young people’s understanding of other cultural beliefs and how to easily mingle:  
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Before NYSC, we should ensure that pupils have cultural exchanges that would 
enrich their world-view and help them treat others as they would want to be 
treated. 
R16 observes that people’s knowledge of other religious beliefs is very poor and needs to be 
substantially improved: 
Most Christians know next to nothing about Islam and most Muslims know 
next to nothing about Christians and I think this affects our perceptions of each 
other. If we can learn more about not just each other’s cultures but also 
religions it will go a long way in mitigating the problem. 
5.3.6.3   Open access 
The use of the media or their hijack by religious interests or groups might lead to the 
suppression of information about other religions or groups. R7 says this happens where 
either of the religions enjoys a majority: 
If you are in minority you are always dominated by the other religion in terms 
of access to the media, whereas the constitution allows equal access. 
Corruption also plays a role in restricting access to the media. R7 further argues that 
people’s views are hardly reported unless they are of interest to the media: 
They always require money from you or they never report what you say. They 
only come to you when they have something general to ask you but not when 
you need your opinion to be sent across. 
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This trend, according to R1, portends danger as the failure to report people’s views or 
expose social problems could mean sweeping majors issues under the carpet rather than 
resolving them: 
Personally I think when you suppress it you are fuelling a terrible situation 
because it has happened and when you drive information underground you 
won’t be able to find solution to the problem.  
As a way forward, R1 opines that ensuring information is made available about an issue or a 
problem could help in providing answers to the questions it raises: 
But put it out there so that people will know the extent of what is happening, 
how bad it is so that responsible leaders will be able to take the appropriate 
action. 
Another solution is since the media, especially electronic media, are in government’s 
control, there is a need for deregulation to enable easy access by the people, R7 suggests: 
…the government can do better by making the media more accessible to the 
people and not exclusively in their control. The private media are equally 
expensive and therefore out of reach, but the government need to look inward 
and make it more accessible to the people. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter data collected by means of semi-structured interviewing were analysed using 
IPA. In all 16 respondents participated and quotes from them were used during the 
discussion to explain issues earlier raised. For instance the main objective was to find out 
whether the media (newspapers) were involved in the manipulation of their audience 
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through the use of negative reporting, the reasons for this and how this might have caused 
or acted as a catalyst in causing religious violence in Nigeria. And the religious conflict in 
Plateau State, Northern Nigeria was used as an example on a number of occasions. In 
Chapter Four, following newspaper analysis through CDA a number of findings were made, 
like the roles the media played in stoking the problem. Yet, at the end of the analysis it was 
realised that some issues, like some of the reasons might not be fully understood without 
analysing interview data. 
  On the whole the analysis here has contributed to the construction of six 
superordinate themes that included public interest journalism, causes of the conflict, North-
South dichotomy, the creation and maintenance of enemy images, ideal versus reality 
factors, and recommendations/peacebuilding. Each of these superordinate themes was 
analysed using sub-themes that equally emerged from the data. Our analysis of interview 
data has helped in more discoveries. For example, although journalists/reporters often get 
blamed a number of factors contribute to the problems the media are perceived to be 
causing. While some of these issues are within their control some are not; certain society 
and workplace pressure compel journalists/media to conform and be involved in retailing 
negative/false reports.  
Although it has been discussed previously and at various times in this thesis this 
analysis reinforced the claims that the media are regionally based and this determines to a 
large extent how they see news and report it. It is also important to note the various roles 
owners and politicians play in determining the impact of regional influences since they 
(politicians and media owners) are regionally inclined. The same applies to religious and 
other factors, but it also appears the media are not directly the cause of the crises although 
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they’re used as a platform to maintain them. Chapter Seven will, therefore, be devoted to 
discussing the meanings of the findings and relate them to a number of theories identified 
through the dictate of the data. But in the next chapter the same technique will be used to 
study data collected during the same field study but by means of focus group interviewing. 
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  CHAPTER SIX                                                             
                             Analysis of Focus Group Interview Data                                       
6.         INTRODUCTION 
As was the case in Chapter Five, this chapter seeks to analyse the data collected during field 
research in Nigeria in the cities of Jos and Kano47, two flashpoints for sectarian violence in 
Nigeria. But in contrast to previous analysis this one focuses on focus group interview data. 
In all, two separate focus groups will be analysed and the participants in Jos and Kano 
(Northern Nigeria) were groups of six and four respectively. In both cases attempts were 
made to make the groups as diverse as possible to enable contribution of wide range of 
ideas. The focus group in Jos had equal number of Muslims and Christians and one female. 
The Kano focus group comprised of one Christian participant, but lacked female 
participation. In both cases the participants were taken from the media audience, 
newspaper readers from different professions who originate from different parts of Nigeria.  
At the beginning of each group discussion a verbal consent of every participant was 
sought, which was recorded alongside the discussion. The main criterion for the selection of 
participants was their personal experience with religious violence, although other issues like 
gender and religion were important. The researcher wanted to avoid ethical issues so 
children (and vulnerable adults) were not included. All these were clearly spelt out to the 
research assistant and others that helped out in various ways and the researcher checked to 
                                                             
47
 Kano has been quite peaceful and in the last eight years there was no case of sectarian violence. However, 
following riots over the outcome of the April 2011 presidential elections it was one of the 10 Northern cities in 
which violence erupted, leading to a number of deaths and destruction of property. 
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ensure the guidelines were adhered to. The researcher wanted to ensure some degree of 
moderation or articulation of a female perspective in the discussion in each group by 
including women. But it did not work out exactly that way as there was only one female 
participant in the Jos focus group who did not present a strong feminine argument in the 
discourse; while in Kano no female participant could be recruited. In Jos, men still 
dominated the group particularly because they were in a clear majority.  
Generally, perhaps due to the sensitive nature of the issues under discussion, it was 
very difficult getting women to take part. Again, in Kano there was a major difficulty in 
ensuring even representation of both religions. Two participants withdrew at the last 
minute. But the researcher made sure no side was unfairly attacked, and the only Christian 
participant in the Kano focus group was quite articulate. In the end all the participants 
expressed what the researcher considered were their sincere views through which their 
phenomenology was interpreted. 
 The questions were also phrased after the analysis of newspaper contents of two 
major Nigerian newspapers that actively reported the November 2008 violence in Plateau 
State, Northern Nigeria. However the questions presented in this technique were slightly 
different from those applied in the semi-structured technique. Again, the analysis followed a 
discussion of the interview processes, including places/venues, manner of interviews, 
duration and transcription. The analytic process will also be discussed, explaining how and 
why superordinate and sub-themes were constructed, allowing the data to lead the way.  
6.1 RESEARCH PROCESS 
In this case the decision to conduct focus groups in two cities in Nigeria was originally 
planned at the early stage of this study based on their position as flashpoints for conflict. Jos 
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was the first choice while Lagos or Kaduna was pencilled as a second option. The idea of Jos 
was almost dropped given the security situation there but following further checks it was 
agreed to go ahead with the visit although a new strategy for safety was adopted. Initially it 
was quite difficult recruiting participants as the first week was spent doing a pilot study in 
which it was impossible getting sufficient number of participants. The main problem was 
making people agree to a venue outside of their own communities. It is necessary to 
mention here that Jos has been so polarised that segregated residential style is now 
prominent in the city; Muslims live in mainly Muslim areas, while Christians live in areas that 
are considered Christian only. In the end somewhere that seemed neutral was considered 
and the choice of Nigerian Film Institute, Jos was pondered. With the help of the research 
assistant and an old contact who is a lecturer at the institution six participants were 
recruited. A room in the institute was used as a venue. It was most convenient for all 
participants as they felt they were quite safe and comfortable. The interview lasted nearly 
three hours and at a point every participant became quite excited and actively contributed 
to the discussion. The researcher continued to come in with follow-up questions in order to 
strike a balance between making sure the original interview guide was adhered to and 
allowing the interviewees identify and pursue new but relevant issues that had been 
omitted, as recommended by Storey (2007).  
 The researcher realised that the interview also provided the participants a rare 
opportunity to discuss the tense situation in Jos and other parts of Plateau State and issues 
they ordinarily would not discuss with people outside their own communities or comfort 
zones. Given the composition of the group, three Muslims and three Christians from various 
parts of the country, they saw it as a perfect opportunity. The fact that the issue of 
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confidentiality had been emphasised by the researcher gave them more confidence to open 
up. The presence of the research assistant did not affect their passion as the discussion 
progressed.  
 It had been realised that setting up a focus group was a phenomenal task and with 
Lagos being quite far away from Abuja or Jos it was expected to be more challenging. The 
idea of Kaduna was also replaced with a visit to Kano, which had previously been a 
flashpoint. An old contact was linked up with in Kano who agreed to assist in setting up a 
focus group. The researcher travelled over 200 miles to Kano and spent a day making sure 
all participants were readily available and willing to participate. Although six people had 
been initially contacted and had agreed to take part, only three finally turned up. One 
person was brought in at the last minute and agreed to participate. Venue was not an issue 
as Kano is not as risky or as polarised as Jos. One of the participants agreed to provide a 
courtyard in their home where mats were spread on the ground, on which all participants 
and researcher sat. The serenity and cultural opulence of the place made everyone even 
more at home and open-minded, even though there were moments they disagreed on 
ideas. The interview lasted two hours and a quarter, although some of the participants 
wanted to go on relaying their experiences. As was the case with the previous focus group 
the researcher kicked-off the process and allowed each participant to contribute in turns 
and the same process was used with sub-sequent or follow-up questions. On some 
occasions they cut in to react to a point. Again it was a mutual experience in which everyone 
took advantage of an exceptional opportunity to contribute ideas to a burning issue, as the 
researcher observed.  
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 Meanwhile, the idea of replicating same process in Lagos had become increasingly 
doubtful but the researcher continued to hope on making it happen. But as would be 
explained in Chapter Eight, it never was. Again, due to the stress of continuous travelling to 
various research venues transcription had to wait until the researcher had headed back to 
the UK. It was eventually done immediately after the audio recordings for the 16 semi-
structured interviews in Chapter Five had been transcribed. Since the lengths of the two 
interviews were not the same the duration for transcription also varied. For instance, while 
the focus group in Jos took about two days to complete, the Kano one was done in a day 
and a half. It was particularly more difficult transcribing this form of audio than the semi-
structured because of the number of participants and the variation in audio levels 
(depending on each person’s ability to project their voice) and the often too many 
interjections to clarify or counter a point. It was also very important to make sure every 
point made was correctly transcribed. Codes were used to represent each person’s 
comments. For instance FGA1-6 was to used to represent the Jos focus group participants 
(FGA meaning Focus Group A), while the Kano focus group was coded FGB1-4 (FGB meaning 
Focus Group B). 
6.2  ANALYTIC PROCESS 
Like the researcher had done with the previous analysis, IPA was applied in this case too. 
Care was taken not to squeeze the subjective experiences of the participants as the 
researcher tried to make sense of the data by reading and interpreting through meaning-
making. It was an iterative process that was painstakingly done to bring out the main ideas 
to summarise the experiences of the participants. The reading and re-reading process here 
was even more difficult as the ideas were more dispersed than in the previous transcript.  
For instance there were occasions that an issue that had been earlier discussed was 
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revisited by a participant and a new debate sparked off. Although the researcher had some 
feelings for some ideas raised by some of the participants the fact that such an issue had 
been resolved in the previous transcript made it much easier to handle their emotion. 
During this process also a major issue the researcher struggled with was how to read and 
juxtapose ideas from the two distinct focus groups.  
The initial temptation was to read them separately and interpret and generate ideas 
from the data separately too. Although it was done that way it did not work out well and the 
researcher’s supervisor suggested doing and presenting the analyses together. This worked 
out much better.  Notes were scribbled on the left-hand margin of the transcript where 
ideas or questions were noted. For instance two major issues were immediately identified 
from the data. First, there seemed some reluctance by some participants to discuss religion 
as they see it as very sensitive but often prone to manipulation. An example below states: 
“Religion is a very sensitive issue and I do not like getting involved in anyway. But my 
experience is that the media tend to take sides and give the wrong picture…” (line 387-390). 
There was also the question of new technology providing a platform for people (non-
journalists) to circulate rumours or falsehood as news. Initially the researcher struggled to 
comprehend this assertion. But during the next round of reading and meaning-making the 
data became clearer and continued to dictate the pace and pattern of the analysis. 
 The next stage of the analysis was when the researcher returned to the transcript 
using the notes made on the left-hand margin as a sort of marker. But the researcher also 
wanted to let the data lead the way in further developing and linking themes to theories. 
Thus, on this occasion themes were noted on the right-hand margin of the transcript while 
attempts were made to relate the same themes to theories that would possibly be later 
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used in interpreting the findings of the analysis, which is the main thing differentiating a 
study of this nature from any other journalistic review of data (see Storey 2007: 55). The 
researcher was determined not to let the theories have any overbearing effect on the data 
and chose to do a separate discussion in which theories would be linked to themes.  
Since there had been a plan to do the same with the findings in Chapter Five analysis 
it was also decided to do a common chapter for discussion in which findings from both 
analyses would be discussed and linked to theories. Unlike the case of Chapter Five analysis, 
there was some difficulty identifying many theories as each group had its own way of 
responding to the questions presented. For example while in one there was much emphasis 
on the causes of the crises and how religion was manipulated, the other group focused 
more on manipulation of the audience by the media specifically. In identifying theories, in 
the first case the researcher tried to look at suggestions from the data on the ‘why’ issues 
raised, for example why the crises erupted and continued to rage. This again led to the 
identification of both social identity theory (SIT) and realistic conflict theory (RCT) as 
possible theories to be applied in discussion. In the second case the researcher looked at 
how the data led the way on the ‘how’ issues for example how the crises escalated or 
spread, with newspapers providing fuel. Based on the data suggesting the media were 
involved in the deliberate peddling of falsehood or misinformation there was a 
consideration for media systems theory (Hallin & Mancini 2004) or framing theory (De 
Vreese, et al 2001) or even socio-cognitive theory (van Dijk 2001) among others. Yet there 
was no single theory favoured over others as the researcher kept an open mind and allowed 
things to emerge on their own. 
242 
 
 In the attempts to adopt superordinate themes the researcher considered data from 
both focus groups. Where there were similarities a common theme was adopted; where 
they differed, a theme arising from the strength of its backing by the data was constructed. 
Eight superordinate themes were initially constructed from the data which included 
publisher interests, commercial gains, misinformation, causes of the conflict, stereotyping, 
enemy images, new technology and recommendations.  
 But it was realised that some of the themes appeared repetitive and might not 
sufficiently explain the issues as clearly as possible.  Thus, some of the themes were merged 
to produce broader but clearer themes, while some of the themes were collapsed into sub-
themes. Five superordinate themes emerged and they are: publisher interest; causes of the 
conflict; media fuelling the conflict; demonization; and recommendations. The researcher 
was concerned about the phrasing of some of the themes but after considering the sub-
themes under each and the amount of data to support them the themes were allowed to 
stand on their own. For instance causes of the conflict, fuelling of the conflict and 
demonization appear similar, on the surface. However, the researcher considered the main 
issues raised by participants like some suggesting the violence were the direct consequence 
of the manipulation of religion. This was considered a root of the problem. But there were 
also claims that the media were aggravating the problem by misreporting it and reasons 
were given for that. In the case of demonization the researcher considered specific data on 
labelling or enemy framing that might further fuel the crises. Since in each case there were 
quite a few sub-themes all three were constructed as superordinate themes. 
Attempts were also made to produce a summary table of themes with illustrative 
quotes. Theme One, Publisher interest has sub-themes that include commercial interest, 
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group/regional interest and corruption in the media. An example of illustrative quote: “All 
the media that operate in Plateau State subscribe to the press agenda principle that says 
truth is not essential and are only interested in making money and generating publicity for 
their own people.” Theme Two: Causes of the conflict and the sub-themes are: religion as a 
badge; economic causes of the conflict and social factors in the conflict. Example of 
illustrative quotation is: “Most of our crises are caused by sentiments and the actual 
participants are hardly good Muslims or good Christians and are hardly educated. They are 
hoodlums who wait for crisis to erupt so they can loot.” Theme Three: Media fuelling the 
conflict; Sub-themes are: misinformation; biased reporting; regionalism and sectarianism; 
and input of new technology, rumour and misinterpretation. An illustrative quote is: 
“Definitely, they are biased and take sides all the time. Both the Northern and Southern 
newspapers are to blame for this problem.” Theme Four: Demonization; sub-themes: Enemy 
images and use of stereotypes. An example of illustrative quote: “…for instance negative 
reports from (sic) Jos make us see Jos people as violent and hardly get our sympathy.” 
Theme Five: Recommendations; sub-themes include: education; economic empowerment; 
cultural education and exchanges; and patriotism/professionalism. An illustrative quotation 
is: “I will canvass for creating a forum where people can meet and interact and shed 
negative beliefs.” 
6.3 PRESENTATION OF ANALYSIS IN NARRATIVE FORMAT: 
In this presentation the only order that has been followed is in a bid to present a coherent 
narrative from the analysis, starting with a superordinate theme and using quotations from 
the data to support each sub-theme, as well as a brief interpretation.  
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6.3.1  Theme One: Publisher Interest 
Discussion here follows the audience perception of news reports, especially the main drive 
of the media and their backers:  
6.3.1.1  Commercial interest 
FGA2, a female from Southern Nigeria, argues that the media use the Plateau sectarian 
violence as an avenue to promote their commercial schema: 
All the media that operate in Plateau State subscribe to the press agenda 
principle that says truth is not essential and are only interested in making 
money and generating publicity for their own people. 
The above argument comes from FGA2’s belief that the reports published or broadcast by 
these media are not the true reflection of the situation on ground and are doctored to 
promote the interest of certain individuals profiting from the crises. 
Lending support to FGA2’s position, FGA1, another student from Southern Nigeria says: 
“There is this phrase about ‘Bad News Making Sales’, which I think they strongly subscribe 
to.” FGA1 refers to the media in this statement, saying they are often more than happy to 
retail negative or unpleasant stories even if it does not augur well for the interest of the 
public. In the same vein FGA6, a student from the North reiterates the point that the 
mainstream media in Nigeria are, on account of their role in Plateau, promoting their 
interest over and above the general good: “But again on this Jos crisis newspapers are only 
out to make money with their reports.”  
The above suggestion by FGA6 is based on their conviction that while some interfaith groups 
are working hard to convince people across the country that often the conflicts have 
nothing to do with religion, the media make them look like religious.  
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FGA5, a student and filmmaker from the North, argues that exaggerated headlines create 
tension and send the wrong signal: 
Newspapers may have an agenda but I don’t know. The headline I mentioned 
means …the violence and people suffering or dying. It makes me develop 
hatred for the town not the people. The people are victims, irrespective of their 
religious beliefs. 
The people mentioned in this statement are the victims of the crises in Jos and other parts 
of Plateau State but who unfortunately, based on news reports end up being demonised. 
However, FGB2, a business man from Kano in the North, believes the people’s readiness to 
accept whatever the media report is partly responsible for the success of the media in 
implementing their commercial interest: 
Unfortunately Nigerians believe the media a lot and the media are out to sell. 
So they know what the people want they just sell to them and people accept 
whatever is sold to them. 
6.3.1.2            Corruption in the media 
FGA3, a student from the North suggests that journalists get influenced by politicians in 
public offices who offer them bribe to make them customise reports in their favour: “They 
are being used and they are dancing to the tune of the government because of this brown 
envelope thing.” FGA3 uses the above statement to support their argument that the media 
are compromised and are not doing much to expose corrupt politicians who divert public 
funds meant for development. FGA6 echoes the same point, saying in the past journalists 
shunned kickbacks and focused more on doing their job with pride: “In those days 
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journalists were more interested in their profession and dignity than what they will get in the 
form of inducement.” 
Journalists in the country, FGA6 notes, are hardly well paid and in the end forced to be 
involved in professional malpractices to survive. Many are willing to peddle falsehood or 
assist in planting stories in exchange for some money. 
But FGA5 does not think journalists should be blamed entirely for this problem because they 
are underpaid despite facing professional hazards: “Given that they face a lot of risks like 
death and poor welfare could account for the way they report this crisis in Jos.” 
6.3.1.3       Group/regional interest 
FGB1, a retired intelligence officer from Kano is of the opinion that politicians and leaders 
use the media to project their group or class interests: “Newspapers as we have seen are 
tools in the hands of the ruling class and their publisher friends.” 
In Nigeria class issues are not as pronounced as religious and ethnic differences. 
Nonetheless, some people still see the society as polarised between those in power who 
control wealth and take decisions affecting everyone on the one hand, and the ordinary 
people that are only useful during elections but at other times are mere spectators 
(Chomsky 1997; Smith 2007). 
But FGA5 notes that newspapers in Nigeria have predetermined perspectives through which 
they view and report events in the country: 
From what I have read regarding the Jos crisis I have come to believe that each 
newspaper tells its story from its own point of view. Journalist are not fair, 
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they are biased and allow their religious or ethnic sentiments to influence their 
report. 
The media, according to FGA5, are seen to be divided in their bid to provide support for the 
parties at loggerheads. News reports and articles on the crises are usually tailored to suit 
the interests of the group each section of the media supports. 
FGA6, stressing this division, argues that the media appear to be at war with each other in 
their bid to give their readers or audience what they want or what they think they want: 
…newspapers in the North, although in minority, are slugging it out with their 
Southern counterparts in a bid to disseminate information to their target 
audience. This results in the slide to the use of sentiments, which doesn’t help 
matters. 
The above statement attempts to explain why some journalists do not mind being in breach 
of the rules of their profession and keep repeating the same thing over and over again, 
while publishers allow such flaws to continue.          
FGA4, a participant from the South-East of Nigeria, blames newspaper columnists for failing 
to balance their articles while subjectively defining issues from their own point of view: 
Columnists are the main problem as they often try to interpret intentions, 
without necessarily seeking to balance. In order to get the exact truth or the 
real fact I read more than one newspaper – like This Day, Guardian, Punch, 
Daily Trust etc. 
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Given the above dilemma FGA4 says they read so many newspapers and access other 
sources of news to ascertain the facts and avoid being manipulated. 
6.3.2      Theme Two: Causes of the Conflict 
This theme presents opinions of participants about the factors that have been responsible 
for the crises that are usually branded religious in Nigeria:  
6.3.2.1  Religion as a badge of convenience 
FGB1 recounts an experience during a religious crisis in which some foot soldiers were 
fighting a battle they either did not understand or did not believe in:  
In one of the crisis I was stopped by a mob in Kano and asked to recite some 
prayers to confirm my religion and as soon as I started reciting the person 
ordering me called out to someone else to come and listen, so as to know 
whether I was reciting the prayers correctly. It was clear that he, himself, 
couldn’t recite the prayers but he claimed to be fighting a religious battle. 
Based on their experience FGB1 opines that most of the crises are only presented as 
religious even though people have other motives: 
The truth is most of what we just claim to be religious crises are not religious 
as such, someone ignites those crises because of their selfish interest and gives 
them a religious cover up. 
FGB3 who’s a civil servant from the South notes that there is some sort of hypocrisy even 
among religious people as they might not mean exactly what they preach: 
…in my opinion with what I have seen every religion preaches tolerance even 
though their hearts do not exactly mean it…The truth of the matter is that you 
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do not need to know the truth for some people as they will fight for what they 
believe in whether they know what it is about or not. 
To buttress their point that religion is only a decoy in the crises FGB3 argues that it might be 
more difficult to manipulate people using religion if their standard of living is improved: 
It is about giving the people what to live for and you will see if anybody will die 
for any religion. 
6.3.2.2  Economic cause of the conflict 
Unemployment is alarmingly high in Nigeria and most young people are idle and frustrated. 
FGB1 believes this is a major incentive for taking part or igniting violence as it gives them an 
opportunity to plunder: 
Ninety per cent of our youths are unemployed and there is massive poverty 
everywhere with so many people just waiting for anything what would give 
them an opportunity to loot. They just join the bandwagon as soon as they 
hear that something is happening. 
FGB2 echoes the same point, adding that those actively participating in or encouraging 
religious violence are merely hoping to make personal gains:  
Most of our crises are caused by sentiments and the actual participants are 
hardly good Muslims or good Christians and are hardly educated. They are 
hoodlums who wait for crisis to erupt so they can loot. 
The issue of unemployment and its role in encouraging violence is further emphasised by 
FGB3 who thinks if life is made more worthy of living people might think less of violence: 
Many people are not employed and would easily be manipulated by any news 
report even when it is not so provocative. Yes, there is a need to make the 
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report more pro-peace but the main issue is give people genuine hope by 
getting them employed and be sure they have something to live for. 
6.3.2.3   Social causes of the conflict 
A major factor, according to FGB1 is the people’s inherent differences that many are taking 
advantage of without any consideration for others:  
Tribalism and religious bigotry have always been part of our life in Nigeria. 
And today people are just coming out to defend their faith or tribe without 
listening to the other. 
But FGA3 believes the crises are enduring because people feel neglected by political leaders 
and that needs to change: 
Governments need to carry all the people along. Unless there is even and fair 
dispensation of the dividend of democracy it will continue to trigger bad blood. 
The government are not carrying people along. 
6.3.3  Theme Three: Media Maintaining the Conflict 
The media have not been directly accused of causing the crises but they have been fingered 
for hyping tension and escalating the crises: 
6.3.3.1   Misinformation 
FGA2 says some newspapers report issues that are inimical to peaceful coexistence: 
Some of the print media sometimes don’t disseminate the kind of information 
they are supposed to pass to the public. They don’t say what could actually  
calm the public… 
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In line with what FGA2 says the media in the country are seen to be inflaming tension and 
causing division among the people. And the print, because they are the most vibrant, are 
blamed most, especially given their experience with THISDAY newspaper in 2002 when Miss 
Daniel’s article48 resulted in sectarian violence. 
FGA2 adds that newspapers sometimes amplify the crisis by reporting happenings 
incorrectly: 
…if there’s something happening in Jos, if there’s a chaotic situation in Jos, 
before you know some newspapers say things that are actually not true and its 
causes another problem. 
FGB1 concurs and suggests that such a problem arises because reporters do not take the 
trouble to research properly and speak to people in the right position to give an accurate 
account: 
…by relying mainly on third party information. They hardly speak with security 
personnel. They often rely on one-side of the story without much verification 
and end up publishing half-truth or even falsehood. 
FGB1 further explains that what follows such a manner of reportage is an extreme 
misrepresentation of facts: “When a story is reported even those who have witnessed it in 
reality tend to be shocked by the amount of exaggeration in it.” 
FGB2 thinks the media make matters worse by sometimes using implausible sources or 
eyewitnesses to back a report: 
                                                             
48 Miss Isioma Daniel‟s articulate provoked riots in the North in 2002. This has been explained in Chapter Five. 
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For instance someone who finds himself a victim, say by accident, ends up 
being spoken to by journalists and his story is overblown and used to paint 
everyone in the affected area in a bad light. 
By blowing the story out of proportion using an incredible source they misinform and 
wrongly galvanize people into taking destructive actions. 
Against the above backdrop FGA5 opines that some news stories are packaged in manners 
that hype sentiments in order to escalate the conflicts: 
Some stories are reported in such a way that emotions are triggered and I 
think journalists need a rethink on this so we don’t continue to inflame the 
crisis. 
On this note the respondent urges media practitioners to consider reversing the trend by 
being more objective. 
A possible way to make reports more objective, as FGA2 suggests, is for gatekeepers in the 
media to make sure only the right information is disseminated: 
There are some things that newspapers don’t need to publish and most are 
even false. Editors need to investigate and consider the consequence before 
publishing such reports. 
Similarly FGA4 calls on the country’s umbrella union for journalists, NUJ, to encourage 
retraining schemes for journalists to enable them do their job well: “NUJ needs to wake up 
and educate its members because they also need education before they can educate others.” 
253 
 
But FGB3 seems less optimistic and cautions with having higher expectations as the 
media in Nigeria are run by people whose commercial interests take priority over other 
things including the common good: 
…we shouldn’t expect the media to tell us the whole truth when we know they 
are in business and they have to make money. So we should be ready to read 
between the lines and use our brains to think and judge for ourselves. 
6.3.3.2   Biased reporting 
FGA5 chides journalists for failing to perform their duty as professionals without allowing 
undue bias to stand in the way: “Journalists are not fair. They are biased and allow their 
religious or ethnic sentiments to influence their report.” 
By viewing happenings through the prism of religion or ethnicity as FGA5 suggests, it shows 
that the media are compromised and contribute towards inflaming tension in not only the 
restive city of Jos but also other parts of the country. 
FGA6 adds that such manipulation of the media plays a role in creating tension in the 
society: “They use these sentiments to get people to support them and end up polarising and 
heating up the polity.”FGA4 considers some journalists a threat to peace, claiming they 
write in breach of the rules of journalism: “Columnists are the main problem as they often 
try to interpret intentions, without necessarily seeking to balance.” 
In attempts to see things purely from their own perspective as has been argued above they 
might become more immersed in the story than they should be, and the consequence could 
be quite grave. 
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Reports or articles, especially biased ones, might have been deliberately written to have 
immense impacts on the audience as FGA6 has suggested: “I once read a column that I felt 
was clearly biased and seeking to shape people’s opinion.” And FGA2 explains that such 
attempts at driving a wedge hoisted on hate are successful in achieving the aims of the 
perpetrators: “The information they pass across affect the audience in one way or the other, 
be you a Muslim or Christian.” 
6.3.3.3  Regionalism/sectarianism 
Nigeria’s regional/religious divisions and the support supposedly lent by the media on both 
sides of the River Niger49 in promoting the cleavages are phenomenal. FGA3 explains: “They 
are seen as Northern newspapers. There are others that are purely Southern.” 
Newspapers that are seen as Northern are the likes of Daily Trust and its other titles 
seemingly providing a voice for the Muslim North, Triumph, New Nigerian, and People’s 
Daily50 and others. In the South there are more than a dozen well established newspapers 
perceived to be projecting Southern and Christian opinions. The oldest and largest 
circulating ones include the Punch51, Guardian, while the Tribune is believed to be the 
South-Western version of Daily Trust allegedly providing a voice to the Yoruba people of the 
South-West, the Nation, the Independent, and THISDAY etc. FGA6 argues that this 
dichotomy between sections of the media in the country depicts a picture of a lop-sided 
development in which a smaller side takes on a much bigger opponent: 
                                                             
49 Nigeria‟s geography shows its natural division of the country into the North and South by the Rivers Niger 
and Benue running through Kogi, Kwara, Niger and Benue States. North of the rivers are Northern States and 
South of them Southern States. 
 
50 People’s Daily newspaper is owned by a group of Northern proprietors and is considered a breakaway faction 
of Daily Trust. It was established about two years ago. 
 
51 Daily circulation figures explained in previous chapters. 
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From the onset there is no balance in the ownership and distribution of 
newspapers between the North and South…what you see is newspapers in the 
North, although in minority, slugging it out with their Southern counterparts in 
a bid to disseminate information to their target audience. This results in the 
slide to the use of sentiments, which doesn’t help matters. 
In reporting issues as sensitive as religion they are said to be biased and do very little not to 
attach themselves to the story and, according to FGA6, media on both sides are involved in 
this breach of professional ethics: 
…they are biased and take sides all the time. Both the Northern and Southern 
newspapers are to blame for this problem. 
Such biases are manifested in the support they show for one religious group or ethnic 
nationality as opposed to others and this is why from the angle a report is written a vigilant 
reader can guess the religion or ethnicity of the journalist that wrote it or background of the 
owner of the media. 
FGA3 uses the examples of Kuru Karama52 and Dogo Na Hauwa53 to stress their claim of 
biased reporting on the basis of religion: 
                                                             
52 On January 17, 2010 Kuru Karama, a Muslim settlement, near Jos was raided by people suspected to be 
Berom and dozens of women and children were killed and dumped in wells 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/01/201012333947758520.html Plateau State Commissioner of 
Police (then) Gregory Anyantin was accused by Muslims of inciting the raid after he claimed that Muslim 
youths attacked a Church service, killing Christian worshippers. His statement was circulated by the media. 
Accessed 7 June, 2011. 
 
53 On March 7, 2010 Dogo Na Hauwa, a Christian village also near Jos, was invaded by suspected Fulani 
herdsmen who used machetes and other weapons to crush scores of women and children to death. It was said to 
be a reprisal for the earlier killings in January 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/03/20103713521482760.html  accessed 7 June, 2011. 
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…two recent crises in Dogo Na Hauwa and Kuru Karama were not given equal 
coverage. While so much was said and the whole world heard about Dogo Na 
Hauwa, there was complete conspiracy not to say anything about Kuru 
Karama. 
FGA3 argues that whereas in the case of Kuru Karama there was little reporting of the 
killings, the media channelled a lot of energy towards reporting the attack on Dogo Na 
Hauwa.  
FGA3 argues further that such division could be a major threat to the country: “…you see 
some divisive newspapers emphasising more on division than unity just to destabilise the 
country.” The above mentioned danger notwithstanding, FGB1 argues that divisions of such 
nature are endemic:  
Tribalism and religious bigotry have always been part of our life in Nigeria. So, 
even when newspapers or media are set up they tend to take this perspective. 
By being able to infiltrate the media tribal and religious sentiments have found for 
themselves a strong base in the heart of Nigerians given that Nigerians rely on and almost 
entirely trust the media.  
6.3.3.4  Input of new technology, rumour and misinterpretation 
In Nigeria mobile phone technology is the main medium through which people circulate 
rumours as news. Rumour has been identified as one of the principal causes of the 
amplification of violence in Nigeria, as FGB2 says: “Our problem is that we depend a lot on 
rumour mongering for information and end up getting misinformed.”  
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In spite of the danger of rumours, FGB1 explains, the mainstream media are either out of 
the reach of the ordinary man or too polarised to serve the purpose and rumours through 
mobile phones become just handy: “So the common man has no access to modern 
technology except to rely on hearsay circulated through mobile phones.” 
Yet rumour mongers are not trained journalists. They lack the basic knowledge of journalism 
which, although journalists are also accused of being in breach of, would regulate how they 
share information and minimise the risk of backlash. 
Interpretation, which constitutes the intent of sharing such information, is a major problem. 
This is so because the often crude means of interpreting the information ends up fuelling 
further crisis. FGB3 explains: “The people who interpret this news send out the wrong 
messages to illiterates who just lose it.”To someone whose level of literacy does not prepare 
them to be able to ask deep questions they just accept any news as facts and act, 
irrespective of the consequence. 
Despite the gloomy picture painted of circulating information through mobile, FGA2 thinks 
that this technology has its positive side as it serves as a genuine alternative to the 
mainstream seemingly manipulative media, especially in verifying reports. FGA2 states: “The 
only other source is using one’s mobile phone to contact friends for information.” Using 
one’s mobile phone to contact friends or people in a position to confirm stories might 
reduce the risk of the menace of misinformation and manipulation of readers or audience of 
the media.  But can a mobile phone be considered an alternative source of news? FGA2 
thinks so and adds that it enhances one’s ability to take an appropriate action: “A different 
source of information helps you to decide on something objectively and fairly and make the 
right decision.” 
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Perhaps, in FGA2’s view, one who’s armed with information in the form of news or rumour 
sent through a mobile phone about violence or an accident in an area could shelve plans 
made to visit the place. 
6.3.4 Theme Four: Demonization 
The use of negative reports or labels to demonise the other is a major issue and newspapers 
on both sides are accused of often painting dehumanising pictures of ‘otherness’:  
6.3.4.2     Enemy images 
FGB4, an unemployed youth from the North, laments the use of offensive names by some 
journalists to refer to people they consider different in some ways:  
They allow some writers or contributors to use the word arna (infidels) to refer 
to Christians, while Christian-owned media are used to refer to Muslims as 
terrorists or Hausa as malo (cow or animal). This is not good at all and should 
not be seen on the pages of newspapers or any media. 
FGB2 also cites an example of the use of labels to refer to people in the North by South-
based journalists and that such references are received with a negative feeling: 
Our media hype tension by repeating bad names like someone in faraway 
Lagos writing about the North he or she has never been to and say we are 
barbaric, unrefined and too backward. 
Similarly, FGB2 denounces the use of derogatory terms by North-based journalists that have 
never been to the South to see things for themselves to represent people in Southern 
Nigeria. FGB3 argues there is no basis for dehumanising people because of their beliefs: 
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Otherwise how can you compare someone who does not belong to your 
religion to the devil or someone who has gone astray? Some Christian 
fundamentalists think even if you are a Christian but don’t go to their Church 
you are evil. Same applies to some Muslims who refer to others as infidels. 
FGB3’s argument points to the fact that in every religion or tribe there are some who do not 
accept others’ right to be different from them and see that as an opportunity to attack them 
using unfair, hateful terms.  
The saddest implication of the use of such terms is they personify the target and often leave 
an imprint on them, as FGA6 suggests by citing Jos as an example:  
 …negative reports from (sic) Jos make us see Jos people as violent and hardly 
get our sympathy. 
With such a picture on the mind of anyone reading about the crisis in Jos a conclusion could 
be drawn on not just the perpetrators of the violence but also everyone there. Thus, similar 
treatment or contempt is meted on all, without distinction.  
6.3.4.2       Use of stereotypes 
In the same way as the creation of enemy images, stereotypes are invented or constructed 
to fit into people’s description with serious repercussions. The print media, according to 
FGB3, use such sentiments to cause hatred: 
The use of labels by newspapers is very effective in dividing the people because 
right now, it is either you are in this religion or you go to hell fire. 
FGB4 also refers to the use of dubious features to represent one side while the other is 
given a perfect reputation: 
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The media worsen the problem by trying to present one side or one religion as 
the truth while they criticise the other as a bad religion. They cause hatred 
through this… 
FGA2 concurs with the above and explains that people are manipulated because they are 
presented one-sided information with which they judge others: 
Most of them usually paint the other side negatively and ensure that the side 
they represent is positively painted. Everything they do is favourable to one 
side. 
Following this pattern problems are stoked and minor issues are easily blown out of 
proportion as some people get blamed for the wrongdoings of a few deviants, argues FGB2:  
 …when there is a problem in a small portion of an area it is overblown and 
negative impressions are created and this risks fuelling overreaction 
elsewhere. 
FGB1 explains that with the media, perhaps, providing a platform for spreading violence 
innocent people become victims and the backlash is monumental: 
…as soon as crisis erupts in one part of the country and it gets reported the 
next thing you hear is that another part of the country, may be at another 
extreme, has reacted in the form of reprisals on people of the same religion 
or tribe as those believed to have instigated or carried out the attacks and 
this spreads round. 
261 
 
FGA6 says Muslims in Nigeria often feel particularly maligned and think the media 
deliberately carry out hate campaigns against them:  “Every Muslim is seen as a potential 
terrorist and that impression has been created on the minds of non-Muslims, except they 
won’t admit it.” Agreeing with FGA6 that Muslims are demonised FGB2 argues that although 
some Muslims might be responsible for some violent happenings it is unfair to blame all 
Muslims: 
Muslims are not happy with those newspapers that often equate Islam with 
violence. The truth is during crises those that wreak havoc are not even good 
Muslims…and in the end those papers reporting from afar just backlist 
everyone by saying Muslims have done this or that. 
Despite what some Muslims describe as negative reports against them some people give 
them the benefit of doubt. FGA2 expounds that a negative impression of people they had 
related with was once created in them by the media and it almost affected their 
relationship. 
I was born and bred in Jos and have Muslim friends, but at a point, due to the 
sort of reports I was reading about Muslims in newspapers I said I would stop 
keeping Muslim friends. 
With the benefit of doubt FGA2 gave Muslim friends they said they were able to see 
people as individuals responsible for their own actions not as the stereotypes the media 
have constructed of them.  
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6.3.5 Theme Five: Recommendations/peacebuilding 
In the above analysis various issues were raised by participants in the study, but it is also 
worthy of note that they proffered solutions that comprise empowerment, 
patriotism/professionalism, cultural exchanges and education, in order to reduce the 
feelings of dissimilarities and tension: 
6.3.5.1       Education 
Beginning with educating the educators, FGA5 suggests the NUJ should take the lead in 
encouraging its member to embark on more training programmes: “NUJ needs to wake up 
and educate its members because they also need education before they can educate others.” 
It is interesting that such an enormous challenge has been thrown at the NUJ and not media 
owners who might be the biggest beneficiaries. But it is also essential to mention that the 
NUJ operates campuses where journalism training takes place.54  
FGB1 also calls for more education for journalists, although the participant thinks they need 
to be equipped with the appropriate tools to work with ease: “Journalists no doubt need 
further training and more conducive equipment to carry out their duties.” Technological 
advancements, if sufficiently taken advantage of, could help journalists in Nigeria monitor 
events in real time and be able to present highly reliable reports. This will depend however 
on whether media owners will consider it a priority and invest sufficient funds in making it 
happen.  
FGB4 also re-echoes the same view point on the education of journalists, arguing that it will 
enable them make the right decisions on what to report or write about:  
                                                             
54 Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ) currently runs a few institutions for the training of journalists in Lagos and 
Abuja, which are in addition to similar courses in some universities in the country. 
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I think the journalists should be trained properly to know when to avoid any 
report even if it is the truth that would inflame the polity. They should know 
when there is the likelihood of crisis and work to prevent its eruption. 
Armed with the right training FGA2 suggests also that journalists could reduce the problem: 
“They should be more interested in education and mitigate rather than amplify the situation 
in Jos.” In line with FGA2’s opinion, FGA1 urges journalists to use their vantage position to 
enlighten their audience: “Media need to go back to drawing board and understand that 
beyond just informing and entertaining how they educate people.” 
And since education is an art that is learnt through training FGA1’s suggestion that they 
acquire the necessary skills to do this is in order and could perhaps further take them and 
the country out of the woods, as it appears. 
Another call for a serious campaign to avert further violence on the Plateau comes from 
FGA5: “We need more education and enlightenment in Jos to prevent further generation of 
bad blood.” 
With the way things have turned in Jos and other parts of the Plateau it would require a 
major sensitisation to get the people to put all they have gone through behind them. The 
media should be in the vanguard of ensuring this happens. 
6.3.5.2       Cultural education/exchanges 
Beyond formal education one other type of education that needs to be seriously considered 
is cultural education and exchanges. FGA6 is of the opinion that the media have been 
involved in stoking this problem and people need to relate more to overcome it: 
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They encourage bitterness and you end up with bad feelings, which can only 
change if we move closer to each other. I will canvass for creating a forum 
where people can meet and interact and shed negative beliefs. 
The idea of making people meet to discuss issues of negative feelings towards each other is 
crucial in that it would be realised that much of what was thought of each other came from 
poor knowledge and, possibly, misinformation. 
Owing to the fact that Muslims in Nigeria believe their religion has been largely 
misrepresented by the media there is a feeling that to address this issue further research by 
the media into how Islam works would suffice, as FGA5 thinks: 
As a Muslim I will be quite happy if others will know more about my religion 
and me knowing more about other faiths and culture. Let journalists make 
intense research and report about the other parties. 
FGA5’s idea is that people should learn more about other faiths and that would help to a 
large extent in removing the wall of isolation erected by different beliefs and a new 
partnership based on understanding and tolerance would be charted.  
FGA3 also thinks there is a need to reverse the trend in which journalists demonise other 
beliefs: “Newspapers write terrible reports about people and cultures and they need to 
change.” 
Although Nigerians have focused more on their dissimilarities if they channel more energy in 
understanding these differences positively they might realise there’s a thin line between 
them. Perhaps this is in line with FGA6’s position:  “If we learn more about our cultures we 
will find out just how similar they are.” 
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There is also a need for journalists to be, themselves, more aware of these issues to enable 
them respect and correctly enlighten the audience about other cultures and beliefs and 
their sanctity. 
6.3.5.3     Patriotism/professionalism 
FGA3 argues there is a need for journalists to be more interested in keeping the nation as 
one rather than emphasising divisions: “We are all Nigerians and must keep the unity of our 
country irrespective of our tribe or religion.” FGA3 adds that journalists need to shun 
professional malpractices to be able to achieve a high sense of patriotism and properly do 
their job and the leaders need to also complement by ensuring good governance: 
Avoid bias and ensure you gather facts before reporting. They must also avoid 
rumour mongering and government should carry people along. 
FGB1 suggests that journalists in Nigeria should, as a matter of priority, be able to back 
reports with impeccable sources: 
In such cases if a reporter was to gather information he needs to get to the 
bottom and report only the fact, because people rely heavily on information 
provided by the media. 
This follows the earlier argument that they sometimes rely on incredible sources to file 
reports that end up resulting in the spread of falsehood and escalation of violence. By 
relying on credible sources FGB3 says they might be able to do their jobs efficiently leading 
to less rancour in the society: “And if the media can also do their job properly then things 
will be smooth and easy for all.” 
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6.3.5.4       Economic empowerment 
The issue of journalist remuneration and welfare is central to the problem of low quality 
journalism practice in Nigeria. But FGA4 opines that with better wages they would have no 
excuse for soliciting for or accepting bribe: 
Journalists needs better pay and most journalists live on meagre salaries. 
There should be a standard salary for journalists and if they are well paid I 
wonder why they would accept brown envelopes so as to give the wrong 
reports or be biased. 
In the same vein FGA6 thinks they need better salary and be well equipped: “They should be 
well paid and should be better trained.” 
Making life better for journalists appears to be a prerequisite for good journalism in Nigeria 
and FGB1 opines that government intervention might be necessary to bring about the 
desired change: 
…the government must prevail on employers to ensure at least minimum 
standard of welfare for employees, ensure there are incentives to encourage 
selfless and dedicated service and shun corruption like accepting brown 
envelopes even when offered. 
While there has been much emphasis on the welfare of journalists FGB3 thinks there is also 
a need to consider the possibility of a better life for the ordinary people who take part in the 
violence: 
267 
 
It is about giving the people what to live for and you will see if anybody will die 
for any religion. Many people are not employed and would easily be 
manipulated by any news report even when it is not so provocative. 
FGB3’s point is spot on. If any meaningful transformation is to be achieved then everyone 
needs to be carried along; changes must affect both news production (including those 
producing it) and news reception (the audience). One thing is producing and retailing news 
and another aspect is its reception. There is a need for them to complement each other. 
6.4  CONCLUSION 
This chapter opened with a discussion of the field research process explaining how the 
researcher went about collecting data while in Nigeria and the issues they had to deal with 
along the way. There was also a detailed explanation of the analytic process and the 
construction of five superordinate themes and how they evolved. It is important to recall 
that the researcher had explained that there would be no attempt to manipulate the 
emergence of themes or squeeze the subjective experiences of the participants. It was 
based on this the data was allowed to dictate the process. From several reiterative readings 
of the transcript all the themes later emerged and they were used as a sign post for the 
analysis.  
 Using data from the two separate focus groups issues that were discovered were 
discussed with illustrative quotations. It is instructive to note that although similar questions 
were presented to participants in the two focus groups the responses differed. While 
certain issues were effectively raised and addressed in one focus group, other concerns 
were better dealt with in the other focus group. In the end the themes were constructed to 
reflect those differences except in a few cases where by some coincidence similar ideas 
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were discovered in response to some questions. For example, Focus Group A (Jos) was more 
comfortable with addressing the role the media (newspapers) played in maintaining or 
fuelling the crises, as participants mentioned instances when they felt there was either 
biased reporting or misreporting of events that escalated the violence. The researcher, thus, 
categorised responses here as the ‘how’ explanations. As for Focus Group B (Kano) they 
tried to look at the causes of the crises although at some point mention was made of the 
amplification role of the media in the conflicts. Participants described both the economic 
and social factors in the crises which may not be necessarily blamed on the media. The 
researcher therefore considered responses here as the ‘why’ explanations. So, while one 
group thought the problems might not be directly from the media and could be due to other 
broader issues (poverty and tribalism), the other group felt the media, being part of the 
society, maintained the problem and were therefore to blame. However, in both cases, one 
can deduce that the media might have played a role of amplification/escalation more than 
igniting the crises; they were problems that were happening or waiting to happen and the 
media probably acted as a catalyst in accelerating the process.  
 Other important issues that arose in the analysis were the audience perception of 
who controls or uses the media to their advantage and to the detriment of the society; how 
certain societal factors like corruption and or regional interests influence reports etc. There 
were also attempts to understand other factors that are relatively new but influential in 
determining the extent and direction of the conflicts like rumours and mobile technology, 
through which false reports are sometimes peddled. This is also somehow outside of the 
control of the media, as the perpetrators, like citizen journalists, might not be trained in 
journalism practice. The use of enemy frames to view and represent ‘otherness’ also came 
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up and participants described how they felt it happens and what it tries to achieve. In a bid 
to present a glimmer of hope participants made recommendations for ways of transforming 
the crises. The use of education, cultural exchanges, empowerment and promotion of 
patriotic feelings and professionalism were mainly suggested. 
            The possibility of presenting a separate discussion chapter, Chapter Seven, was 
previously considered. Therefore, the next chapter will be devoted to discussing the findings 
in this and Chapter Five and efforts will be made to draw a link between theories that have 
been identified as appropriate for understanding the issues raised in this study and findings 
related to them. Again, themes that emerged from the data were also responsible for 
determining each theory identified by the researcher. Following the same pattern headings 
will be appropriately constructed, under which discussions will be presented.  
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      CHAPTER SEVEN                                                              
                                 Discussion and Analysis of Findings               
7 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to explain the meanings of the findings made in both Chapters Five and 
Six by linking the findings to theories. In trying to achieve this, discussions will be presented 
using headings that were identified during the reiterative readings of transcripts. These 
headings include: regional cleavages; patron clientelism; competition and interdependence; 
enemy images; stereotyping; and cross-cultural exchanges (and education). Using a 
theoretical understanding in each case, at least, the issues raised in the analyses will be 
linked to the Nigerian situation. Regional cleavages, for instance, will be discussed in the 
context of media ownership, location and use among other issues, along regional/religious 
divides as suggested by the data. Patron clientelism will be linked to corruption as a cultural 
problematic that has infected the media, despite some efforts to combat it. Competition 
and negative interdependence will dwell on cognitive explanations and consequences of 
competition. Enemy images will be discussed as a major means of misinterpreting and 
assigning wrong meanings to ‘otherness’, leading to the exacerbation of the crises. 
Stereotyping will also delve into issues like the post-September 11 global media framing of 
Muslims/Islam, which some Nigerians connect to their plight. And in proffering solutions the 
successful application of contact hypothesis in Northern Ireland will be briefly discussed and 
proposed for Nigeria, using the media as a conduit. A conclusion will then be drawn based 
on all that is discussed. 
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7.1  REGIONAL CLEAVAGES 
In order to have a fairer glimpse of how the various media in the world work Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) have proposed the use of political parallelism as a framework. In their study 
of the media systems in Western Europe and North America, they sought to boost the 
earlier work of Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) that the media environments in different 
countries cannot be studied under a universally applied theory. Scholars of media studies 
had been under the assumption that a single theory could be used to explain the working of 
the media in all parts of the world, until these two works provided alternative perspectives. 
Thus, in order to simplify this issue, Blumler and Gurevitch (1995: 61) have argued that four 
main factors have to be considered for trans-border comparative analysis of the media and 
these are: degree of state control over the mass media organisations; degree of mass media 
partisanship; degree of media-political elite integration; and the nature of the legitimising 
creed of media institutions. To further make simpler the criteria advanced by Blumler and 
Gurevitch (1995), Hallin and Mancini (2004: 21) suggest four criteria as well. These include: 
the development of media markets, emphasising especially the strong or weak development 
of mass circulation press; political parallelism, which denotes the extent and manner of 
connection between the media and political parties or the degree the media replicate the 
major political cleavages in the realm; the development of journalistic professionalism; and 
the extent and manner of state intervention in the media system. 
 This part of the discussion is specifically interested in the second issue Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) mention, political parallelism. In order to understand the role of political 
parallelism in the working of the Nigerian media one needs to refer to previous discourses in 
this study on the background of the Nigerian media. It has been noted that the Nigerian 
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media were developed during colonial period and grounded on the convenience of colonial 
authorities, although they were later hijacked by anti-colonial movements led by people like 
Sir Herbart Macaulay and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe55. As has been earlier observed the first 
newspaper (indeed the country’s first media) Iwe Irohin Fun Awon Ara Egba ati Yoruba was 
established in 1859 in the South-West and located in Abeokuta (Ogbonda 1988; Olayiwola 
1991; Babalola 2002; Salawu 2006). Iwe Irohin’s equivalent in the North Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo 
was founded in 1937-38, more than 78 years after Iwe Irohin and after nine other 
newspapers had been established in the South. This development, which suggests 
wonkiness, has led to an unending and threatening division. This principally acted as the 
main impetus to the sort of relationship between the people in the two regions and the 
media established in the regions. Thus, given the analysis above it is hardly doubtful that the 
media would stick to regional rather than national loyalty; hence the attachment Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) have pointed out in their typology, whereby the media reflect the political 
cleavages in the environment. They have also contended that “no analyst would argue that 
journalism anywhere in the world is literally neutral” (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 26).  
Journalism practice in Nigeria, following the positions advanced by both Hackett 
(2003) and Hallin and Mancini (2004) is nowhere close to being neutral. We have seen from 
our discussions how in both studies participants clearly expressed opinions confirming this. 
From these opinions one can deduce, having in mind Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) 
framework, that the media in Nigeria exhibit the following features: regional base; linked to 
elitist groups or families; promote group or region’s sectional or commercial interests; are 
used as a means for the struggle to dominate; and have substantially played a role in 
                                                             
55
 Early nationalism and quest for independence were championed by the media. West African Pilot edited by Dr 
Nnamdi Azikiwe was foremost in this crusade and in the regions there were such trends in which rare unity and 
bravery were showcased. 
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polarising the country along religious and ethnic divides. These shall be discussed in sub-
sections. 
7.1.1   Regional base 
In terms of regional base it has been argued earlier on that the media are identified on the 
basis of where they are located and those who own them. Incidentally their reportage is 
seen through the same prism. The South clearly towers over the North in terms of media 
location and ownership as Hackett (2003) has explained and this is vexing the Muslim North, 
particularly, as reports are perceived as anti-North and anti-Islamic. Most of the national 
newspapers, news magazines and a huge number of private electronic media are located in 
the South. Until the founding of the Media Trust Limited in 199856 no privately owned 
newspaper in the North had survived intense competition with its Southern counterparts for 
long. Weekly Trust (and later Daily and Sunday Trusts) was the first to break the jinx, blazing 
the trail that paved the way for other equally Northern newspapers like Leadership and 
People’s Daily and others. Today, although still dominated, the presence of these 
newspapers avails the North with an opportunity to have its voice heard. In the past they 
had to rely on government-owned New Nigerian and Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria 
(FRCN), Kaduna to present the Northern view or angle in any crisis situation, as opposed to 
the dozens of well-funded and firmly-established Southern newspapers like the Punch, 
Guardian, THISDAY, Tribune, the defunct Concord and Comet. In the Kafanchan religious 
violence of 1987 Ibrahim (1989: 68-69) draws attention to the roles the media located in the 
two divides played in projecting views sympathetic to their sides and spreading the crisis:  
                                                             
56
 Media Trust are the publishers of Daily, Weekly & Sunday Trust as well as Aminiya newspapers. Leadership 
and People’s Daily later joined the league of Northern newspapers and have been seen as purely Northern 
although Leadership owner is a Northern Christian. 
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The New Nigerian newspapers and the Federal Radio Corporation (FRCN) of 
Kaduna, both noted for their pro-Northern establishment and pro-orthodox 
Islamic views, played a major role. They emphasised an anti-Islamic reign of 
terror in Kafanchan and the need for defending Islam…The pro-Southern and 
pro-Christian press did not help matters. The Guardian of 14 March, for 
example, wrote about the ‘Mullah’s of easy violence’ whilst the Standard of 13 
March and the Punch of 14 March based their reports on damages to the 
Christian communities while ignoring what the Muslims had suffered in 
Kafanchan. 
Up until now there has not been much change in the situation Ibrahim paints above. 
From the two separate studies’ findings the views of participants will be used to illustrate 
this division, the North versus South or Islam versus Christianity:  
The media are seen as defending certain interests. The South-West 
newspapers are seen as sympathising with Northern Christians, while the New 
Nigerian Newspaper is seen as defending the Caliphate and seeking to Islamise 
the North. There are certain interests that often ensure their line of thinking is 
portrayed. (R4 August 2010) 
 From the onset there is no balance in the ownership and distribution of 
newspapers between the North and South…what you see is newspapers in the 
North, although in minority, slugging it out with their Southern counterparts in 
a bid to disseminate information to their target audience. This results in the 
slide to the use of sentiments, which doesn’t help matters. (FGA6 August 2010) 
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I know there are those protecting the Muslim and Northern interest, there are 
those that basically represent the Yoruba and South-West as well as Christian 
interest and there is at least one major South-East, pro-Ibo newspaper which 
also defends Christianity...   (FGB4 September 2010) 
The first quote came from semi-structured interview data while the rest from focus group 
interview data. In all three examples there is suggestion that the issue of base is central in 
determining the inclination of reportage, emphasising the North/South, Islam/Christianity 
division. 
7.1.2              Elitist link 
Larkin (1997a), who studied the flourishing Hausa home video industry in the North, reveals 
the growing private ownership of grassroots media in the form of video technology. This 
development is a testimony to growing privatisation and corresponding reduction in state or 
government control, which comes at a time of change in global political economy of the 
media. Larkin (1997a, 2000: 210) thus states:  
I wish to emphasise that the rise of Nigerian videos, while seemingly a local 
phenomenon, is part of a worldwide change in the political economy of 
contemporary media...Most important the rise of video culture signifies the 
emergence of a new kind of public sphere in Nigeria, one that is based on the 
privatisation of media production and consumption. 
However, before the period pointed out above, the South of Nigeria had seen a robust 
private media ownership, especially in the print strand. In an earlier analysis in this thesis a 
respondent had observed that the Tribune, a South-West newspaper is owned by the 
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Awolowo57 family. The respondent had said: “The Tribune was established by the Awolowo 
family, but it goes to every length to defend the interest of the South-West” (R4, August 
2010). The Tribune was actually founded by Chief Obafemi Awolowo in 1946 (Babalola 2002; 
Ado-Kurawa 2006).   
Other newspapers owned by notable families or elites include: The Nationalist 
published by Waziri Ibrahim, a presidential candidate under the platform of Great Nigeria 
People’s Party (GNPP) in the Second Republic; Augustus Akinloye’s Sunday Advocate; The 
Eagle owned by K. O. Mbadiwe, Jim Nwobodo’s Satellite; The Trumpet of Alex Ekwueme; 
The Sun by Anthony Enahoro and the defunct National Concord owned by Abiola. There are 
also the Guardian of Alex Ibru58, Lateef Jackande’s Lagos News, Major General (Retired) 
Shehu Yar’adua’s the Reporter, the Nation owned by former Lagos State governor and 
Action Congress of Nigeria chieftain, Bola Tinubu. Also, another The Sun is run by former 
Abia State governor Orji Uzo Kalu and others (Olayiwola 1991: 39; Babalola 2002).  It is 
instructive to note that many of these newspapers are now defunct for various reasons, like 
the demise of their proprietors, for example Chief Abiola. Nonetheless, these examples 
explain the second feature mentioned. 
7.1.3   Promotion of sectional or commercial interests 
The third feature of the media in Nigeria as observed from the data is their open 
identification with certain interests inimical to the public or common good. It has been 
pointed out that their commercial concern usually takes precedence over all other things, 
                                                             
57 The Tribune is owned by one of the fathers of Nationalism in Nigeria, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, and it‟s 
staunchly pro-Yoruba. Despite being one of the oldest newspapers in the country its influence is hardly felt 
beyond the South-West. 
 
58
 Alex Ibru‟s sibling Felix was a First Republic senator and first civilian governor of Delta State. Jakande is a 
former Lagos State governor in the Second Republic. Yar‟adua was Obasanjo‟s deputy from 1976-79 and 
contested one of the aborted primary elections by IBB. He was also the late President UmaruYar‟adua‟s brother. 
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except where there is an attempt to promote sectional or sectarian values. The mass media, 
according to the critical political economy argument, usually operate in an environment in 
which they act like other industrial and commercial organisations in the process of 
producing and distributing commodities (Murdock & Golding 1973). Thus, news is seen as a 
commodity that is retailed to the audience for commercial purposes and the satiation of this 
commercial motive in the form of profit becomes the ultimate goal. Commenting on the 
financial data of 24 media giants in the US, Herman and Chomsky (1994: 5-8) state: 
These twenty-four companies are large, profit-seeking corporations, owned 
and controlled by quite wealthy people…Many of the large companies are fully 
integrated into the market…This trend toward greater integration of the 
media into the market system has been accelerated by the loosening of rules 
limiting concentration, cross-ownership, and control by non-media companies. 
In Nigeria, as Larkin (1997a) has rightly observed increased commercialisation and 
privatisation of the media albeit a local development is a sign of their integration into the 
global market economy. It also means a drive towards greater profit through sales and 
various commercials as Herman and Chomsky (1994) have explained in respect of the 
American media. Jonathan Ishaku (2009: 135) shares the following view in reference to the 
financial gains of newspapers from the recurring violent conflicts in Northern Nigeria: 
Conflict, as bad news, generally sells. Religious conflict sells newspapers and 
magazines and has created the notion that religious diversity is bad for 
national co-existence. 
It is also important to note that based on the nature of their structure, location and 
ownership, the media are used in representing religious interests. This takes us back to the 
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assertion by Hallin and Mancini (2004) that they can never be totally neutral. Our data have 
confirmed this as in both studies some respondents argued that the media meddle in 
religious issues by taking sides in their reportage. Often, they opine, the religious bias of a 
newspaper or media is dictated by the part of the divide it belongs, either the North or 
South. This is why, as Ibrahim (1989) notes, newspapers in the North like the New Nigerian 
are seen as pro-Islamic and those in the South like the Guardian are considered pro-
Christianity.  
7.1.4   Tool of domination 
The fourth feature is the inclination toward domination or as a tool of domination. Professor 
Hackett (2003) has correctly observed that a major bone of contest between the North and 
South of Nigeria is their differences in terms of the acquisition of Western literacy, its 
benefits and the consequent, albeit seeming, alienation of the North. Despite the North 
producing most of the country’s military and civilian presidents59, earlier experiences have 
continued to define relations between the two regions and the media have made 
themselves available in promoting this. A respondent suggests that:  
…what you see is newspapers in the North, although in minority, slugging it 
out with their Southern counterparts in a bid to disseminate information to 
their target audience. (FGA6 August 2010) 
One of the reasons for group loyalty/competition or interdependence as explained by social 
identity theory (SIT) is the desire for self esteem or status based on which members of an in-
group elevate their group higher than others’ (Brief, Umphress, Dietz, Burrows, Butz & 
                                                             
59
 See Chapter One, History of Nigeria, where it has been explained that more presidents have emerged from the 
Northern part of the country although they come from both the Muslim majority and Christian minority tribes in 
the North. 
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Scholten 2005). And because of their link to the cleavages the media, apart from rating 
themselves higher than those of the other side, promote the same feeling of superiority 
among their audience/readers. This, perhaps, explains the use of stereotypical images. 
7.1.5   Ethnic or religious polarisation 
The fifth feature directly correlates with the above in that in a bid to dominate or win in the 
struggle pointed out in the foregoing quote the media end up dividing the people on the 
basis of religion and ethnicity but seldom appeal to class like the media in the West do, as 
noted by Herman and Chomsky (1994: 3) in reference to the work of Curran and Jean 
Seaton on the emergence of the media in Great Britain: 
…a radical press had emerged that reached a national working-class audience. 
This alternative press was effective in reinforcing class consciousness. It united 
the workers because it fostered an alternative value system and framework for 
looking at the world… 
In the case of Nigeria, as was explained earlier, the media emerged as colonial 
convenience and Hackett (2003) has complemented this assertion by pointing out how one 
side was alienated, leading to grievances and bitter competition along the axes of 
geographical location, ethnicity and religion. This is further illustrated by their audience 
base and the perception of the audience of their reports as well as the ‘other’ as the quotes 
below suggest:  
The information they pass across affect the audience in one way or the other, 
be you a Muslim or a Christian. (FGA2 August 2010) 
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Tribalism and religious bigotry have always been part of our life in Nigeria. 
And today people are just coming out to defend their faith or tribe without 
listening to the other. So, even when newspapers or media are set up they 
tend to take this perspective. (FGB1 September 2010) 
All these features have confirmed the links of the media to political cleavages as Hallin & 
Mancini (2004) have highlighted, which this section had set out to explain.  
7.2 PATRON CLIENTELISM  
Clientelism can hardly be discussed without mentioning corruption, just as corruption in the 
media is linked to falsehood or false reporting. In his book Flat Earth News, Nick Davies 
(2009: 51-52) states:  
In a strange, alarming and generally unnoticed development, journalists are 
pumping out stories without checking them – stories which then circle the 
planet. And so now, in a way that was not true in the past, the global mass 
media are not merely prone to occasional error but are constitutionally and 
constantly vulnerable to being infected with falsehood, distortion and 
propaganda. 
Hallin and Mancini (2004: 58) have explained clientelism as: 
 …a pattern of social organization in which access to social resources is 
controlled by patrons and delivered to clients in exchange for deference and 
various forms of support. 
They have further described it as a term referring to an exclusive social system in which 
formal rules are relegated by personal ties or, as it later turned out, connections are made 
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through political parties, religious groups etc. As opposed to rational-legal authority, which 
is linked to a political culture in which primacy is given to ‘public interest’ or ‘common 
good’, they argue that in a clientelistic culture what prevails is commitment to specific 
benefits.  
  Clientelism exists in every culture at some point in its history, as Hallin & Mancini 
(2004) claim. In the case of Nigeria it is pertinent to draw attention to scholarly works 
suggesting the rooting of clientelism in the systems of the two regions and how people have 
tried to the deal with it, as a social issue. The first is a look at the cultural setting of the 
North, where on the foundation of Islam, Northerners are seen by some people as trying to 
present a picture of moral integrity and uprightness. In a bid to maintain this posture they 
try to shy away from corruption as Hunter and Oumarou (1998: 168-169) try to explain 
using Kirk-Greene’s (1974) thesis Bahaushe Mutumin Kirki (the good Hausa man). In their 
analysis of the thesis they expound a number of qualities a good Hausa man possesses, hali 
(character) through which a typical Northerner should normally be viewed. According to 
them: 
Kirk-Greene…enumerates ten qualities he feels are obligatory in understanding 
the concept of mutumin kirki, the good Hausa man. They are: gaskiya (truth); 
amana (trust); karamci (generosity); hakuri (patience); hankali (sense, 
common sense); kunya (shame, modesty); ladabi (good manners); mutunci 
(humanity); hikima (religious, wisdom); and adalci (religious, scruples). 
In Chapter Five a respondent who’s an ex-female editor of a Northern newspaper was, 
perhaps, trying to confirm some of these virtues in the following words: 
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We are even referred to as a regional paper by some people who claim we 
champion anything North. But we still go out of our way to ensure that we are 
not stereotyping. Some people see us as thoroughly Northern, thoroughly 
Islamic but we know that when it comes to practising the ethics of journalism 
as it should be, even by international standards, we can hardly be beaten in 
this country. (R6 August 2010) 
Inasmuch as the above analysis of the typical Northerner might have been applicable 
to the Northerner and perhaps the Nigerian situation at some time in the past, the current 
situation points to the contrary. The issue of brown envelope journalism is a major one and 
today journalism (in both the North and South) is seen from this perspective than the one 
painted by both Hunter and Oumarou (1998), on the one hand, and the female editor 
quoted, on the other hand. And as another respondent claims, although there are attempts 
to fight corruption in the media, it is a problem that is endemic in the Nigerian system:  
Some newspapers take good care of their journalists and even advertise that 
you should not give any gift to their journalists because they pay them and the 
journalists should not take it. There is also the culture of corruption in Nigeria 
whereby if you are given a gift you cannot reject or the person giving will feel 
disrespected…but Daily Trust is telling us that even if he takes let him bring it 
to them and they will return it to you.  (R5 August 2010) 
The reference to Daily Trust is in respect of its ‘No, Thank You’ policy in which it encourages 
the Nigerian public not to offer bribe to any of its staff. And as the respondent mentioned, 
since some people might feel offended if an offer is rejected the paper allows its journalists 
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in such a situation to accept the gift but must hand it in to the company to be returned to 
the patron.  
Another work of interest to this study is the one by Omobowale and Olutayo (2010: 
453), an empirical study of political clientelism and its development impact in rural Ibadan, 
Nigeria. In it they considered the patron-client relationships that have developed in 
different scenarios over five decades, defining and enshrining a political culture fanned by 
corruption. In one of the scenarios they state: 
During Nigeria’s Second Republic (1979-83), Ibadan’s clientelistic structure was 
similar to the arrangement of the 1950s. This time the poor majority became 
the clients of Alhaji Adelakun, a prominent Ibadan indigene…Whoever won or 
lost elections in Ibadan was dependent on Adelakun’s clientelistic structure. 
Adelakun perfected the means of extending goods to clients and injury and /or 
death to political opponents. In spite of his fierce and open display of thuggery 
and violence, he remained a respected politician and patron in political circles 
and was thus beyond the reach of the law. 
The fact that Adelakun remained above the law despite doing everything contrary to the 
rules governing lawful behaviour in the country is a testimony of the deep-seated corruption 
in the system, which as R5 said is a culture.60 
 Of great significance to this study is also Richard A Joseph’s (1987) work Democracy 
and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: the rise and fall of the Second Republic. In it the author 
attempts to look at the nature of corruption in the Second Republic and how political offices 
                                                             
60 In explaining Nigeria‟s political culture corruption was one of the factors considered (see Chapter One). 
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were seen as a means to amassing ‘spoils’ and rewarding clients. Larry Diamond (1989: 284) 
highlights: 
Drawing heavily (but not inflexibly) on Max Weber, Joseph uses the term 
prebendal to define patterns of political behaviour which rests on the justifying 
principle that (state) offices should be competed for and then utilised for the 
personal benefit of office holders as well as of their reference or support 
group. (See Yusha’u 2010: 364) 
Daniel Jordan Smith’s (2007) book A Culture of Corruption is also hugely relevant to this 
discussion. Smith (2007: 13), explaining the preponderance of corruption in high and low 
places in Nigeria, notes: 
The most elite politicians, government officials, economic moguls – federal 
ministers, state governors, NNPC61 managers, major construction and 
petroleum industry contractors, and so on – commonly reap millions of dollars 
through corruption. But people at many levels of society participate in 
corruption in order to survive. 
Smith (2007: 122) also observes that during elections Nigerians vote for the best patrons; 
someone who gives them the most money or might be able to deliver the most government 
resources even if the mechanism of delivery is corruption. This is because the people have 
lost faith in their leaders and know they can only have access to them through the 
structures of patron-clientelism.  
                                                             
 
61 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) is the main oil corporation through which the Federal 
Government of Nigeria participates in the exploration and refining of crude oil and also regulates the country‟s 
petroleum industry. 
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From all that has been discussed it seems corruption is a major problem in the Nigerian 
society. The media, which are supposed to be the watchdog of a society like this, are also 
compromised because of their association to the cleavages in the system. And despite 
efforts to discourage or even penalise journalists for joining the ‘brown envelope’ 
bandwagon, the impact of such campaign will continue to be minimal because of the extent 
to which corruption has penetrated the system and hijacked the psyche of the people. 
Brown envelope journalism has gained a notorious popularity among journalists in Nigeria. 
Terje Skjerdal (2010: 369) explains that brown envelop journalism:  
…is applied to denote journalistic activity which involves transfer of various 
types of rewards from sources to the reporter…it is safe to say that the 
following three characteristics are usually involved if we speak about the 
original “little” brown envelope: the practice occurs on the personal level, it 
has some degree of confidentiality, and it denotes an informal contract 
between the source and the reporter whereby both parties have certain 
obligations. These three characteristics are visualized through the image of a 
brown envelope containing cash physically hander over from source to a 
reporter. 
The media, being part of the society as Hallin and Mancini (2004) have underlined, 
will remain part of the fraud especially if one recalls what R5 said regarding the feeling of 
disrespect to someone offering a gift to a journalist who rejects such a gift. They (the media) 
are also part of the fraud if we consider and take seriously the quotes below: 
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They often rely on one side’s information without verifying and this is why they 
are often accused of bias. In Plateau we have been given a bad name 
irrespective of religion due to the reports written about us. (R11 August 2010) 
…many of those parading themselves as journalists here are not even qualified 
or credible journalists; they have been employed by dubious proprietors who 
don’t even pay them any salary and they are asked to fend for themselves by 
filing all sorts of reports. There are some media houses where their reporters 
allow stories to be planted through them and the stories get published. (R8 
August 2010) 
The above, coupled with other strains faced by genuinely honest journalists like 
delayed or non-payment of wages among others, are bound to complicate the problem. Our 
data analysis has at various points exposed this. It is also important to note that there are 
situations in which grim falsehood might be circulated by forces outside of the control of the 
media. Our data analysis further revealed this, particularly how new media/technology (the 
internet and mobile phone) are aiding the flouting of practice journalism rules. For instance 
while citizen journalism is increasingly gaining currency and emphasising immersion in the 
story, rumour mongers are effectively taking advantage of the handiness of mobile phones 
to circulate false stories and images. Given the extent of Nigeria’s polarisation and endemic 
corruption, these possible means of peddling falsehood could find a fertile base and with 
serious repercussions, as the quotes below appear to suggest: 
 There is this trend now, citizen journalism, where you are supposed to 
immerse yourself in the issue at the same time as you report. (R1 August 2010) 
287 
 
 Our problem is that we depend a lot on rumour mongering for information 
and end up getting misinformed. (FGB2 September 2010) 
The people who interpret this news send out the wrong messages to illiterates 
who just lose it. (FGB3 September 2010) 
The three quotes, one from semi-structured interview data and two from Kano focus group 
data, refer to the growing subscription of Nigerians to the forms of journalism mentioned 
above and how this could mean being fed falsehood and galvanized into taking the wrong 
decisions. 
7.3 ENEMY IMAGES  
The sharp divisions of the media, as we have discussed, are a reflection of the cleavages in 
the society and hugely denting on their ability to demonstrate fair or neutral journalism. 
Enemy images are used to further such divisions and fuel the crises as our analysis suggests. 
In the process of trying to achieve that what could follow is the framing theory’s suggestion 
that certain aspects of reality might be selected, organised and emphasised while excluding 
others (De Vreese, et al 2001: 108). Alexander, et al (1999: 78) say features of enemy 
images comprise painting a meek picture of a rival party’s “motivations in both substantive 
and normative terms.” In the picture the enemy is presented as being motivated by only a 
few self-serving interests, which are all judged evil and immoral (Jervis 1976; cited in 
Alexander, et al 1999: 78). Green (1993: 327) adds that as soon as the enemy is constructed 
as an outsider, they are then imagined as devoid of humanity, more of an animal clothed in 
human skin. 
In a classic study of the making and use of enemy images in the media Ottosen 
(1995) reveals that journalism is tailored to produce certain results at some point and in the 
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same manner customised to produce different outcomes on the same issue at another time. 
Following a content analysis of the media reportage of four international conflicts by three 
Norwegian newspapers, Ottosen (1995: 101) examined a sample of 915 articles and states:  
In my analyses the situationally determined enemy image represents the 
presentation of a concrete hostile action, while the dispositionally determined 
enemy image represents the expectation of such an action. By identifying the 
situational and the dispositional enemy images we can trace the danger zone 
for enemy images in journalism.  
Following the above distinction Ottosen (1995: 101) goes on to define dispositional enemy 
image as: 
…a negative stereotype of a nation, state, religion or/and their respective 
regimes and heads of states. The enemy image can express itself through 
metaphors or other effects in the language or visual and graphical effects that 
create expectations of aggressive, hostile or inhuman behaviour. 
Apart from the fact the enemy images are less obvious in news stories than they are 
in editorials and commentary columns Ottosen’s (1995) major finding is the preponderance 
of dispositional trend in the articles. This draws our attention to the situation earlier 
highlighted in our analysis of the data from both studies, where some participants fingered 
newspaper columnists for stoking the problem. Here is a quote from FGA4 (August 2010), a 
participant in one of the focus groups:  
Columnists are the main problem as they often try to interpret intentions, 
without necessarily seeking to balance. 
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Hackett (2003: 58) also refers to an article in the Sunday Standard of February 28, 1988 
where the Prophet Muhammad was described as an ‘epileptic prophet’. In explaining how 
manipulation occurs following such a trend Hackett (2003: 58) adds that: 
The predilection of many newspapers for such descriptive labels as 
‘fundamentalists’, ‘shiites’, ‘fanatics’, etc., notably when referring to Muslims, 
is, I would suggest, extremely instrumental in shaping attitudes. 
Hackett’s (2003) comment reminds of the contributions of two respondents who lament the 
use of derogatory terms or metaphors by the media on both sides to represent ‘otherness’:  
They allow some writers or contributors to use the word arna (infidels) to refer 
to Christians, while Christian-owned media are used to refer to Muslims as 
terrorists or Hausa as malo (cow or animal). This is not good at all and should 
not be seen on the pages of newspapers or any media. (FGB4 September 
2010) 
You have already demonised some people when you say Fulani people just 
think of Dogo Na Hauwa and see all Fulani as people who kill women and 
children. Or when you say Berom some people link them to people poisoning 
ponds to kill cattle or attack Fulani in their hamlets. If you continue to report it 
that Berom attack or Fulani attack you are just piling hatred or perpetuating 
violent behaviour against certain groups. (R5 August 2010) 
Again, in both Hackett’s (2003) reference to the article in the Sunday Standard and 
the quote from FGB4 it was commentary columns that were blamed. This is because in news 
pages, as Ottosen (1995) suggests, it is less obvious even when headlines or texts contain 
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enemy images. Therefore, based on the findings in the analysis and the discussion above, 
this researcher postulates that: in the Nigerian media enemy images are commonly used; 
newspapers on both sides use such images to demonise the other; ‘otherness’ is a major 
feature of cultural and political differences between the two divides, North and South, or 
Islam and Christianity; the media fall into this classification of ‘otherness’ and constitute a 
primary site for its expression, often leaving bitter, dangerous feelings in its trail as Kawu 
argues:  
But far more frightening for me is the way that the space of knowledge about 
the “other”: The other region, the other religion, or the other people, has 
narrowed in our country. Knowledge has been trounced by very emotional 
responses and often very ignorant assumptions, about our compatriots. 
(Sahara Reporters 2011). 
7.4   STEREOTYPING 
Just like the use of enemy images, stereotypes are used to demonise an opponent or a rival 
in such a way that their negative features, real or perceived, are made to appear more 
obvious than their positive sides, if any. Lippmann (1922) explains that stereotypes:  
…get hold of the few simple, vivid, memorable, easily grasped, and widely 
recognised characters about a person, reduce everything about the person to 
those traits, exaggerate and simplify them, and fix them without change or 
development to eternity. (Hall 1997: 258) 
Stereotypes are employed usually by a ‘superior’ party to reinforce its dominance over an 
‘inferior’ opponent. And similar to any enemy framing process they ensure the preservation 
of a social and symbolic order in which a group carves out itself as ‘us’ and alienates the 
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other, which it regards as ‘them’, (Hall 1997: 258). Hall expounds further that stereotyping is 
a ‘power/knowledge’ game in which people are categorised on the basis of a norm, while 
those excluded are constructed as ‘other’, (Hall 1997: 259). 
The framing of rivals using stereotypes took a new turn following growing 
misunderstanding (and misrepresentation) between the Western and the Islamic world 
(Arabs, Muslims, and Middle Easterners). The September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks on the 
US was a watershed in this relationship as the American media began symbolising people of 
Arab or Islamic descent with terrorism and potentially targeting Americans. It is in line with 
this that Jackson (2010: 9) states: 
Thus, although one might hope that the most common representation of Islam 
in American mass media is of an ordinary, good man, woman, or group of 
believers, instead it is of a dark, often even disembodied, presence, who is, in 
his own words, out to ‘get’ Americans. 
The negative framing of Islam/Muslims in the Western media is seen to have a global 
implication with stereotypes borrowed and applied in local contestations as some 
conspiracy theorists allege. In Nigeria, for instance, quite a few Muslims believe the type of 
negative coverage Muslims/Islam/Northerners get from the more vibrant South-based 
media is directly connected to the global framing of Muslim as the enemy as Jackson (2010) 
has suggested the American media do. In buttressing the position that has been taken by 
such theorists, a participant in one of the studies in this thesis argues: 
That is the mentality, which in any case ties with global mentality – 
Islamophobia. This is negative propaganda against Islam, which is deliberate 
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and organised. What you see sometimes in the Nigerian media, I think, is an 
attempt to integrate into that Islamophobic way of reporting. (R6 August 
2010) 
This view is shared by many Muslims in Nigeria and the number of those with such thinking 
is growing, especially in the North. In one of the focus groups a respondent says:  
It’s an international phenomenon in which one faith has been painted 
negatively. Every Muslim is seen as a potential terrorist and that impression 
has been created on the minds of non-Muslims, except they won’t admit it. 
(FGA6 August 2010) 
But Ishaku (2009: 136-137) tries to debunk the claims of conspiracy theorists by linking a 
prominent Northern newspaper to a violent local Islamic group with alleged ties to Taliban. 
According to him:  
Since 2001, when security intelligence community began to notice the 
activities of the Talibans (the Boko Haram), Daily Trust newspaper has always 
attempted to undermine or ridicule security agencies’ efforts in tackling this 
dangerous extremist group. During the arrest and investigation of Bello 
Damagun and his associates62, the Weekly Trust (stable-mate of the Daily 
Trust) called it ‘Detention without Trial: FG targets Muslims activists’ in its July 
10-16, 2004 edition. 
                                                             
62
 Bello Damagun, who‟s one of the founders of Media Trust (publishers of Daily Trust and its stable-mates), 
was once accused of sponsoring youths from Northern Nigeria to undertake terrorism training in Mauritania, an 
allegation he vehemently denied. The issue was taken to court but has since been rested. 
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From the arguments advanced by both sides - those claiming unwarranted targeting 
by the Southern media in line with an anti-Islamic global media stereotyping and those 
attempting to deflate the allegation - it is pertinent to draw attention to Ibrahim’s (1989) 
earlier argument that both sides are complicit in this hate campaign and exacerbation of 
sectarian crises in Nigeria. Ibrahim has highlighted the call by the New Nigerian and FRCN 
Kaduna on Muslims to fight against Christians’ reign of terror in Kafanchan during the 
religious violence of 1987. He also notes the use of the phrase ‘Mullah of easy violence’ to 
describe Muslims by the Guardian. In both cases there was clear stereotyping of a larger 
group following the actions of a few members of each group. It is on this basis that one 
acknowledges some issues that have arisen in the discussion on stereotyping. These are: 
stereotypes are used in the Nigerian media to negatively portray the other; in the process 
violence in the country is amplified by the media; there is also a tendency to misrepresent 
and therefore paint a false image or wrong impression of the other; there is a strong feeling 
among Muslims/Northerners that a deliberate hate campaign by the South-based media 
targets them and their faith; that the said hate campaign is in a bid to join the global 
bandwagon of anti-Muslim/anti-Islamic hate campaigners; and there is a feeling that the 
North-based media are shielding extremist Muslim groups with suspected international 
terrorist connections from the law by alleging Muslim targeting.  
7.5  COMPETITION AND NEGATIVE INTERDEPENDENCE 
This headline was constructed following analysis of data in both studies revealing the role of 
factors like basic needs, including identity and security issues, in the crisis.  
Discussions in this chapter have so far been concerned with the role of the media in 
maintaining the conflict. This section therefore seeks to address different issues, the causes 
of the violence as suggested by the data. From our analysis two main factors were identified 
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as the major causes of the religious conflicts in Nigeria. This, of course, is owing to the 
general position by respondents that the conflicts are not religious but made to appear 
religious for certain reasons. First, competition for scarce resources became fiercer in the 
early 1980s as the government of President Shagari introduced austerity measure. It was in 
that period that the first noticeable of these conflicts was ignited in Kano on December 18-
19, 1980 by the Maitatsine extremist group; at least five thousand lives were lost while 
many people were unaccounted for (Falola 1998). Between December 1980, when the first 
Kano riot took place, and December 1998, when the Maiduguri conflict occurred, no fewer 
than 14 violent conflicts had erupted in various parts of Northern Nigeria with huge 
destruction of lives and property (Usman 1987; Ibrahim 1989; Falola 1998; Hackett 2003; 
Kukah 1993; Ishaku 2009). Usman (1987: 72) argues:  
The attack on, and destruction of, Christian Churches in Sabon Gari  Kano, 
marks the highest, and most dangerous, point this systematic manipulation of 
religion has yet reached in its opposition to the unity of the people of Nigeria. 
This incident enables us to see more clearly the purposes and direction of this 
campaign of manipulation built around religion. 
 The manipulation Usman (1987) mentions above could be the use of frustrated 
unemployed youths either by extremist religious clerics like Maitatsine or some political 
leaders. In order to understand this within the context of this study realistic conflict theory 
(RCT, earlier introduced in Chapter Two), shall be brought into this discussion. Although the 
term realistic conflict theory was coined by Campbell (1965; Levine & Campbell 1972), RCT 
actually refers to the theory explaining people’s (in-group) perception of competition over 
scarce resources as a zero-sum game in which their gain is another’s (out-group) loss and 
295 
 
vice versa (Brief, Umphress, Dietz, Burrows, Butz, & Scholten 2005), with such a perception 
of win or lose resulting in increased prejudice against an out-group through the use of 
stereotypes, like name-calling, and in-group solidarity like awareness of distinct identity, in-
group unity and even the acceptance of deviant behaviours of members, use of boundary 
symbols, and overt discrimination of others, like ethnicity and racism (Sidanius & Pratto 
1999; Sherif 1966; Sherif, et al 1961; Brief, et al 2005). Negative interdependence or fierce 
competition as explained by this theory often results in increased hostility and social 
conflicts (Echebarria-Echabe & Guede 2003). Thus, competition over such things as territory 
(land), jobs, power and economic gains (Insko, Schopler, Kennedy, Dahl, Graetz & Drigotas 
1992) could spark off violent conflicts. During the Sherif, et al study in the summer of 1949, 
1953 and 1954 the introduction of superordinate goals (SG) was the intervention that 
restored harmony despite an earlier aggressive competition (through raid, name-calling etc). 
SGs are goals that can only be achieved through interdependence and cooperation. The 
goals arise where there is a common enemy from outside or a common problem from 
within (Leyens, et al 1994: 46).  
 Within the Nigerian situation it is important to look at how the respondents view the 
role of competition as explained by RCT in the conflict. Quotations from the data shall be 
used as examples to elaborate the relevance of RCT in this discussion: 
I have heard people say poverty contributes to violence and I agree with that 
completely. If you look at the mass poverty in the North you will see it is one of 
the attributes or a major cause of the violence. (R5 August 2010) 
At the bottom of it all I think it’s economic, it’s material. It is the struggle for 
what people think is scarce resource so now people fall back on the ethnic 
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group or their religion to try and grab as much as they can for themselves. (R1 
August 2010) 
Ninety per cent of our youths are unemployed and there is massive poverty 
everywhere with so many people just waiting for anything that would give 
them an opportunity to loot. They just join the bandwagon as soon as they 
hear that something is happening. (FGB1 September 2010) 
 It is about giving the people what to live for and you will see if anybody will 
die for any religion…Many people are not employed and would easily be 
manipulated by any news report even when it is not so provocative. (FGB3 
September 2010) 
In the four quotes above one thing is common and that is the agreement that the conflict is 
due to economic reasons, which RCT emphasises. It is essential to recall our earlier 
explanation that the crises first started in the 1980s as Nigeria’s economy experienced a 
sudden plunge. And as the condition continued to deteriorate the rate at which people 
succumbed to pressure to become violent increased tremendously. In the process of trying 
to grab for oneself and one’s group as much of the scarce resources as possible the religion 
or tribe issue comes in, which is the second factor.  
RCT is complemented by social identity theory (SIT) in explaining the social cognitive 
aspect of conflict (Tajfel & Turner 1979: 34; Breif, et al 2005: 831). Stemming from the works 
of Tajfel (1969, 1978a, 1978b, 1982), Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) and Turner (1981) SIT 
explains the role of identity and group formation in competition and conflicts (Insko, et al 
1992). It enunciates the primacy of issues like status, self-esteem and beliefs over objective 
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benefits. Thus, interdependence is central to SIT as it says members of a group become 
aware that their destiny depends on interdependence (Leyens, et al 1994). People, 
therefore, form a group when they are aware of the interdependence of their destiny 
(Rabbie 1991). SIT also discusses in-group favouritism, arguing it is usually induced by 
factors like shared fate or objective competition. By belonging to a group and knowing that 
the other person belongs to a different group is enough reason to create prejudice even 
without knowing that person; just as members of an in-group rate their group better or 
higher than others’ (Brief, et al 2005). In linking this to our study quotes from the data will 
be used to illustrate the SIT factor in the conflict: 
…whenever a political leader falls out with the political class he comes back to 
tell the people that he is being marginalised because of his ethnicity or 
religion, and with some little mobilisation, like peanuts, you’ll see an army of 
idle young men unleashing havoc.  (R10 August 2010) 
They become religious even if they were not at the beginning. The Jos crisis 
was not religious. The governor is known to be tribalistic even among the 
various groups in the state, even in his normal life he is known to be tribalistic. 
(R2 August 2010) 
The media worsen the problem by trying to present one side or one religion as 
the truth while they criticise the other as a bad religion. They cause hatred 
through this because not everyone is happy with such publications and they 
can force people to take to violence as they see others as the bad guys and 
would want to act on that information. (FGB4 September 2010) 
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The above quotes illustrate respondents’ views on how people fall back on identity or 
interdependence in a bid to make competition a thing of ‘us’ (in-group) and ‘them’ (out-
group). Politicians are fingered as the biggest culprits as they resort to such a tactic for their 
personal benefits; because they are losing out they turn to interdependence as their last 
bastion. This is exactly why SIT says people rely on interdependence when they realise their 
survival dependents on it. The last quote mentioned the media for being part of the division, 
because they paint one group as better than the other. They, therefore, encourage in-group 
versus out-group prejudice and at the same time they constitute an in-group (North-based) 
as opposed to out-group (Southern/Lagos-Ibadan axis media) and vice versa. While this 
helps them to competitively outsmart others, it also serves as a fuel for fiercer competition 
among the people; thereby increasing the possibility of conflict and violence. 
 At this point one needs to re- 
introduce the conflict maintenance factor, which the media have been accused of being 
responsible for. Again, quotes will be used to illustrate respondents’ positions.  
 …the media were divided on the basis of certain sentiments like saying these 
are my people and I don’t care about the others. So the warring parties could 
only make their plight known to the world through the relationship they have 
with a particular section of the media. (R7 August 2010) 
They are aware of the implications of their reports but often they want to be 
seen defending their religion than not doing anything because they fear other 
journalists who are of different religious faith may take advantage and project 
their view as the right one irrespective of the adverse implications like bloody 
conflicts and so on. (R8 August 2010) 
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Some of the print media sometimes don’t disseminate the kind of information 
they are supposed to pass to the public. They don’t say what could actually 
calm the public… (FGA2 August 2010) 
 I once read a column that I felt was clearly biased and seeking to shape 
people’s opinion. And this is common to both sides. They use these sentiments 
to get people to support them and end up polarising and heating up the polity. 
(FGA6 August 2010) 
There is a need to once again refer to our previous discussion of the background of the 
various newspapers in Nigeria, based on which it can be deduced that they exhibit the 
following features: colonial legacy; weapon for fighting colonialism; tool in the hand of 
politicians to outsmart political opponents; commercial enterprise for people to make 
money; used by regional and religious groups to polarise the polity and promote their 
interests. In all the above features there is at least a link to one of the theories, either 
through economic or group interests and this explains why they have failed to be neutral 
and are rather encouraging fierce competitions leading to violent conflicts. For instance, the 
fact that they are used by individuals or groups based in the regions or affiliated to religions 
might explain the link to economic benefits (RCT) or group/tribe’s interest (SIT). Also 
commercial benefits clearly show their drive to make money, which is an economic factor. 
But they are not directly the cause of the conflicts. This takes us to the argument by 
Gauntlett (1998) that the media effects model erroneously focuses attention on the 
relations between violence/crime and media contents. However, based on the findings of 
Hagell and Newburn’s (1994) study, violence or crime has no connection with media (or 
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newspaper in this case) usage as especially people have less access to papers given the 
declining readership/circulation figures earlier mentioned.  
7.6 CROSS-CULTURAL EDUCATION AND EXCHANGES 
Nigeria’s division could be described as one arising from issues like perceived cultural 
dissimilarities. It was mentioned earlier (in Chapter 1) that the country came into being 
following the colonisation of the different ancient kingdoms, empires, caliphate and 
chiefdoms operated on distinctive cultural beliefs and religious faiths. These differences 
were compounded by the manner of colonialism/administration applied in the different 
regions, leading to the emergence of a Muslim North that is distinct from the Christian 
South, with each side feeling cheated and bitter (Hackett 2003; Salawu 2006; Gumi 1992; 
Ishaku 2009). Although Hackett (2003) argues there have been attempts by successive 
governments to negotiate the differences, especially on religion, not much success has been 
achieved.  Today most of the crises arise due to these differences.  
 Despite the failures to deal with the problem sufficiently there have been 
suggestions from participants to adopt a mass enlightenment campaign about the different 
cultures of the people. It is believed that when better educated people would learn to treat 
each other with more respect than is currently the case. Noor, et al (2008) have suggested 
that the best way of getting past any conflict and its painful experiences is by reconciling the 
warring parties, flagging off the healing process leading to mutual acceptance between 
conflicting groups (Staub & Bar-Tal 2003; Noor, et al 2008: 482). But reconciliation has to 
take place on the foundation of forgiveness offered and accepted by each in-group and out-
group, although there might be enormous resistance from both sides due to the 
psychological trauma of their experiences. In their experiment with this in the conflict of 
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Northern Ireland, Noor, et al (2008) note that such resistance was stiff towards intergroup 
reconciliation despite a peace agreement. Fundamentally, they identify past wrongdoings as 
a stumbling block and suggest dealing with those in order to achieve forgiveness and 
reconciliation. And in the process they propose discouraging revenge, which could collapse 
the entire process and re-ignite violence.  
 In his study of the intervention process in Northern Ireland, Neil Ferguson (2010) 
argues the conflict has left the society sharply polarised, as demonstrated by two detached 
cultural substructures through which different cultural and sporting organisations, 
newspapers, preferred histories, political parties and school systems are accessed (Mac 
Ginty, Muldoon & Ferguson 2007; Ferguson 2010). Ferguson (2010) further explains that in 
spite of its rebuttal, by some, and other hurdles intervention in the form of introducing 
integrated schools has hugely reduced segregation with integrated schools becoming over 
sub-scribed in 2007. Even in situations where Protestants and Catholics continued to run 
non-integrated schools, Ferguson (2010) maintains that rules were introduced to ensure 
cross-community contact, promote greater tolerance and boost equal opportunities 
(Gallagher 2004; Ferguson 2010). Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU) and Cultural 
Heritage (CH) introduced in the Education Reform Order (1989) stipulated compulsory 
cross-curricular themes in the two sides’ school systems. The stimulus of this intervention, 
as Ferguson (2010) notes, comes from contact hypothesis (Allport 1954), which seeks to 
convene conflicting individuals/groups into contact with the aim of shedding off ignorance 
and prejudices through new impressions empowered by knowledge (Allport 1954; Ferguson 
2010; Hean & Dickinson 2005: 481; Christian & Lapinsky 2003: 248). Following a study of the 
origin of intergroup prejudices and likely conflicts Allport (1954) propounded contact 
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hypothesis on four preconditions in order to ensure the reduction of in-group solidarity with 
the intent of discouraging out-group hostility. These prerequisites, which have risen to more 
than four, suggest that contact must be prolonged, it must involve some co-operative 
activity, must have official support for the integration, the parties should be equal in 
number and status, there must be one-to-one contact, the contact must be voluntary, it 
must involve an opportunity for friendship, must provide information to dispel ignorance, 
should highlight similarities and differences and take place in a pleasant surrounding (Cairns 
1996; Pettigrew 1998; Ferguson 2010; Hewstone & Brown 1986; Hean & Dickinson 2005). 
Since it was advanced by Allport (1954) contact hypothesis has been found to have 
its limitations and this explains why the preconditions outlined above were suggested. And 
given that one of the aims of intergroup contact is to ensure the emergence of a common 
(in-group) identity to tackle/end a conflict there is a need for longer contact and more 
intimacy. In the Nigerian situation the government introduced the mandatory NYSC in 
197363 to contribute towards healing the wounds of the country’s 30-month civil war and 
enhance cultural awareness and inter-relationships. But the aims have yet to be realised. 
The people have continued to be divided and the media are part of the division and have 
played a vital role in maintaining it. In a survey to assess the performance of NYSC, Obadare 
(2010: 45) sampled the opinions of 90 serving and former corps members. Analysing the 
data, Obadare (2010) argues that despite 50 per cent of the participants agreeing that NYSC 
has failed to achieve its general aims and objectives, in response to whether the scheme has 
contributed to national integration 56.7 per cent answered yes. But Obadare (2010) also 
                                                             
63 National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) is a mandatory (12 months) civic plus a brief military exercise aimed 
at preparing fresh Nigerian graduates for the challenges of Nation Building, like patriotism, community 
development and inter-cultural understanding and tolerance. A more detailed explanation is given in Chapter 
One. 
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notes that the serving corps members had a more positive opinion about the scheme, 
probably due to their enthusiasm and inexperience, than the alumni that took part in the 
study. Explaining some of the possible reasons for the participants’ belief that the 
programme has not been able to promote national integration or foster cross-cultural 
exchanges, Obadare (2010: 48) states: 
In many cases, new friendships, groups and companionships were still formed 
along ethno-religious divides during and after the orientation camps. Most 
corps members who were posted to areas outside their regions of origin and 
who had different religious faiths were often not accepted in their places of 
primary assignment. Besides, the recurrent problems of religious clashes 
(intolerance), negative ethnicity and inter-ethnic killings, and the leadership 
crisis in Nigeria over the past thirty years lent further credence to the 
complaints voiced by respondents. 
In the aftermath of the violence that saluted the outcome of the April 2011 
presidential election in Nigeria there were a few suggestions for the abolition of NYSC or its 
restructure due to the murder of 10 serving members in some Northern states. Asaju, while 
contributing to the debate in a newspaper column (Sunday Trust July 3, 2011) argues: 
It would therefore seem logical that what is needed is mobilization of 
communities to accept these youngsters as part of the community. This can be 
done using the stick and carrot game; an amendment to the NYSC Act 
stipulating strong penalties for communities that harm them. 
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Among the penalties suggested by the writer are the imposition of heavy fines or the 
closure of government presence in any community whose hostility leads to the death of a 
corps member, so as to serve as a strong disincentive to potentially hostile communities 
that might want to attack what Asaju (2010) describes as “the base of a country’s unity and 
the NYSC is an enviable cornerstone of national integration.”64 
While the writer earlier emphasised the issue of integration which, as they suggested 
might be achieved if the host communities were mobilised, maybe through sensitisation, to 
accept and integrate corps members, the use of punitive measures might need to be 
seriously considered and implemented. This is because integration is reciprocal, requiring 
both the host and the guest agreeing to it, which could be achieved through a sustained 
campaign stressing its mutual benefits. In the case of Northern Ireland, the Education 
Reform Order (1989) was successfully used to ensure compulsory cross-cultural themes in 
the school systems of the two sides in conflict. It was a stimulus of intervention that was 
based on the application of contact hypothesis. A reformation of the NYSC Act as suggested 
by Asaju (2011) could be very necessary here too; making contact hypothesis its motivation 
could also make it a success. It is, perhaps, based on this that a respondent in one of the 
interviews suggests: 
Before NYSC, we should ensure that pupils have cultural exchanges that would 
enrich their world-view and help them treat others as they would want to be 
treated.” (R16 September 2010) 
                                                             
64
 Tunde Asaju‟s article entitled „NYSC- to be or not to be‟ was accessed via the following link 
http://sunday.dailytrust.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7129:nysc--to-be-or-not-to-
be&catid=42:wakaman&Itemid=113 accessed 19 July, 2011. 
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Cultural education, as the participant has advocated, should not be at the point of 
mandatory corps service or journalism training, it should be at a much earlier stage as the 
example in Northern Ireland has shown. In almost every of the data analysed in this study 
there has been a consensus among participants that Nigerians need to know more about 
each other’s way of life to be able to co-exist. In the case of journalists, being the watchdog 
of the society, there have been suggestions that they also need enough cultural knowledge 
to be able to educate others. According to a participant: 
In Nigeria for example, it will be quite important if a Mass Communication 
student from Kano is made to understand the cultural and religious 
ceremonies of the Yoruba and Igbo. In this way we will know and appreciate 
our similarities and differences, which will prevent stereotyping. In a word I 
will suggest better exposure for our trainee journalists to our different 
cultures. (R6 August 2010) 
Another respondent also dwells on a need for further education of journalists to enable 
them to properly enlighten others: 
NUJ needs to wake up and educate its members because they also need 
education before they can educate others. (FGA5 August 2010) 
Juxtaposing the various views from the data as shown in this section, one might 
conclude that cultural education, including contact hypothesis, is essentially needed in the 
Nigerian situation albeit with certain modifications to suit the realities on the ground. Some 
of these realities are the obvious dissimilarities in the people’s cultures and religious beliefs, 
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foreign cultural influences65 and most importantly socio-economic conditions. As the Noor, 
et al (2008) experience in Northern Ireland shows, there is a need to resolve certain 
underlying problems for forgiveness and reconciliation to be achieved, which would lead to 
the transformation of the conflict. Thus, one would suggest at this point that: cultural 
education begin at much earlier school levels to prepare young minds for cultural tolerance 
and peaceful coexistence; governments at various levels need to support and ensure its 
emphasis in the school curricula; in addition to mandatory corps service young people too 
should be encouraged to learn peace studies and cultural education as compulsory courses 
in tertiary institutions; communities should be sensitised about the benefits of NYSC and be 
encouraged to accept and integrate corps members; employers be encouraged to promote 
codes of conducts prohibiting stereotyping and encourage cultural tolerance; and a robust 
cultural and anti-corruption enlightenment campaign using the media, following their own 
education on inter-culture and improvement of their welfare status, be adopted and 
encouraged by governments in collaboration with media owners. 
7.7  CONCLUSION 
It is essential to conclude this chapter by drawing from the various theories analysed in 
Chapter Two explaining the tendency among humans to become aggressive and drift to 
violence or violent conflicts. For instance, the biological theory (including Freud’s (1920) 
explanation of the instincts of life and death being inherent and in constant conflict) has 
argued that aggression is genetic in mankind and often manifests as man interacts with 
other humans. There was also the social and economic explanation linked to Ardrey (1976) 
that argues that mankind is intolerant of the presence of strangers in their territory, while 
                                                             
65 The South is more inclined to Westernisation, while the North is more tilted to the East. Refer to Chapter One. 
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the psycho-political trauma school has suggested that previous traumatic experiences could 
transform people into violent types.  
 Other explanations were the frustration-aggression hypothesis (FAH) arguing that 
people could become frustrated if they fail to achieve certain goals they have set for 
themselves and tend to blame it on a weaker target, specifically invented to vent such 
frustrations. In the case of Rwanda, Zimbardo (2009: 15-16) quotes a Hutu genocide suspect 
explaining how they turned Tutsis to scapegoats in order to vent their frustration. There was 
also Zillman’s (1994) explanation that arousal by one issue could combine with arousal by 
another (different) issue to either increase or decrease the tendency of one to be violent. 
Yet the question of basic needs, including security and identity, was the most delicate of all 
factors considered likely to provoke violent conflicts. For instance, in all the conflicts studied 
in Chapter Two, as well as the Nigerian situation, there were suggestions that group identity 
and perceived inequality substantially played a role in causing the conflicts. People form in-
groups to defend or preserve their identity and become hostile to out-groups seen as 
distinctively different. And as Jeong (2008: 55) observes: “Stronger, exclusive identity 
increases the chances for an in-group to defame, and justify discrimination against an out-
group with the development of stereotypes.” In-groups are, thus, formed by setting 
boundaries on the basis on region, religion, tribe or even clan or certain features that might 
have been deliberately constructed to satiate the desires of manipulative leaders or 
politicians. SIT has explained that people fall back on interdependence when they become 
aware that their destiny depends on it. Such destiny might not be unconnected to one’s 
economic needs. For example one of the respondents in our studies has opined that: 
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At the bottom of it all I think it’s economic, it’s material. It is the struggle for 
what people think is scarce resource so now people fall back on the ethnic 
group or their religion to try and grab as much as they can for themselves. (R1 
August 2010) 
In the process of trying to grab as much as possible for oneself and one’s ethnic or in-group, 
competition for scarce resources becomes fierce and likely violent. Brief, et al (2005) have 
argued that competition over scarce resources is considered a zero-sum game in which an 
in-group’s gain means an out-group’s loss. Therefore, every means might be employed to 
ensure victory, like the use of stereotypes and enemy images or name-calling. There might 
also be a resort to violence, as some examples have illustrated. 
 Since the early 1980s Nigeria has continuously witnessed violent conflicts between 
people of different tribes and religions in the country; notably between Muslims and 
Christians. In almost all cases it was blamed on religion. But as the illustrative quote above 
from a respondent R1 shows religion is only used as a decoy. This is so because, as R1 and 
many other respondents have opined, religion is seen as easily amenable to manipulation. 
Another respondent R7 (August 2010) has also argued that: 
People hide under the cover of religion to attract sympathy and therefore use 
religion. But when you give it closer look you find out all the reasons that make 
it not religious are there. The only thing is that the people fighting against 
each other belong to two different religions. 
An important point to note in the argument above in relations to both SIT and RCT is 
that people intent on realising their desire, a desire to grab as much of the scarce resources 
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as possible, have realised the best way to do so is by forming groups through which such 
agenda might be realised. In the process religion, which sets a boundary for defining an in-
group against an out-group, is manipulated. This manipulation of religion, with real 
economic undercurrents, was what Usman (1987) has decried and described as the bane of 
Nigeria’s unity. Thus, every participant in the conflict appears bent on using religion but in 
the real sense the goal is mainly economic. Politicians manipulate the people for economic 
reasons; unemployed youths allow themselves to be manipulated because they have no real 
reason to live, life seems meaningless to them, and they are hopeless and frustrated; the 
media manipulate their audience either because they are owned by manipulative politicians 
or that they want to increase sales by being identified with certain ethno-religious beliefs. In 
the end the goal is simple: selfish economic interest.  
 In the entire argument, therefore, the most important motive in the conflict in 
Nigeria is not religious but economic; from the Maitatsine crisis to the current one in Jos and 
other parts of the Plateau. This explains why, just as Sherif, et al (1961) observed in their 
studies in 1949, 1953 and 1954, while participants reformed cohesive groups and resumed 
fiercer competition, including name-calling and raids, their leaders chose not to restore 
sanity because they were benefitting from the chaos. In Nigeria the same seems to be 
happening as political leaders appear more interested in perpetuating the cleavages in the 
system and would rather be seen as ethnic or tribal champions. While there is a need to 
introduce a superordinate goal (SG) as Sherif (1961) did to restore sanity, the case of 
Northern Ireland is worth emulating. Ferguson (2010) has explained how EMU was 
introduced to promote an integrated schools system and reduce dissimilarities and 
prejudices. In Nigeria, although the NYSC was introduced to foster unity its goals have yet to 
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be realised. This explains why there is a need to reform the programme so it can address 
crucial cross-cultural issues, and this might need to start at a much earlier stage as a 
respondent has posited: 
Before NYSC, we should ensure that pupils have cultural exchanges that would 
enrich their world-view and help them treat others as they would want to be 
treated. (R16 September 2010) 
As in the case of Northern Ireland, again, which pivoted its EMU on Allport’s (1954) contact 
hypothesis, Nigeria might need to adopt contact hypothesis and adapt it to its specific 
situation, using a reformed NYSC as SG.  
In the concluding chapter of this thesis, Chapter Eight, there will be an overall 
summarisation of all the previous chapters, as well as discussions of the limitations of this 
study, its findings, contribution to knowledge and recommendations/suggestion of areas 
that need further researching. 
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          CHAPTER EIGHT                                                               
                                                               Conclusion             
8  INTRODUCTION 
This study has been an attempt to explore, understand and discuss the way in which the 
media, particularly newspapers, report religious conflicts in Nigeria, and how this might 
have contributed in amplifying the crises. Beyond just looking at the various conflicts and 
their causes, there were also attempts to understand where, how and why other factors 
helped in maintaining the conflicts. Newspapers (journalists) were specifically identified for 
maintaining the conflicts because of their own links to the divisions in the country. For 
instance newspapers are owned by proprietors or group of proprietors that are more 
interested in promoting regional rather than national goals as well as their commercial 
interests. As such they are seen to be (or actually) based in a particular region, staffed by 
editors, columnists and reporters with regional view points, and promoting regional cultures 
and beliefs etc. In addition to the above, the workplace (including financial) condition of 
journalists in Nigeria was considered. It was found that journalists are underpaid or (in some 
cases) unpaid. This means they are impoverished and vulnerable, and might be very willing 
to do anything to earn themselves money, even at the expense of professional ethics. An 
attempt was further made to understand this within the clientelistic culture of Nigeria.  
The thesis is made of eight chapters and Chapter One provided a setting within 
which the entire study could be understood. Thus, there was an introduction explaining 
what the researcher planned to do like investigating the nature of the violence, 
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understanding the level and manner of involvement of the media and attempting to 
develop a strategy for understanding the problem and transforming it. It was based on this 
the aims/objectives of the study were outlined: to critically examine the emergence of 
newspapers in Nigeria and how it might be linked to their perception and choice of news 
values; to extensively investigate the influence of ownership and control among other 
issues, on newspapers and how it affects the reportage of religion/religious conflicts in 
Nigeria; to carefully determine how it might be possible for the media to manipulate their 
audiences/readers; to thoroughly examine the role of political and socio-economic factors in 
the crises; and to significantly expose the danger of manipulation and its relations to violent 
conflicts in the country. The significance of the study were stated as follows, to: profoundly 
understand the particular challenges of reporting religion/religious violence in complex 
societies like Nigeria; genuinely proffer solutions to the problems discovered; significantly 
contribute to discourses on ownership, control and use of the media in the study of 
journalism and society in colleges and universities; and to particularly device a framework 
for critically examining the issues highlighted and means by which ethnic, cultural and 
religious similarities might be emphasised while de-emphasising dissimilarities especially in 
societies with complexities like Nigeria, using the media as a conduit. Most importantly, the 
researcher summarized the research questions they were hoping to provide answers to, 
which included: To what extent do the media (newspapers) in Nigeria provide a platform for 
promoting religious disharmony? What are the factors that make it difficult for journalists in 
Nigeria not to be biased when reporting religion or religious conflict? How are enemy 
images and stereotypes created in news production and reporting? To what extent are the 
conflicts actually religious? Against the above background attempts were made to have an 
understanding of the environment in which the media operate in Nigeria. Thus, Nigeria’s 
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history was traced; there was also a look at the history of the print media in the country; an 
attempt was made to chronologically review religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria; efforts 
were made to understand the country’s political culture; and the framework for conducting 
this study, phenomenological research, as well Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) typology for 
studying media systems that was referred to in a contextualised format several times in the 
thesis, was outlined.  
Although some literature had been reviewed in the previous chapter, more was 
considered in Chapter Two. There were attempts to understand the manifestation of 
violence among humans and how this could be linked to the various conflicts that have been 
witnessed especially from the late 1980s and 1990s up until now. For example the conflicts 
in Rwanda, Darfur, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Ireland were studied briefly, bringing 
out the causes and involvement of the media either in stoking or mitigating the problem. 
There was also an attempt to study the reporting of religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria 
with a view to understanding the roles played by the media in either causing or amplifying 
the crises.  
Chapter Three dwelled on the research methodologies the researcher has used in 
trying to complete the study. Thus, efforts were made to first explain some philosophical 
terms like ontology and epistemology and their relationship to this study, particularly the 
choice of a theoretical approach. In the end a strand of interpretivism, phenomenology was 
identified as the approach most suitable for the study. Phenomenology and the rationale for 
its choice were thoroughly explained. There were also explanations about the research 
design and process, as well as data collection methods. Therefore, the researcher elucidated 
that they collected newspaper back copies (of two Nigerian newspapers) used for analysing 
the reporting of a religious crisis through critical discourse analysis (CDA). Also, it was 
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explained that primary data were collected by means of semi-structured and focus group 
interviewing in Nigeria. The method of analysis was also identified as interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA).  
Chapter Four contains the first of the three studies in this thesis. It opened with 
further description and discussion of critical discourse analysis (CDA). The research and 
analytic processes were also explained, describing how themes for analysis and headings for 
discussion in the chapter emerged. The themes included: aggravation/finger pointing; 
indifference/lack of concern; pessimism/exaggeration; satire/use of rhetoric/labels; and 
peacebuilding/conciliatory efforts. Employing CDA, reports by two Nigerian newspapers of 
the November 2008 violence in Jos, central Nigeria, were analysed. Thus, the THISDAY and 
Daily Trust reports between November 29, 2008 and December 26, 2008 were examined. 
This was followed by discussions, using Teun van Dijk’s (2001) model especially, to conclude  
the chapter by explaining the meaning and framing of headlines and texts of news 
stories/articles/opinions among others, under the following headings: regional cleavages; 
enemy framing; misinformation; and peacebuilding.  
Chapter Five is the second of the studies, the analysis of semi-structured interview 
data obtained from Nigeria. The research process narrated how data were collected 
following interviews with 16 participants who were mainly journalists, editors, newspaper 
proprietors, columnists and commentators. After transcription the analytic process 
described how, following several readings of transcripts, superordinate and sub-themes 
emerged which were used through IPA to analyse and interpret the data.  Participants were 
coded R1-16. Themes under which the analysis was presented were: public interest 
journalism; causes of the conflict; the North/South divide; the creation and maintenance of 
enemy images and stereotypes; ideal versus reality; and recommendations/peacebuilding. 
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The third of the studies is in Chapter Six. It was in this chapter that the two focus 
groups data were analysed and interpreted using the same methodology as applied in 
Chapter Five that is explanation of the research and analytic processes detailing how 
interviews were conducted, as well as transcription, readings and construction of 
superordinate and sub-themes. In the chapter, the two focus groups were simultaneously 
analysed although different codes were assigned each group to distinguish them. For 
instance the Jos focus group was code-named FGA while the Kano focus group was assigned 
the code FGB. During the analysis similar codes with numeric were combined to produce 
codes for each participant and this helped to differentiate a participant from other 
participants. The superordinate themes were: publisher interest; causes of the conflict; 
media fuelling the conflict; demonization; and recommendations. 
Discussions of the findings in both Chapters Five and Six were presented in Chapter 
Seven. The chapter is made up of eight sections, six of which were headlines for discussions 
that included regional cleavages, patron clientelism, enemy images, stereotyping, 
competition and negative interdependence, and cross-cultural education and exchanges. 
Each of the headlines emerged from the themes that were constructed during the data 
analysis and linked to a theory providing explanations for the issues identified under them. 
Thus, findings in the studies in Chapters Five and Six provided the appropriate illustrations 
for the discussions in this chapter. 
Finally, Chapter Eight provides a platform for explaining all that has been done in this 
and previous chapters, from one to eight. It is, therefore, a summary of the entire thesis and 
also an attempt to discuss the findings as well as factors or issues that contributed in one 
way or the other to limiting the capacity or ability of this researcher to complete the study. 
In addition to the issues the researcher explained in this chapter some areas that although 
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the researcher might or might not have intended covering were not touched or not properly 
investigated due to the limitations mentioned earlier. The researcher has therefore 
identified these areas and made suggestions for further research to fill up the lacuna this 
study could not cover.  
8.1 FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
When this study started it had been hoped that some contribution might be made to 
knowledge. Particularly, the researcher wanted to study, understand, and critically analyse 
the patterns in which newspaper reports are tailored to produce certain results that might 
cause or contribute to the causes of conflicts. It was hoped that there would be further 
understanding of the events behind the scene that often fuel these conflicts and consider 
options for resolving the problem. In view of all this, the researcher was hoping to device a 
framework for critically examining the issues highlighted and means by which ethnic, 
cultural and religious similarities might be emphasised while de-emphasising dissimilarities 
especially in societies with complexities like Nigeria, using the media as a conduit. Most 
importantly, it was expected that the ideas generated might be useful in the study of 
journalism and conflict resolution in colleges and universities etc. It was also thought that 
such ideas might be helpful to policymakers in formulating policies that would lead to 
resolving ethnic and/or religious conflicts.  
Against the above backdrop, a number of discoveries were made that are significant 
towards understanding the roles of the media and others factors (like economic and 
political) in inter-religious crises in Nigeria. First, whereas the impression often created is 
that the conflicts are religious it was discovered that religion is actually used as a tool of 
manipulation. The real factors are economic and to some extent political, which are 
interrelated in this respect. Both literature examination and data analyses have revealed the 
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role of economic factors in the conflict. For instance, it was noted that religious crises 
started erupting from the 1980s in Nigeria when the country’s economy faced recession. 
The situation worsened as things got worse. A number of the respondents also cited this as 
a major cause, arguing that idle youths are often used as foot soldiers.  
Second, religion and ethnicity/tribe are also used in the conflict because they are 
seen as a means of swelling the ranks of parties in the conflict. Religion, in particular, is 
more amenable to manipulation and often used by both parties to draw support across the 
country. The geo-political division of Nigeria into the North and South easily allows for the 
categorisation of regions into certain religious affiliations as opposed to others. The North, 
for example, is believed to be predominantly Muslim, while the South is considered 
populated by more Christians than Muslims. Thus, in the event of any conflict each party 
appeals to people from the region it is more likely to draw sympathy or support. This 
explanation is best understood if we refer back to the discussion in Chapter One in which 
Nigeria’s history was traced from pre-colonial era to present day; how people with little or 
no cultural similarities were brought together as a country; and the impacts these 
dissimilarities are continuing to have on the people and country.  
Third, the media (especially newspapers) are part of and linked to the divisions 
because they are also a colonial creation and have continued the same old rivalry, thereby 
stoking ethnic/religious hate and fuelling violence. It is essential to note that the study has 
also discovered that they are not the cause of the problem. But they are part of it because 
they are owned by proprietors that are linked in one way or the other to the cleavages; they 
are based in one region or the other and tend to promote regional interests; they are 
affiliated to one religious belief or the other and/or easily have access to and present the 
views of people from one religious group; they are mainly staffed by people from one 
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section of the society and because they are product of the same divisive society they tend to 
portray such view points. This might explain why demonization of one group by the other is 
common and both sides have been fingered for using the media to carry out such 
campaigns. 
Fourth, Nigeria’s political culture, it has been found, should also be blamed for the 
crises in the society. Falola (2009) has described the political culture as violence, while 
endemic corruption and ethnicity/tribalism are seen to be crucially part of the problem. 
They combine, based on the findings of this researcher, to present a mixed bag of Nigeria’s 
political culture and play a substantial role in defining relationships amongst people in the 
country. This makes more sense if the plight of some newspapers is considered i.e. in the 
hands of manipulative or dubious publishers in collusion with unscrupulous 
editors/managers who recruit reporters and compel them to conform by peddling falsehood 
or championing unethical journalistic practices.  For example, there were suggestions that 
some publishers employ quack reporters whom they fail to pay wages but allow them to be 
used in planting false stories, which are published without double checking. In some media 
organisations salaries are often unpaid or underpaid, leaving journalists with no choice but 
to succumb to pressure from the clientelistic system. 
Fifth, the influence of new media and technology in redefining journalism is an 
interesting discovery. This is so because non-journalists are taking over the role of 
professionals and they justify this act. Citizen journalism plays a major role in that it 
enunciates immersion in the story, which might explain why some reporters with 
mainstream media do not have any problem with being one-sided or nakedly biased. This 
might also explain why some media organisations are proudly flaunting their links to a side 
as opposed to the other and see no fault in that, in spite of professional ethics. The use of 
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mobile phones to circulate rumours is also another important discovery. The fact that 
majority of the population targeted are illiterate makes it even easier for them to be 
manipulated. It is easier for someone to claim reading or hearing something, and then 
circulate such story through text messages to hundreds of people. Such information/rumour 
might be further spread through word of mouth as was the case in Rwanda.  
Sixth, in spite of the seemingly daunting issues in the above discoveries it was also 
found that many of the respondents were optimistic that there might be some glimmer of 
hope for transforming the conflict. It was based on this that many suggested re-education or 
further education to understand their differences and foster unity through such 
understanding. A respondent actually noted that the more the dissimilarities were studied 
the more it might be realised that there were more similarities than differences. Cross-
cultural education and exchanges were thus proposed as a way of fostering understanding, 
facilitating long-term contacts and sharing values and beliefs.  
The significance of all this is that the study has explained or exposed that the media 
(newspapers) in Nigeria are situated within a specific context or environment which 
regulates or constraints their performance or objectivity.  This is important as the media are 
best understood in relations to the society in which they operate, as Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) argue, and in this case the Nigerian situation with its culture of corruption (and 
violence and tribalism) provides a prism for explaining the willingness of journalists to 
succumb to being used to maintain violent conflicts. In the study of journalism and society 
understanding this cause and effect relationship might be useful in understanding the 
delicate position of the media and how they could be cautiously and positively utilised to 
divert from being willing tools in the hands of manipulative patrons.  
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8.2  LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
A number of factors stood in the way of making this research a total success, some of which 
will be explained shortly. First, time was a major constrain as the entire thesis must be 
completed with a minimum time of three years and maximum time of four years. Aware of 
this handicap the researcher had to be cautious to set a realistic target. For instance an 
initial plan was made to collect data from the Nigerian cities of Jos, Lagos, Kaduna, Kano and 
Abuja. But the plan had to be modified to allow the researcher to realistically spend 
sufficient time in Jos, Abuja and Kano. And although the participants were carefully selected 
to present a national outlook the fact that no survey was specifically conducted in Lagos 
could limit the outcome of the findings. 
 Another limitation was money. The researcher’s initial plan was to visit Nigeria in the 
first quarter of 2010 to collect data. But this plan changed because funding was not 
available until July 2010 when the trip was undertaken. And because of this limitation only 
three cities could be visited to conduct the survey. Within Nigeria too, finances became a 
major issue as the researcher needed a research assistant to help with fixing interviews and 
providing other logistical assistance. Although in the end a volunteer agreed to take up the 
position their feeding and other costs of maintenance during the survey had to be borne by 
the researcher. This added to the strain faced by the researcher and increased the need to 
complete the survey as quickly as possible. 
 There was also a culture of not keeping to appointments and time schedule in 
Nigeria. As was explained in Chapter Three there was an occasion a very important 
interviewee kept the researcher waiting for eight hours and this affected other plans as a 
plan to head back to Jos that day was cancelled. It also affected the researcher’s finances as 
a hotel accommodation had to be sought within a short space of time. On another occasion 
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while trying to catch a flight to Lagos there were cancellations and further delays even after 
boarding flight. The researcher ended up being in Lagos late at night; the interviews had to 
be cancelled completely as the researcher headed back to the UK the next day. 
 Although the situation in Jos was worrying, given growing cases of isolated killings 
and the likelihood of sudden violent eruptions, the researcher was determined to carry on 
with the survey, albeit cautiously. The only limitation this caused was the failure to meet up 
with interview participants who were not comfortable with taking the risk of travelling from 
their safe communities (havens) to even neutral places. Thus, some key participants were 
not able to take part in the study. The researcher was also conscious of time factor and 
hoping not to end up with too much data, so some people that were vital to the research 
could not be included. For example only 16 individual interviews and two focus groups were 
done. Originally it had been hoped that at least 30 semi-structured and four focus group 
interviews would be conducted. Also, there was a plan to analyse four newspaper reports 
through content analysis. The plans were changed after taking into consideration time 
limitation and the need to avoid doing too much. 
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
Given the limitations discussed in Section 8.2 it is imperative that suggestions for further 
studies in some areas should follow. Some of the discoveries described in Section 8.1 could 
not be effectively addressed in this study. This was so because it would require completely 
fresh studies to adequately address those areas; this researcher will therefore suggest 
further research in the following areas:  
There is a major problem with having alternative media to address issues that have 
been neglected by the mainstream media as they struggle to project sectional or regional 
interests. It is important to carry out further studies to understand the actual need for 
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alternative media and the likely effect it will have on the manner in which information is 
disseminated. It is helpful to recall that in our analysis it was realised that the absence of 
alternative media to counter the propagandist influence of most news media resulted in the 
people resorting to the circulation of rumours through mobile phones which further 
inflamed the situation. This is so because non-journalists use such medium to peddle 
falsehood. Despite this discovery the researcher could not do much to investigate it further 
and, therefore, suggests it should be taken further by another researcher. 
 Another area needing further research is the extent to which the financial and 
workplace conditions of journalists affect their commitment to objective journalism. A 
participant in one of the studies had argued that “all the time journalists are in a matchbox 
except that it is a very big matchbox.” Put in another way, journalists may have a choice but 
this also restricted. They could just continue to work for manipulative media and toe the 
line, like others, or decide not to. In each case there are major repercussions: the one for 
the society as professional ethics are jettisoned and conflicts are further fuelled; and the 
other for the journalists as they may lose their source of livelihood and some clientelistic 
benefits that come with succumbing to manipulation. It is important that this situation is 
studied on its own in order to understand the extent to which such temptation is actually 
thrown at journalists resulting in a compromise. It is also essential to understand the real 
influence of the country’s clientelistic culture in all this and how it might be mitigated or 
checkmated. 
 The third area of interest that was discovered during this study is the role of citizen 
journalism in redefining public interest and how it may be achieved. This brand of 
journalism practice emphasises immersion in the story and this is where the issue of 
objectivity becomes a subject of controversy. While citizen journalists argue that you can 
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immerse yourself in the story and still be objective there are quite a few people who believe 
in traditional journalism practice that argues otherwise. It is an important issue that needs 
further researching to understand whether immersion might be possible even as objectivity 
is not neglected; or how it might not be possible to talk about immersion and objectivity in 
one breath.  
Finally, it might appear as if the real influence of the media and their ability to 
manipulate or contribute towards causing crises has been hyperbolized. It is therefore 
important to further address this by specifically studying the political economy of the media 
in Nigeria. This can only be done if one is able to find out their daily circulation (sales) units 
and how much accrues to each of them every financial year. At the moment there is no 
sufficient information about those and media owners are happy to disguise or hide such 
information, which makes it look really dodgy. A particular study to find out this might be 
able to address a number of other questions. 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter is the concluding part of this thesis. It has been able to explain how this study 
started and what the researcher was hoping to achieve in the end. It has also highlighted 
other chapters and their contents, especially what the researcher did in those chapters. In 
all eight chapters of the thesis, there was an explanation as to what was the expectation at 
the beginning and how or what was achieved. Other issues that have been addressed in this 
chapter are the limitations of the study, based on which the researcher explained that some 
factors stood in the way to limit its success. There was also a discussion of the contribution 
the study might make to knowledge, like the possibility of devising a framework through 
which ethnic, cultural and religious similarities might be emphasised while de-emphasising 
dissimilarities especially in societies with complexities like Nigeria, using the media as a 
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conduit, which could be used in the study of media and society as well as conflict resolution 
or peace studies. There were also a number of suggested areas for further research, 
including alternative media, the financial and workplace conditions of journalists, citizen 
journalism, and political economy of the mainstream media. 
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS USED IN THE THESIS  
AC Action Congress, currently leading opposition party with the strongest support in South-
West 
ADVAN Advertisers Association of Nigeria  
AFP Agence France Press  
ANPP All Nigerian People’s Party  
AP Associated Press 
ASUU Academic Staff Union of University 
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 
CA Content Analysis 
CAN Christian Association of Nigeria 
CDA Critical Discourse Analysis 
CDR Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (Hutu extremist group) 
CH Cultural Heritage 
CODESRIA Counsel for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa  
COS Chief of Army Staff 
CRK Christian Religious Knowledge 
DA Discourse Analysis 
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DW Deutsche Welle  
ECWA Evangelical Church of West Africa 
EMU Education for Mutual Understanding  
FAH Frustration Aggression Hypothesis 
FG Federal Government                                                        
FRCN Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria Kaduna 
GNPP Great Nigeria People’s Party 
HRW Human Rights Watch 
IBB Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida  
IGP Inspector General of Police 
INEC Independent National Electoral Commission 
IPA Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
IRA Irish Republican Army  
JEM Justice and Equality Movement  
JNA Yugoslav National Army  
June 12 Acronym for democracy in the annals of Nigeria’s history (June 12, 1993) 
MASOB Movement for the Actualisation of the State of Biafra, a pan-Ibo group 
MSS Muslim Students Society of Nigeria 
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NACOMYO National Council of Muslim Youth Organisation 
NASFAT Nasril Fati, a Muslim organisation 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces involved in peacekeeping operations  
NECO National Examination Council 
NIPR Nigeria Institute of Public Relations 
NLSS National Living Standard Survey 
NNN New Nigerian Newspapers 
NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
NPC National Population Commission 
NPN National Party of Nigeria 
NPP Nigerian People’s Party 
NRA Ugandan National Resistance Army 
NYSC National Youth Service Corps 
OPC Odu’a People’s Congress, a pan-Yoruba organisation 
OUP the Official Unionist Party 
PDP People’s Democratic Party, Nigeria’s biggest political party since 1999 
PLSG Plateau State Government 
PLASIEC Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission 
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RCT Realistic Conflict Theory 
RFI Radio France International 
RFP Rwandan Patriotic Front 
RTLMC Radio Television Libre des Collines, one of Hutus’ anti-Tutsi hate campaign media 
SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party 
SG Superordinate Goals 
SIT Social Identity Theory 
SLA Sudan Liberation Army  
SPLA Southern People Liberation Army  
UPN Unity Party of Nigeria 
UVF Ulster Volunteer Force  
VOA Voice of America 
WAEC West Africa Examination Council 
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APPENDECES  
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The first survey technique was Semi-Structured interviewing and the following questions 
were presented to participants: 
1. What is your experience with reporting religion/religious conflict in Nigerian 
newspapers? 
2. What is your assessment of the suggestion that most religious violence in Nigeria 
are, in fact, ethnic and or political problems dressed up in the garment of religion 
and amplified by the media? 
3. How aware are journalists who write about religion/religious crises of the effects of 
their reports/articles on the audience? 
4. How much control do newspapers have over what they publish, particularly those 
affecting or relating to religion? 
5. Tell me about the recruitment policy of your organisation. 
6. How much does a journalist’s remuneration/welfare package contribute in ensuring 
objectivity/professionalism? 
7. In what ways are journalists/reporters made aware of boundaries beyond which 
they must not step in the course of their work? 
8. What is your assessment of the assertion that negative reports about the “other” 
reinforce prejudice and encourage extremism? 
9. If you were to suggest a restructure of the current regime of journalism training in 
Nigeria what changes would you advocate for making journalists more aware of their 
watch dog role and promoting national unity? 
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The second survey technique was Focus Group interviewing and the following questions 
were presented to participants: 
1. What is your experience with the way Nigerian newspapers report religion/religious 
conflicts? 
2. In what ways do you think newspapers shape the values and impressions people 
have of the different religious faiths in Nigeria? 
3. When reading sensitive reports/articles how much effort do you make to read 
between the lines and search for hidden meanings, if any? 
4. In your opinion, how is the ‘other’ often represented in newspapers? 
5. What role would you suggest negative impressions play in amplifying religious crisis 
in Nigeria? 
6. What impact does alternative news have in changing previously held impression of 
the ‘other’? 
7. What effect will some basic knowledge of other cultural and religious beliefs have on 
the audience? 
8. If you were to suggest a change in the current journalism practice in Nigeria what 
changes would you suggest for making journalists more active in playing their watch 
dog role and promoting national unity? 
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ETHICAL ISSUES ON FIELD STUDY 
A number of ethical issues were considered prior to the field study, and even during the 
study in Nigeria some of the concerns became quite apparent. The issues are listed below: 
(a) Jos was particularly unstable and often unpredictable. There were genuine fears 
about the safety of the researcher, research assistant and participants in the study.  
(b) Although Lagos was considered for a focus group study, there were concerns about 
holding a focus group, difficulty with recruiting participants was particularly 
anticipated. 
(c) Kano or Kaduna was pencilled down as an alternative.  
(d) There was mutual suspicion among the people and people were generally cautious 
about what they discussed with others. 
(e) The researcher anticipated that people might not be willing to freely participate in 
the study, especially group discussion (focus group). 
(f) It was also feared that even if people agreed to take part they might hold back 
certain information. 
(g) Since the researcher was relying on others in the field to do the groundwork, like 
organising venues the researcher feared certain things might not go exactly 
according to plan. 
(h) Initially, there was a suggestion that written consent should be obtained from 
participants but the idea was dropped because the researcher feared there might be 
some participants who might not be able to read or write. 
(i) It was also suggested that for the literate ones written consent should be obtained 
while verbal consent should be taken from those who were not able to read or write. 
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(j) But the researcher feared obtaining consent from participants, especially in focus 
groups, in different ways might stir suspicion. 
(k) The researcher realised that he needed to establish a very good rapport with the 
researched to be able to understand their phenomenology fully. 
(l) The presence of a research assistant could pose a challenge especially where 
participants might think a third party was allowed access to the information they 
were revealing to the researcher in confidence. 
The researcher was able to deal with above issues as follows: 
The issue of safety was resolved by holding the focus groups, especially the one in Jos, in a 
neutral venue that all participants endorsed prior to the study. It was also agreed that 
whatever was discussed should not be mentioned outside of the venue. The researcher 
clearly told the participants that codes would be used to represent their statements and the 
audio would be destroyed after transcription. To boost their confidence in the process they 
were told they could ask the researcher to excuse the research assistant if at any point they 
felt uncomfortable or wanted to make a sensitive disclosure. 
 The researcher also wanted to ensure that no ethical procedure was breached so 
participants were asked at the beginning of each interview to say whether they consented 
to the study or not, and the verbal consent was recorded. Also, the participants were told 
the research assistant was under oath not to disclose any part of the information to anyone 
outside of the venue. 
The researcher made a plan to alternatively do a study in Kano or Kaduna if the one 
scheduled for Lagos failed to materialise. Against this backdrop another person was 
contacted in Kano to facilitate the process, like contacting potential participants and 
organising a possible venue. 
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To make sure all procedures that had been put in place were in order the researcher 
decided to begin with a pilot study, which revealed a number of weaknesses including the 
real difficulties of organising focus group interviews.  
The researcher was able to get closer to the researched and win their confidence which 
made them more relaxed and willing to reveal as much information as possible. Although no 
one was paid for their time during the focus group or individual interviews the researcher 
made available light refreshment during the process, particularly the three-hour focus 
group. Despite not expecting that someone would come to the venue to cause or provoke 
any form of violence or disorder the researcher had planned to inform the appropriate 
authorities where and if necessary. The ultimate aim was to ensure the research was done 
according to ethical procedures while making sure the participants, research assistant(s) and 
researcher were not exposed to avoidable risk. 
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